Nuclear Iran
Published in El Pais
(Spain) on 15 May 2014
by Editorial (link to original)
(Spain) on 15 May 2014
by Editorial (link to original)
Translated from
by Stuart Taylor.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
Resumed negotiations in Vienna between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany have reached their climax. As was foreseen in last November's provisional agreement, during the next two months through to the very end of July, the diplomatic sprint is aiming to achieve a definitive compromise that dramatically reduces the advanced capability of the ayatollahs’ regime to produce atomic weapons. In return, we would see a gradual end to Western sanctions that have brought the Iranian economy to its knees.
The encouraging atmosphere does not mask the fact that the most politically and technically complicated phase of the struggle starts now, made possible by the election of a relatively moderate candidate, Hasan Rouhani, as Iran’s president. Years of Iranian lies and a decade of fruitless diplomacy have left a trace of alleged distrust among the speakers, difficult to overcome and liable to be exploited in this crucial phase by the hawks from both sides, basically the powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard and an ultra-conservative sector of the U.S. Congress—not forgetting Israel, which sees the possibility that Tehran may hold nuclear weapons as an existential threat. Barack Obama, for whom an agreement with Iran has become a defining component of his presidency, has resisted multilateral pressure to reinforce sanctions.
The benefits of an eventual compromise would be very significant, and not only for Iran. Tehran, which has vast reserves of gas and oil, urgently needs to free itself from the international noose and reconnect with the global economy in order to legitimize its ambitions of regional power. The goal of distancing itself from poverty and improving relations with the West was decisive in the popular 180-degree turn in favor of Rouhani almost a year ago. Since then, an almost unavoidable wavering optimism has infiltrated Iranian society.
Outside of its borders, a deciding factor could be an Iran that is less distant from the U.S. and positively involved in the critical situation in the Middle East — especially in Iraq and Syria, with whom Iran has varying degrees of relations. If, in the case of Iraq, the interest in guaranteeing the stability of its neighboring country becomes obvious, in Syria the ayatollahs control the levers that facilitate the survival of Bashar al-Assad. Sustaining the tyrant is an economic bloodbath for Tehran.
The encouraging atmosphere does not mask the fact that the most politically and technically complicated phase of the struggle starts now, made possible by the election of a relatively moderate candidate, Hasan Rouhani, as Iran’s president. Years of Iranian lies and a decade of fruitless diplomacy have left a trace of alleged distrust among the speakers, difficult to overcome and liable to be exploited in this crucial phase by the hawks from both sides, basically the powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard and an ultra-conservative sector of the U.S. Congress—not forgetting Israel, which sees the possibility that Tehran may hold nuclear weapons as an existential threat. Barack Obama, for whom an agreement with Iran has become a defining component of his presidency, has resisted multilateral pressure to reinforce sanctions.
The benefits of an eventual compromise would be very significant, and not only for Iran. Tehran, which has vast reserves of gas and oil, urgently needs to free itself from the international noose and reconnect with the global economy in order to legitimize its ambitions of regional power. The goal of distancing itself from poverty and improving relations with the West was decisive in the popular 180-degree turn in favor of Rouhani almost a year ago. Since then, an almost unavoidable wavering optimism has infiltrated Iranian society.
Outside of its borders, a deciding factor could be an Iran that is less distant from the U.S. and positively involved in the critical situation in the Middle East — especially in Iraq and Syria, with whom Iran has varying degrees of relations. If, in the case of Iraq, the interest in guaranteeing the stability of its neighboring country becomes obvious, in Syria the ayatollahs control the levers that facilitate the survival of Bashar al-Assad. Sustaining the tyrant is an economic bloodbath for Tehran.
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