A Little Bit of Hope
Published in El Pais
(Spain) on 15 September 2013
by Editorial (link to original)
(Spain) on 15 September 2013
by Editorial (link to original)
Translated from
by Francesca Bragoli.
Edited by Chris J. deGrazia.
The framework agreement reached yesterday between the U.S. and Russia regarding the destruction of chemical weapons in al-Assad’s regime is good news. In one week, the Syrian regime will have to provide a list of its chemical weapons, as well as their exact locations. And before the end of November, it will have to destroy the installations where these weapons are made. All of this will be under the strict supervision of the U.N. inspectors who will have unlimited access to all the installations where those weapons are produced or stored. If the threat of force was meant to dissuade the Syrian regime — and as an extension, others (I mean Iran) — from producing or implanting these or other forbidden weapons, this agreement will serve to achieve this objective without resorting to a costly military intervention.
However, one must not be fooled. That fact that al-Assad has stopped to admit his possession of chemical weapons and accept their destruction is not due to Putin’s political shrewdness or to John Kerry’s diplomatic clumsiness, but to the credibility of the threat of force formulated by Obama. Given the criminal character of al-Assad’s regime, the pressure continued to be necessary, and therefore it is clear in the agreement that when a possible breach satisfies Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is permitted to authorize force against one of its own members. Certainly, Russia could exercise its right to veto to block any eventual military action. But it is difficult to see how the Syrian regime, having accepted some compromises that mark tight deadlines and clear conditions, could get out of the immense pressure that would be concentrated on it if it were to use chemical weapons.
Behind the celebrations, it is necessary to highlight two important gaps. On the one hand, the agreement fails to establish the authority and responsibility of the chemical attack of Aug. 21, an attack irrefutably confirmed by the U.N. inspectors. The condition that in favor of diplomacy, justice for the victims has been sacrificed, is a painful price to pay: We hope that this condition will only be temporary and that in the future the people behind this attack will be brought to the International Criminal Court.
On the other hand, the agreement does not say anything about how it is going to end the civil war that has claimed more than 100,000 lives and yielded 5 million refugees and that could flow over to other regions. Of course, this was not the objective of the agreement. However, the mere possibility that al-Assad could hand over his chemical weapons and resume the killing of civilians should immediately be worked on by the entire international community in credible and long-lasting peace negotiations. The handing over of chemical weapons and the end of the civil war should not be treated as separate entities. Peace is indivisible.
However, one must not be fooled. That fact that al-Assad has stopped to admit his possession of chemical weapons and accept their destruction is not due to Putin’s political shrewdness or to John Kerry’s diplomatic clumsiness, but to the credibility of the threat of force formulated by Obama. Given the criminal character of al-Assad’s regime, the pressure continued to be necessary, and therefore it is clear in the agreement that when a possible breach satisfies Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is permitted to authorize force against one of its own members. Certainly, Russia could exercise its right to veto to block any eventual military action. But it is difficult to see how the Syrian regime, having accepted some compromises that mark tight deadlines and clear conditions, could get out of the immense pressure that would be concentrated on it if it were to use chemical weapons.
Behind the celebrations, it is necessary to highlight two important gaps. On the one hand, the agreement fails to establish the authority and responsibility of the chemical attack of Aug. 21, an attack irrefutably confirmed by the U.N. inspectors. The condition that in favor of diplomacy, justice for the victims has been sacrificed, is a painful price to pay: We hope that this condition will only be temporary and that in the future the people behind this attack will be brought to the International Criminal Court.
On the other hand, the agreement does not say anything about how it is going to end the civil war that has claimed more than 100,000 lives and yielded 5 million refugees and that could flow over to other regions. Of course, this was not the objective of the agreement. However, the mere possibility that al-Assad could hand over his chemical weapons and resume the killing of civilians should immediately be worked on by the entire international community in credible and long-lasting peace negotiations. The handing over of chemical weapons and the end of the civil war should not be treated as separate entities. Peace is indivisible.