Support for Taiwan Reduced to an Anti-China Tool for the US

Published in China Times
(Taiwan) on 23 September 2022
by Lu Chih-hsiang (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Matthew McKay. Edited by Lisa Attanasio.
Following the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s approval of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, President Biden said on Sept. 18 that if China were to attack Taiwan, the United States would send troops to the island’s defense. The legislative and executive branches are working in concert, and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party has been imbued with a renewed sense of vigor; yet the Taiwan Policy Act is fraught with uncertainties and is unlikely to be fully passed into law during this session alone. For his part, Biden has spoken out four times in defense of Taiwan, and each of his statements has been retracted by the White House. These high-profile actions in support of Taiwan are like double-edged swords, ostensibly enhancing U.S.-Taiwan relations while at the same time getting under Beijing’s skin – but they are not necessarily in Taiwan’s best security interests. The oblivious DPP government, however, is willing to be a tool of the United States’ anti-China policy.

In a meeting with former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in New York on Sept. 20, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cited House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the Senate’s deliberation of the Taiwan Policy Act, and comments relating to the defense of Taiwan as serious challenges to the U.S.-China Joint Communiques and undermining the political foundation of U.S.-China relations. Wang’s targeted remarks were a clear demonstration of how the United States’ actions in support of Taiwan and against China could be the brewing of a storm which, if not clarified and de-escalated in time, would reignite the furor over Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

President Biden’s four statements on deploying troops to assist with Taiwan’s defense were all passive responses to questions from the media: They have been interpreted as a move toward greater clarity on U.S. strategic ambiguity, but no major change in U.S. policy would be announced so rashly during a press conference. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that Biden has “specifically and emphatically and unequivocally reinforced and reiterated the One-China policy.”

In remarks addressed to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 21, Biden himself made a fleeting reference to upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, reaffirming the One-China policy and seeking neither conflict nor cold war with China, thus sending the right message to both sides of the Taiwan Strait and to the international community. While Biden’s decision to send troops to Taiwan’s defense may come from the heart, the fact remains that the United States is keeping to its established One-China policy and strategic ambiguity, and that U.S. foreign policy is consistent and predictable, while the DPP administration has always been selectively biased and refuses to face reality.

In an assessment by CIA Deputy Director David Cohen, by 2027 the Chinese Communist Party will be militarily capable of seizing Taiwan by force. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy has pointed out in her Foreign Affairs article “Time Is Running Out to Defend Taiwan” that 2024 to 2027 will be a vulnerable period for Taiwan, and that the United States must not just help modernize Taiwan’s military and enhance its self-defense capabilities, but also strengthen its own ability to deter the Chinese Communist Party. These authoritative observations suggest that while American commitments are important, they are no longer the sole determinant of security in the Taiwan Strait. The key, rather, lies in whether the United States and Taiwan can effectively deter and defeat the CCP’s military operations.

U.S. military experts generally believe that Taiwan’s most pressing security problem is its long-standing neglect of the importance of national defense, resulting in it being inadequately prepared to respond to the military challenges and threats posed by the CCP. Even though the defense budget is now being increased and purchases of weapons and ammunition are being stepped up, there is still a long delivery backlog and the crowding-out effect of the war in Ukraine to contend with. Procurement of the M109A6 self-propelled artillery gun has been suspended, and the timely delivery of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, shoulder-launched FIM-92 Stingers and HIMARS rocket launchers is therefore critical; but the 2020 U.S. arms sale to Taiwan has been postponed to 2025, and the last batch will not be completed until 2028, going beyond the critical 2027 deadline.

The latest poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation reflected this same fact: Roughly 52% of respondents had no confidence in the DPP government’s ability to defend Taiwan, with 30% of them reporting an extreme lack of confidence. This lack of a strong foundation for national defense is Taiwanese security’s “elephant in the room.”

When the Taiwan Policy Act was under consideration with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it drew bipartisan opposition, with five senators arguing that the bill was a move toward strategic clarity and potentially changing the One-China policy, which in turn could bring regional instability and be detrimental to Taiwan. On the other hand, the heavyweight Sen. Mitt Romney frankly admitted that one of the reasons he voted for the bill was that it would be difficult to pass it into law, thus reflecting the complexities of Washington politics. While anti-China, pro-Taiwan consensus certainly exists, it has been added to the politicians’ toolbox of cheap talk, when what Taiwan really needs is concrete support and assistance.

The author is a veteran correspondent.


挺台淪美國反中工具

20:342022/09/23
言論 呂志翔

美國參議院外委會通過《台灣政策法》,拜登總統18日又表示,如中國攻擊台灣,美國將出兵協防。國會與行政部門相互呼應,民進黨政府宛如注入一劑強心針;但《台灣政策法》充滿變數,這個會期恐難以單獨完成立法,而拜登四度發言防衛台灣,四度遭到白宮「收回」。這些高調挺台動作如同兩面刃,表面上提升美台關係,也同時挑動北京最敏感神經,不必然符合台灣安全利益,但民進黨政府無感,甘為美國抗中政策工具。

中國大陸外交部長王毅20日在紐約會見美國前國務卿季辛吉時,列舉了眾議院議長裴洛西訪問台灣、參院審議《台灣政策法》及有關協防台灣的言論,嚴重挑戰美中三公報,嚴重破壞美中關係的政治基礎。王毅的針對性發言充分顯示,美方一系列挺台抗中行動可能變質為「茶壺裡的風暴」,如不能及時釐清、降溫,將重演裴洛西訪台風暴。

拜登總統四度出兵協防台灣的發言都是面對媒體詢問時的被動回應,被解讀為美國的戰略模糊更趨清晰,但美國任何重大政策轉變不會草率透過媒體答詢宣示。白宮國家安全顧問蘇利文就指出,拜登「特別清楚且毫不含糊地強調並重申了一中政策」。

而拜登更親自於21日在聯合國大會的演說中罕見提及維持台海和平穩定,重申「一個中國」政策,不尋求與中國對抗或冷戰,同時向兩岸及國際社會傳達正確的訊息。拜登的出兵協防台灣可能發自內心,但美國維持既定一中政策及戰略模糊則是事實,美國外交政策具有一致性與可預測性,而民進黨政府總是選擇性偏聽,拒絕面對現實。

中央情報局副局長柯恩評估,中共在2027年將具有武力攻擊台灣的能力;美國前國防部政策次長佛洛諾伊在《外交事務》季刊發表「防衛台灣時不我予」專文指出,2024到2027年是台灣的「脆弱時期」,美國必須協助台灣軍事現代化,提升自衛能力,美國本身也須強化威懾中共的能力。這些權威觀察代表了美國的承諾固然重要,但已非台海安全的唯一決定因素,關鍵在於美台是否能有效威懾及擊敗中共的軍事行動。

美國軍事專家普遍認為,台灣最迫切的安全問題是,長期忽視國防重要性,導致並未充分準備因應中共的軍事挑戰與威脅。即使現在增加國防預算,加強採購武器裝備與彈藥,卻遭遇長期積壓運交的瓶頸及烏克蘭戰爭的排擠效應。M109A6自走炮採購案叫停,魚叉反艦飛彈、刺針肩射飛彈、海馬斯火箭及相關機動發射器是否能如期運交至關重要,但2020年的軍售案推遲到2025年,最後一批要等到2028年才完成,超過了2027年的關鍵期限。

台灣民意基金會的最新民調也反映了同樣的事實,約5成2受訪民眾對民進黨政府保衛台灣的能力沒有信心,其中3成極端缺乏信心,缺乏實力基礎的國防才是台灣安全的最大隱憂。

《台灣政策法》在參院外委會審議時有5位跨黨派議員反對,他們認為法案走向戰略清晰,潛在改變了一中政策,可能帶來區域不穩定,並不利於台灣。而重量級參議員羅姆尼則坦承投票支持原因之一是這個法案難以成為法律,充分反映了華府政治的錯綜復雜,反中挺台固然是共識所在,也成為政客便宜行事的工具,而台灣真正需要的是實質支持與援助。

(作者為資深媒體人)
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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