Obama’s Baby Steps
President Obama said after the Washington summit on nuclear security that “the world will be more secure.” That remains to be seen.
At this point, the measures announced in the pre-summit communiqué were only statements of intent. Concrete steps that were reported as summit accomplishments — such as the transfer of 90 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Ukraine to supposedly more secure Russia — were already fait accompli.
In addition, the summit was shortsighted: The subject was limited to the control and secure storage of about 2,000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium already held in a world with eight nuclear-armed states and 36 other nations that possess such materials for nuclear power production, but could theoretically also divert them to military purposes.
The nuclear industries and governments of France, the United States and Germany want to greatly increase this number of countries in the coming year by exporting nuclear power stations and nuclear technology to them. By 2030, the plan is to have 400 new nuclear power stations, with that number increasing by another 200 by the year 2050. That’s according to French President Nicolas Sarkozy as he said recently at a meeting of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). But no mention was made of these plans, which carry an enormous security risk, at the Washington summit.
It was also a mistake that Obama didn’t invite precisely those countries that have confirmed or suspected nuclear weapons intentions to the summit; namely, North Korea and Iran. Instead, Obama, Merkel and Sarkozy used the occasion to call for increased sanctions against Tehran, a policy that is a proven failure and as well as counterproductive.
After the (at least rhetorical) American nuclear weapons doctrine retreat and the signing of the START extension with Moscow, the summit represented Obama’s third step toward a nuclear weapons-free world. But these steps were by no means large enough and were far too contradictory to produce any positive reactions in the Iranian or North Korean capitals, or in the capitals of other problem nations. Therefore, it remains open whether Obama can achieve his most important interim goal, success at the NPT Review Conference coming up in New York in May.
At this point, the measures announced in the pre-summit communiqué were only statements of intent. Concrete steps that were reported as summit accomplishments — such as the transfer of 90 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Ukraine to supposedly more secure Russia — were already fait accompli.
In addition, the summit was shortsighted: The subject was limited to the control and secure storage of about 2,000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium already held in a world with eight nuclear-armed states and 36 other nations that possess such materials for nuclear power production, but could theoretically also divert them to military purposes.
The nuclear industries and governments of France, the United States and Germany want to greatly increase this number of countries in the coming year by exporting nuclear power stations and nuclear technology to them. By 2030, the plan is to have 400 new nuclear power stations, with that number increasing by another 200 by the year 2050. That’s according to French President Nicolas Sarkozy as he said recently at a meeting of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). But no mention was made of these plans, which carry an enormous security risk, at the Washington summit.
It was also a mistake that Obama didn’t invite precisely those countries that have confirmed or suspected nuclear weapons intentions to the summit; namely, North Korea and Iran. Instead, Obama, Merkel and Sarkozy used the occasion to call for increased sanctions against Tehran, a policy that is a proven failure and as well as counterproductive.
After the (at least rhetorical) American nuclear weapons doctrine retreat and the signing of the START extension with Moscow, the summit represented Obama’s third step toward a nuclear weapons-free world. But these steps were by no means large enough and were far too contradictory to produce any positive reactions in the Iranian or North Korean capitals, or in the capitals of other problem nations. Therefore, it remains open whether Obama can achieve his most important interim goal, success at the NPT Review Conference coming up in New York in May.