US Retreat and Russian Interference in the Middle East

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 22 January 2020
by 丁隆 (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Liza Roberts. Edited by Patricia Simoni.
As we enter the new year, the situation in the Middle East has seen a resurgence. When the United States assassinated Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, it pushed the Middle East to the brink of war. Russia has launched a concentrated diplomatic effort, including President Vladimir Putin’s surprise visits to Syria and Turkey. Additionally, Russia’s facilitation of a meeting in Moscow between the conflicting Libyan parties played an important role in reaching a cease-fire agreement signed at the Berlin summit. In recent years, new developments have added another footnote to the trend of U.S. withdrawal and Russian interference in Middle Eastern affairs.

The United States and Russia Have Different Views about the Middle East

The so-called U.S. withdrawal and Russian interference is both a side-by-side comparison in the effectiveness of the two countries' presence in the Middle East in recent years, as well as a vertical comparison of the changing roles of these two countries in the region.

During the Cold War, the Middle East was an important arena in the struggle for U.S.-Soviet hegemony. At one point, the Soviet Union was allied with Egypt, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and others. However, Egypt realigned with the U.S., and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, severely damaging both the soft and hard power of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union, acting through the United Nations, gave the U.S. the green light to launch the Gulf War. This decision indicated that the Soviet Union had given up fighting with the U.S. over the Middle East, and the region has since entered a period of U.S. influence.

The basis of the changing roles of the U.S. and Russia in the Middle East lies in adjustments to the regional strategic approaches of the two countries. The U.S. has launched two Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan, sinking deeply into a quagmire and leading to a loss of national strength. After Barack Obama took office, the U.S. began an effort to retreat from the Middle East, and the Trump administration is continuing this policy. The goals of the modified U.S. Middle East policy are to reduce burdens, decrease investments, avoid large-scale and high-risk military operations, allow regional allies to share responsibility, and allow the U.S. itself to play the role of an offshore mediator. The Middle East serves as a touchstone for the world. Russia sees the region as a vital starting point for reviving the influence of powerful nations.

In other words, the underlying logic of the two countries’ Middle Eastern policy revisions is the countries’ differing views of the Middle East. The U.S. began to see the Middle East as a burden, while Russia began seeing it as an opportunity for emerging power.

The Beginning of, and Motives behind, Russian Interference

If one believes that the revisions in the two countries’ Middle Eastern policies resulted in the inevitability of U.S. withdrawal and Russian interference, then the Arab Spring provided an opportunity for Russia to return to the region.

From the beginning, the U.S. and Russia held vastly different views on the storm that engulfed the Arab world. The U.S. viewed it as a victory for democracy and freedom, while Russia saw it as the Middle East’s version of the Color Revolutions.* During the Libyan crisis, the Western nations in the U.N. proposed the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya on the grounds that it was needed to protect civilians. Russia abstained from voting, thereby allowing the resolution to pass. However, when the resolution was used by Western nations as an excuse to forcefully intervene in the Libyan crisis, Russia decided it was time to end the chaos in the Arab world.

Thus, when Syria fell into turmoil and Russia’s last ally in the Middle East was in imminent danger, Russia decisively intervened in the Syrian military conflict at the behest of the Syrian government.

Russia's military operations in Syria served at least four purposes: The first was to rescue the lawful Syrian government from peril, winning back Russia’s own stronghold on strategic importance in the Middle East, and establishing a foundation for Russia’s return to the region. Second, following the crisis in Crimea, Russia was sanctioned by the West. The victory in Syria brought Russia enough capital to contend with the West and to effectively alleviate the pressure of sanctions. Third, as a powerful party in deciding the situation in Syria, Russia successfully established Syria as a platform for integrating diplomacy with natural resources in the Middle East. Although the conflicting parties in Syria behave in a tit-for-tat manner, every action requires Russia’s cooperation. This has also promoted the standardization of diplomacy in the Middle East. Fourth, Russia played a vital role in defeating the Islamic State terrorist group, not only protecting itself from harm, but contributing to international safety. As for the Libya issue, Russia has also played an important role, heavily influencing peace talks.

Of course, Russia’s successful interference in the Middle East cannot be realized by wishful thinking alone. Ultimately, the motivation behind strengthened cooperation between Russia and the Middle East is their common interests.

Regarding security issues, the United States’ desire to withdraw from the Middle East has caused many Middle Eastern countries to view the U.S. as unreliable rather than as an ally. As a result, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries have begun seeking to diversify their allies in order to mitigate the risks involved in relying solely on the U.S. Russia’s reemergence in the Middle East has made it a newly viable partner in the promotion of national security for these countries.

In the energy sector, responding to the challenges posed by shale oil has allowed the major oil-producing nations of Russia and Saudi Arabia to find a common language. These two countries work together closely in crude oil production, limiting production and protecting prices, and resisting competition from U.S. shale oil. The leaders of Saudi Arabia and Russia met in 2017 and 2019. In 2019, a major U.S. oil company left Iraq, and Russian oil company Rosneft replaced it as Iraq’s most important oil partner. Russia and Turkey worked together to construct the TurkStream natural gas pipeline, not only strengthening Russia’s cooperation with Turkey on energy, but opening channels through which to transport resources to Europe.

Regarding nuclear energy, Russia works closely on the construction of nuclear power plants with Iran, Egypt, Algeria and other countries. As far as arms sales are concerned, Russia’s victory in Syria has helped open the market in the Middle East to Russian weapon sales. Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries have all signed large arms purchasing agreements with Russia.

Examining the Role of Outside Powers in the Middle East

Compared to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, this instance of Russia returning to the Middle East has several distinguishing features. The first is pragmatism and flexibility, as Russia focuses on practical results and not on setting unreachable goals. Russia possesses a clear understanding of the limits of its own strength; thus, its military and diplomatic operations in the Middle East require little investment, leave only a small footprint, and emphasize ingenuity. After the situation in Syria was stabilized, Russia immediately halted large-scale military operations and withdrew most of its troops. Regarding the issues in Libya, Russia’s military and economic investments are limited, yet it has secured its role as a key influencer.

The second distinctive feature is Russia’s avoidance of any collision with the American side of the conflict. Russia has maximized the benefits of U.S. withdrawal while using the strategic gap left behind to further influence Middle Eastern affairs. Russia has chosen to involve itself only in areas of conflict where the U.S. is unwilling to get involved and where it does not seek free economic movement. Russia has certainly not initiated competition with the U.S. over the Middle East, and has not substituted itself as a hegemonic power in the Middle East like the U.S. once tried to do.

Third, there have been no programs designed to influence popular ideology, political systems or economic patterns. This is fundamentally different from the logic, methods and goals of the U.S. and Soviet Union’s involvement in Middle East affairs. In contrast, Russia focuses on obtaining clear geopolitical and economic benefits for the Middle East, with an emphasis on local and short-term results.

Although U.S. withdrawal and Russian interference is a noticeable phenomenon, it cannot be strictly inferred from the situation. We still need to analyze the role of other external powers in the Middle East.

First, this sort of change is certainly not global. Russia gains power in the gaps and strategic cracks in the Middle East. The U.S. is still the foreign country with the most military power, the greatest number of allies, and the strongest influence in the region. Russia’s influence is still limited by local and individual problems. Second, whether discussing economic or military power, Russia remains inferior to the U.S. to varying degrees. This also impacts the sustainability of Russia’s return to the Middle East, as well as the magnitude of the long-term benefits that it can gain from the region. Finally, Russia doesn’t intend to become deeply involved in Middle East affairs, rather it only wishes to become an important participant, mediator and stakeholder in the region.

Russia’s arrival has changed the uniformity of the situation in the Middle East, and the Middle East now has the power to check and balance the U.S. At the same time, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia in the Middle East is different from how it was during the Cold War; it is no longer a zero-sum game. The two countries can deflect competition and can even cooperate. Simultaneously, with new partners, the countries in the Middle East have a new opportunity to resolve conflicts.

*Editor’s note: The Color Revolutions were peaceful protests in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during late 2003 through mid-2005, resulting in the end of corrupt, undemocratic regimes and the election of new presidents in those countries.


进入新年,中东局势波澜再起。美国击杀伊朗将军苏莱曼尼,一度将中东推向战争边缘。俄罗斯则展开密集外交,普京突访叙利亚和土耳其,促成利比亚冲突方在莫斯科会面,并对利比亚问题柏林峰会达成停火成果文件发挥重要作用。局势新发展为近年来中东事务中“美退俄进”的现实与趋势增添了一个注脚。

美俄“中东观”不同

所谓“美退俄进”,既是两国近年来在中东发挥作用的横向对比,又是两国在中东角色变迁的纵向比较。

冷战时期,中东是美苏争霸的重要场域。苏联曾在中东拥有埃及、叙利亚、阿尔及利亚、南也门等多个盟友。然而埃及倒向美国,苏联入侵阿富汗,使苏联在中东的软硬实力皆严重受损。伊拉克入侵科威特后,苏联在联合国为美国发动海湾战争开绿灯,标志着其放弃与美国在中东争夺,中东自此进入“美国时间”。

美俄在中东角色的变化根源在于两国中东战略的调整。美国发动两次海湾战争和阿富汗战争,深陷泥潭,导致国力损耗。奥巴马上台后,美国开始从中东淡出,特朗普政府延续这一政策。美国中东政策调整的目标是卸包袱、减投入,避免大规模高风险军事行动,让地区盟友分担责任,自己扮演“离岸平衡手”的角色。中东是世界性大国的“试金石”,俄罗斯将中东视为重振大国雄风的重要起点。

也就是说,两国中东政策调整的深层逻辑是两国“中东观”的不同,美国开始将中东视为包袱,而俄罗斯将其视为崛起的机遇。

“俄进”的入口和动因

如果说“美退俄进”的必然性源于两国中东政策调整,那么“阿拉伯之春”则为俄罗斯重返中东提供了入口。

对于这场席卷阿拉伯世界的风暴,美俄从一开始便看法迥异。美国视其为“民主自由的胜利”,俄罗斯则认为这是中东版的“颜色革命”。利比亚危机时,西方国家在联合国以“保护平民”为由,提议在利比亚设立禁飞区,俄罗斯投弃权票予以放行。但该决议被西方国家用来武力介入利比亚危机,俄罗斯认为是时候对阿拉伯乱局按下停止键了。

因此,当叙利亚陷入动荡,俄罗斯在中东最后一个盟友岌岌可危时,应叙利亚政府邀请,俄罗斯果断军事介入叙利亚冲突。

俄罗斯在叙利亚的军事行动至少达到了四个目的:

一是救叙利亚合法政府于危亡,为自身赢得在中东的重要战略支点,为重返中东奠定基础。二是俄罗斯因克里米亚危机受到西方制裁,叙利亚的胜利使其获得与西方周旋的资本,有效缓解了压力。三是作为能够决定叙利亚局势走向的一方,俄罗斯成功将叙利亚打造为整合中东外交资源的平台,尽管叙利亚问题有关各方之间针锋相对,但都需要俄罗斯的合作,这也推动了中东外交机制化。四是俄罗斯在击败恐怖组织“伊斯兰国”的行动上发挥关键作用,不仅自身免受恐怖主义之害,也为国际安全做出贡献。在利比亚问题上,俄罗斯也成为重要一方,对战事或和谈都带来重要影响。

当然,俄罗斯在中东的“进”,只靠一厢情愿不可能实现,归根结底还是中东国家与俄罗斯有共同利益和加强合作的动因。

在安全领域,美国欲从中东抽身,使不少中东国家感到美国靠不住了,不再是它们可以依赖的盟友。于是,沙特、埃及等阿拉伯国家开始寻求盟友多元化,以对冲单一依赖美国的风险。俄罗斯在中东的重新崛起,使其成为这些国家安全领域新的合作伙伴。

在能源领域,应对页岩油挑战让沙特和俄罗斯两个石油生产大国找到了共同语言。两国在原油生产上紧密合作,限产保价,抵御来自美国页岩油的竞争。2017年和2019年,沙特和俄罗斯两国元首实现互访。2019年美国主要石油公司撤离伊拉克,俄罗斯石油公司取而代之,成为伊拉克最重要的石油合作伙伴。俄罗斯与土耳其合作建设“土耳其溪”天然气管道,不仅强化了与土耳其的能源合作,还以此打开通往欧洲的能源运输通道。

在核能领域,俄罗斯与伊朗、埃及、阿尔及利亚等国在核电站建设上紧密合作。在军售方面,俄罗斯在叙利亚战场上的胜利,帮助俄罗斯武器打开中东市场。土耳其、埃及、沙特等国都与俄罗斯签下军购大单。

客观看待域外大国在中东的作用

与美国和苏联相比,俄罗斯此次重返中东有几个显著特点。一是务实灵活,注重实效,不设定过高目标。俄罗斯对自身实力的局限性有清楚认识,因此在中东的军事和外交行为投入小、足迹轻,注重巧妙落子。叙利亚局势稳定后,俄罗斯立即停止大规模军事行动,撤回大部分部队。在利比亚问题上,俄罗斯军事和经济投入很小,但取得了关键影响力。

二是避开美国锋芒,不与其迎头相撞。俄罗斯充分利用美国的战略收缩,瞅准美国留下的战略缝隙介入中东事务。俄罗斯选择美国不愿卷入的地区冲突、不愿谋取的经济利益施展手脚,并未在中东与美国展开全面竞争,也没有取代美国称霸中东的想法。

三是没有携带推广意识形态、政治制度和经济模式的议程。这与美国和苏联介入中东事务的逻辑、手段和目标有根本不同。相比而言,俄罗斯更注重在中东获得明确的地缘政治收益和经济收益,看重局部和短期收效。

虽然“美退俄进”是个引人注目的现象,但并不是一个严谨的推论。对于域外大国在中东的作用,仍需客观看待。

首先,这种变化并非全局性的,俄罗斯是在中东空白处、缝隙中崛起。在中东驻军最多、盟友最多、影响力最强的域外大国仍是美国,俄罗斯的影响还限于局部和个别议题。其次,无论经济实力还是军事力量,俄罗斯都与美国存在不同程度的差距。这也影响俄罗斯重返中东的可持续性以及从中获取长期收益的大小。最后,俄罗斯无意深度卷入中东事务,只想成为中东事务的重要参与者、调解人和利益方。

俄罗斯的到来,改变了中东“一言堂”的局面,中东有了制衡美国的力量。同时,美俄在中东的关系已与冷战时期不同,不再是零和游戏。它们可以错位竞争,甚至可以合作。同时,中东国家有了新伙伴,中东冲突解决也有了新机遇。
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