CIA Demilitarization Has Stalled
Obama’s strategy of transferring control of drone strikes to the Pentagon is facing challenges from reticent interns, operational differences and a divided Congress.
In May 2013, in one of his most significant speeches on defense, U.S. President Barack Obama advocated an overhaul of the anti-terrorist strategy that had been in place since the 9/11 attacks. The outlines of the new plan centered on a directive that would, among other initiatives, gradually transfer control of the drone attack program from the CIA to the Pentagon, a sign of the general consensus within the administration on the need for greater transparency in relation to drone use and the need to demilitarize the intelligence agency.
Nine months later, however, most attacks are still controlled from the CIA’s drone operation center in Langley. Divisions in the Senate, reticence on the part of certain sections of the agency itself and, most of all, operational, legal and even cultural differences between the programs operated by the CIA and those run by the Pentagon are the main obstacles standing in the way of the smooth transition for which the Obama administration had hoped.
“There are practical questions about the jurisdiction of the armed forces and how intervention should be limited in different parts of the world. Then there are the problems associated with an intelligence agency that is able to carry out executions,” explains Paul Pillar in a telephone conversation.* Pillar was a CIA analyst for 29 years, until 2005, and is now a senior research fellow in national security at Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution. The CIA was the first to implement drone strikes against al-Qaida militants in Pakistan in 2001, while the Pentagon carried out its first attack in Yemen in December 2009, just three days after al-Qaida’s Arabian Peninsula branch was declared a terrorist organization. The CIA joined the attacks in Yemen in 2011, killing U.S. cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who had managed to elude the armed forces, in its first incursion.
Although the objectives are the same, the ways in which the two institutions determine, develop and carry out drone strikes are very different, as is the legal cover under which they operate. “In the military context there are much stricter legal and institutional requisites that must be met before an operation can be carried out,” explains Christopher Swift, adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, who lived in Yemen for several years.*
CIA drone strikes are considered “covert operations,” which are defined as “those activities whose execution must not be made known publicly, and which do not involve traditional military operations.” As such, the government has no legal obligation to report on these operations, unlike those directed by the Pentagon, which, as “armed forces operations,” are public and subject to international law, meaning that they can only be carried out with the knowledge and consent of the countries involved, and within areas recognized as war zones.
The secrecy surrounding the agency’s program means that certain countries, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, can allow the CIA to set up bases on their territory without having to explain the situation to their citizens, as theoretically these bases do not exist. The alternative would put them in the uncomfortable position of having to justify the presence of a foreign army. However, this secrecy means that it is up to foreign governments to record casualty figures for drone strikes, and it is impossible for Washington to contradict any claims because legally it cannot keep any records.
It is this lack of transparency surrounding CIA drone strikes — criticized by Democrats, libertarian Republicans and civil rights groups — that the Obama administration hopes to tackle as it progressively transfers control of the attacks to the Department of Defense. James Clapper, director of National Intelligence, admitted this a few days ago in Congress, the first time the existence of the CIA’s drone program had been officially acknowledged.
Swift believes that the legal framework will be “clearer” if operational control is handed over completely to the Pentagon. However, it is mainly because of the different philosophies behind the two institutions that he believes the transfer is necessary. “From an institutional point of view, and in terms of international law and war practices, it makes much more sense for the armed forces to pull the trigger,” he says.*
The professor admits, however, that in a “realistic world” the transfer is likely to be “complicated,” for both military and political reasons. He attributes the limited success of the administration’s plans to two factors. First, the CIA has always carried out some covert operations, so it cannot completely give up this aspect of its work. Second, opposition from Congress: “There are great divisions on this matter. There is no consensus on when, where or how to legislate.”*
In fact, in mid-January Congress added a secret amendment to its budget law that would veto any transfer of funds for handing over control of drone strikes from the CIA to the Pentagon. Many legislators see the level of precision and efficiency of the CIA drone strikes as far superior to those controlled by the Pentagon. Last year Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that the CIA had an impeccable history of exercising “patience and discretion” when carrying out drone strikes and that she would “really have to be convinced that the military would carry it out that well.” The CIA’s superior precision can be attributed to its greater experience, and to its ability to infiltrate terrorist groups through a network of informants to which the Pentagon does not have access.
However, other members of Congress, such as the veteran Republican John McCain, have defended the need for most of the strikes to be directed by the Department of Defense and supported the demilitarization of the agency. Pillar shares this opinion, and hopes that the original dichotomy between the two institutions can be restored. “It’s the army’s job to kill and the CIA’s job to collect and analyze information abroad,” he says.*
John Brennan was a staunch defender of this idea when he served as Obama’s counterterrorism adviser. During his inauguration as head of the CIA in February 2013, he called the drone program an “aberration.” However, since then there have been few steps toward reducing the militarization of the agency that began after 9/11, a sign of the internal and external complications standing in the way of the transfer of power.
Beyond the demilitarization of the CIA and the transparency of the drone programs, Obama’s change of strategy was also intended to set a precedent for the future, when other countries start to use drones for military purposes. The legislation, secrecy and institutional culture that surround the CIA’s activities are not helping to achieve this important objective.
The CIA’s Difficult Return to Its Roots after 9/11
The CIA began its process of militarization after 9/11, but the process was accelerated when Obama came to power in 2009 and expanded the policy of drone strikes. The best example of this paradigm shift were the appointments in 2011 of General David Petraeus as head of the CIA and Leon Panetta, the previous director of the agency, as defense secretary. The first four directors of the CIA, after it was founded as an intelligence and espionage agency in 1946, had military backgrounds, but since then almost all have been civilians, with a few exceptions, such as the period between 2006 and 2009.
According to experts, the militarization of the CIA was part of its natural evolution. Swift denies that the agency has become a paramilitary organization, arguing that it has simply moved away slightly from the intelligence side of its operations in adaptation to the post-9/11 “context.” “[Combat] operations have always been part of the CIA’s mission, and now they are an adaptation to circumstances,” he says, giving examples of operations during the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict. Pillar uses similar arguments and stresses that most of the CIA’s work is still primarily related to intelligence. He denies that the agency has moved too far from its original remit. As an example, he argues that the drone program is not a completely new development for the agency; in the past it had already carried out “significant covert operations using new technologies.” The difference, however, is in the massive implications of the drone program.*
The current director of the CIA has declared that the agency “should not be doing traditional military activities,” but there are various complications obstructing its return to its roots as an intelligence agency. One difficulty, for example, is what to do with the agents in charge of drone operations, most of whom were recruited after 9/11 and have no experience of espionage on the ground. Pillar predicts that within 10 or 20 years, the main function of the CIA will once again be espionage, but that there will still be small teams carrying out covert combat operations. He says that the nature of these — for example, whether drones are involved — will depend on the “political intentions, the strategic objectives and the necessities of the moment.”*
*Editor’s Note: These quotations, accurately translated, could not be verified.
In May 2013, in one of his most significant speeches on defense, U.S. President Barack Obama advocated an overhaul of the anti-terrorist strategy that had been in place since the 9/11 attacks. The outlines of the new plan centered on a directive that would, among other initiatives, gradually transfer control of the drone attack program from the CIA to the Pentagon, a sign of the general consensus within the administration on the need for greater transparency in relation to drone use and the need to demilitarize the intelligence agency.
Nine months later, however, most attacks are still controlled from the CIA’s drone operation center in Langley. Divisions in the Senate, reticence on the part of certain sections of the agency itself and, most of all, operational, legal and even cultural differences between the programs operated by the CIA and those run by the Pentagon are the main obstacles standing in the way of the smooth transition for which the Obama administration had hoped.
“There are practical questions about the jurisdiction of the armed forces and how intervention should be limited in different parts of the world. Then there are the problems associated with an intelligence agency that is able to carry out executions,” explains Paul Pillar in a telephone conversation.* Pillar was a CIA analyst for 29 years, until 2005, and is now a senior research fellow in national security at Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution. The CIA was the first to implement drone strikes against al-Qaida militants in Pakistan in 2001, while the Pentagon carried out its first attack in Yemen in December 2009, just three days after al-Qaida’s Arabian Peninsula branch was declared a terrorist organization. The CIA joined the attacks in Yemen in 2011, killing U.S. cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who had managed to elude the armed forces, in its first incursion.
Although the objectives are the same, the ways in which the two institutions determine, develop and carry out drone strikes are very different, as is the legal cover under which they operate. “In the military context there are much stricter legal and institutional requisites that must be met before an operation can be carried out,” explains Christopher Swift, adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, who lived in Yemen for several years.*
CIA drone strikes are considered “covert operations,” which are defined as “those activities whose execution must not be made known publicly, and which do not involve traditional military operations.” As such, the government has no legal obligation to report on these operations, unlike those directed by the Pentagon, which, as “armed forces operations,” are public and subject to international law, meaning that they can only be carried out with the knowledge and consent of the countries involved, and within areas recognized as war zones.
The secrecy surrounding the agency’s program means that certain countries, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, can allow the CIA to set up bases on their territory without having to explain the situation to their citizens, as theoretically these bases do not exist. The alternative would put them in the uncomfortable position of having to justify the presence of a foreign army. However, this secrecy means that it is up to foreign governments to record casualty figures for drone strikes, and it is impossible for Washington to contradict any claims because legally it cannot keep any records.
It is this lack of transparency surrounding CIA drone strikes — criticized by Democrats, libertarian Republicans and civil rights groups — that the Obama administration hopes to tackle as it progressively transfers control of the attacks to the Department of Defense. James Clapper, director of National Intelligence, admitted this a few days ago in Congress, the first time the existence of the CIA’s drone program had been officially acknowledged.
Swift believes that the legal framework will be “clearer” if operational control is handed over completely to the Pentagon. However, it is mainly because of the different philosophies behind the two institutions that he believes the transfer is necessary. “From an institutional point of view, and in terms of international law and war practices, it makes much more sense for the armed forces to pull the trigger,” he says.*
The professor admits, however, that in a “realistic world” the transfer is likely to be “complicated,” for both military and political reasons. He attributes the limited success of the administration’s plans to two factors. First, the CIA has always carried out some covert operations, so it cannot completely give up this aspect of its work. Second, opposition from Congress: “There are great divisions on this matter. There is no consensus on when, where or how to legislate.”*
In fact, in mid-January Congress added a secret amendment to its budget law that would veto any transfer of funds for handing over control of drone strikes from the CIA to the Pentagon. Many legislators see the level of precision and efficiency of the CIA drone strikes as far superior to those controlled by the Pentagon. Last year Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that the CIA had an impeccable history of exercising “patience and discretion” when carrying out drone strikes and that she would “really have to be convinced that the military would carry it out that well.” The CIA’s superior precision can be attributed to its greater experience, and to its ability to infiltrate terrorist groups through a network of informants to which the Pentagon does not have access.
However, other members of Congress, such as the veteran Republican John McCain, have defended the need for most of the strikes to be directed by the Department of Defense and supported the demilitarization of the agency. Pillar shares this opinion, and hopes that the original dichotomy between the two institutions can be restored. “It’s the army’s job to kill and the CIA’s job to collect and analyze information abroad,” he says.*
John Brennan was a staunch defender of this idea when he served as Obama’s counterterrorism adviser. During his inauguration as head of the CIA in February 2013, he called the drone program an “aberration.” However, since then there have been few steps toward reducing the militarization of the agency that began after 9/11, a sign of the internal and external complications standing in the way of the transfer of power.
Beyond the demilitarization of the CIA and the transparency of the drone programs, Obama’s change of strategy was also intended to set a precedent for the future, when other countries start to use drones for military purposes. The legislation, secrecy and institutional culture that surround the CIA’s activities are not helping to achieve this important objective.
The CIA’s Difficult Return to Its Roots after 9/11
The CIA began its process of militarization after 9/11, but the process was accelerated when Obama came to power in 2009 and expanded the policy of drone strikes. The best example of this paradigm shift were the appointments in 2011 of General David Petraeus as head of the CIA and Leon Panetta, the previous director of the agency, as defense secretary. The first four directors of the CIA, after it was founded as an intelligence and espionage agency in 1946, had military backgrounds, but since then almost all have been civilians, with a few exceptions, such as the period between 2006 and 2009.
According to experts, the militarization of the CIA was part of its natural evolution. Swift denies that the agency has become a paramilitary organization, arguing that it has simply moved away slightly from the intelligence side of its operations in adaptation to the post-9/11 “context.” “[Combat] operations have always been part of the CIA’s mission, and now they are an adaptation to circumstances,” he says, giving examples of operations during the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict. Pillar uses similar arguments and stresses that most of the CIA’s work is still primarily related to intelligence. He denies that the agency has moved too far from its original remit. As an example, he argues that the drone program is not a completely new development for the agency; in the past it had already carried out “significant covert operations using new technologies.” The difference, however, is in the massive implications of the drone program.*
The current director of the CIA has declared that the agency “should not be doing traditional military activities,” but there are various complications obstructing its return to its roots as an intelligence agency. One difficulty, for example, is what to do with the agents in charge of drone operations, most of whom were recruited after 9/11 and have no experience of espionage on the ground. Pillar predicts that within 10 or 20 years, the main function of the CIA will once again be espionage, but that there will still be small teams carrying out covert combat operations. He says that the nature of these — for example, whether drones are involved — will depend on the “political intentions, the strategic objectives and the necessities of the moment.”*
*Editor’s Note: These quotations, accurately translated, could not be verified.