Think Differently About al-Qaida
Published in El Pais
(Spain) on 30 April 2012
by Fernando Reinares (link to original)
(Spain) on 30 April 2012
by Fernando Reinares (link to original)
Translated from
by Marissa Joakim.
Edited by Casey J. Skeens.
The organization is more widespread in the world, but it is impossible to clarify if its terrorist threat is less, equal or more.
A year after Osama bin Laden was shot down by U.S. Navy Special Forces in his hiding place of the Pakistani town of Abbottabad, where he had been hiding since approximately 2006, one can come to at least two conclusions about al-Qaida and the threat that this terrorist structure poses to Western societies. First: al-Qaida finds itself today more extended in the world than where it was 12 months or so ago, and is as much or more involved in activities of terrorism, especially in the south of Asia, Middle East, northern Africa and eastern Africa. Second: it is not possible to make clear with the sufficient degree of certainty if al-Qaida’s supposed terrorist threat has since been reduced, maintained or increased for the democracies of North America, Western Europe and Oceania.
When talking about al-Qaida, one normally thinks of an organization confined to the northeast of Pakistan, the epicenter of global terrorism. But what is located in that zone is the central nucleus of al-Qaida. That is, its general command, which accompanies the responsible and active sects in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a rule collaborating with the predominant jihadist organizations in this scene, which have strengthened and still provide protection to the leaders of al-Qaida. The latter are repeated targets of U.S. intelligence drone attacks, which after the death of Osama bin Laden have taken the lives of other prominent members of al-Qaida's core, such as the Libyan Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, the Pakistani Ilyas Kashmiri, the Egyptian Abu Miqdad al-Masri and the Saudi Abu Hafs al-Shari. But al-Qaida is also its regional branches, established between 2002 and 2007: al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula, al-Qaida in Mesopotamia and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. These branches of the same global terrorist structure differ in composition, articulation and relations with the general command. They adapt their dynamics to the changing authority and to the setting in which they operate, from Yemen or Iraq to Algeria or Mali. Al-Qaida has expanded to the east of Africa, where they have maintained a cell since the '90s. Al Shabab, the jihadist organization active in Somalia, which is also active in other countries such as Kenya and Uganda, decided not long ago to join al-Qaida. Their leader publicly swore, in February 2012, loyalty to the emir of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who also publicly accepted this solemn vow of subordination.
In spite of this expansion, the image of al-Qaida among Muslims has not improved after the death of Osama bin Laden and his exaltation as a martyr by the central nucleus and from the three territorial extensions that formed this global terrorist structure a year ago. They sustain stronger potential to mobilize in some Islamic countries, but in the majority, negative assessments of al-Qaida prevail, especially among Muslims that live in Western societies. However, this may be due to the fact that where al-Qaida develops their practices of violence, they kill mostly Yemenis, Iraqis, Algerians and other people who consider themselves Muslims but whom al-Qaida considers apostates and traitors, basically for not submitting to the Jihadist Salafism ideology.
Al-Qaida aspires to establish domains in which a rigorous interpretation of Islamic law is imposed. Its common global agenda — compatible with other regional or local groups looking to take advantage of opportunities arising from conflicts and changes in the Arab world — includes the purpose of attacking Western countries. Al-Qaida had not materialized the catastrophe foretold as vengeance for the death of bin Laden. But we should not forget that they were still obsessed with a new great act of terrorism in the U.S., nor that, a few months before the assault of his refuge in Abbottabad, al-Qaida’s plans to simultaneously attack three European cities were thwarted. It is impossible to claim that the threat is less now, not even when al-Zawahiri's days are numbered.
Fernando Reinares is a professor of Political Science at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and the principal investigator for the Global Terrorism program at the Real Instituto Elcano.
A year after Osama bin Laden was shot down by U.S. Navy Special Forces in his hiding place of the Pakistani town of Abbottabad, where he had been hiding since approximately 2006, one can come to at least two conclusions about al-Qaida and the threat that this terrorist structure poses to Western societies. First: al-Qaida finds itself today more extended in the world than where it was 12 months or so ago, and is as much or more involved in activities of terrorism, especially in the south of Asia, Middle East, northern Africa and eastern Africa. Second: it is not possible to make clear with the sufficient degree of certainty if al-Qaida’s supposed terrorist threat has since been reduced, maintained or increased for the democracies of North America, Western Europe and Oceania.
When talking about al-Qaida, one normally thinks of an organization confined to the northeast of Pakistan, the epicenter of global terrorism. But what is located in that zone is the central nucleus of al-Qaida. That is, its general command, which accompanies the responsible and active sects in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a rule collaborating with the predominant jihadist organizations in this scene, which have strengthened and still provide protection to the leaders of al-Qaida. The latter are repeated targets of U.S. intelligence drone attacks, which after the death of Osama bin Laden have taken the lives of other prominent members of al-Qaida's core, such as the Libyan Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, the Pakistani Ilyas Kashmiri, the Egyptian Abu Miqdad al-Masri and the Saudi Abu Hafs al-Shari. But al-Qaida is also its regional branches, established between 2002 and 2007: al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula, al-Qaida in Mesopotamia and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. These branches of the same global terrorist structure differ in composition, articulation and relations with the general command. They adapt their dynamics to the changing authority and to the setting in which they operate, from Yemen or Iraq to Algeria or Mali. Al-Qaida has expanded to the east of Africa, where they have maintained a cell since the '90s. Al Shabab, the jihadist organization active in Somalia, which is also active in other countries such as Kenya and Uganda, decided not long ago to join al-Qaida. Their leader publicly swore, in February 2012, loyalty to the emir of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who also publicly accepted this solemn vow of subordination.
In spite of this expansion, the image of al-Qaida among Muslims has not improved after the death of Osama bin Laden and his exaltation as a martyr by the central nucleus and from the three territorial extensions that formed this global terrorist structure a year ago. They sustain stronger potential to mobilize in some Islamic countries, but in the majority, negative assessments of al-Qaida prevail, especially among Muslims that live in Western societies. However, this may be due to the fact that where al-Qaida develops their practices of violence, they kill mostly Yemenis, Iraqis, Algerians and other people who consider themselves Muslims but whom al-Qaida considers apostates and traitors, basically for not submitting to the Jihadist Salafism ideology.
Al-Qaida aspires to establish domains in which a rigorous interpretation of Islamic law is imposed. Its common global agenda — compatible with other regional or local groups looking to take advantage of opportunities arising from conflicts and changes in the Arab world — includes the purpose of attacking Western countries. Al-Qaida had not materialized the catastrophe foretold as vengeance for the death of bin Laden. But we should not forget that they were still obsessed with a new great act of terrorism in the U.S., nor that, a few months before the assault of his refuge in Abbottabad, al-Qaida’s plans to simultaneously attack three European cities were thwarted. It is impossible to claim that the threat is less now, not even when al-Zawahiri's days are numbered.
Fernando Reinares is a professor of Political Science at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and the principal investigator for the Global Terrorism program at the Real Instituto Elcano.