Trump Sets up Power Directorate: Brussels No Longer Rules Europe
Published in Rzeczpospolita
(Poland) on 14 May 2025
by Jędrzej Bielecki (link to original)
(Poland) on 14 May 2025
by Jędrzej Bielecki (link to original)
Translated from
by Danuta Kowalska.
Edited by Michelle Bisson.
The five largest European Union countries together with the U.K. are now setting the direction of integration. Brussels takes a back seat.
Over the weekend, the leaders of Poland, France, Germany and the U.K. traveled to Kyiv to present an ultimatum to Moscow: Agree to a cease-fire or face severe new sanctions. The initiative made such an impression that Donald Trump called the European four, allowing Europeans to negotiate peace for the first time. In response, Vladimir Putin made his services available Saturday night and presented an alternative proposal for direct negotiations with the Ukrainians to prevent the resurgence of trans-Atlantic unity. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa could only dream of such effectiveness.
But this wasn’t a one-off move. On Monday, the foreign ministers of what’s now known as the “Big Five”— Poland, Germany, France, Italy and Spain — met with their U.K. counterpart in London. On Friday, defense ministers will meet in the same format. In between, the ministers of the six countries are staying in remote contact.
Defense Is an Area Where Brussels Has Little Sway
In this way, something in the shape of a directorate of free Europe has emerged. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski made the first move on Nov. 19 last year by inviting his counterparts from France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. to Royal Łazienki Park in Warsaw. The move caught Spain by surprise: Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, who was touring Latin America at the time, contacted those gathered at the last minute (the British [Foreign Secretary] David Lammy was contacted in the same way, but this was planned in advance). The Spanish rightly saw the risk that spending little on defense and being situated far from the greatest conflict of modern Europe, their state could easily be marginalized in the new power play.
It is no coincidence that the Łazienki meeting was called exactly two weeks after Trump's election victory. The new U.S. president immediately proved to be an existential challenge for the EU, which only grew stronger over time. Would America stop defending Europe? Would it desert Ukraine and make a deal with Putin? Would it declare a trade war, pushing the Old Continent into recession? All these questions had to be answered immediately because of the pace that Trump set. The sluggish Brussels institutions, having insufficient legitimacy, were incapable of doing that. All the more so since Hungary and Slovakia were obstructing their actions.
But it was not only the need for immediate action that led to the creation of the European directorate. An even more important factor was the nature of the challenges that Trump presented to Europeans. They concerned, in particular, defense against Russian imperialism and the reconstruction of the arms industry — areas in which Brussels essentially had no competence.
The Directorate of Europe Is a Good Way To Build Cooperation with the UK
The format initiated by Sikorski developed very quickly. After the French president (and three days later, the U.K. prime minister) had meetings at the White House, summits of the leaders of Europe’s largest countries were organized alternately in Paris and London. Thus the "coalition of the willing" was born, with the goal of sending a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine. This is the language Trump understood: Europeans bearing the lion's share of the costs and risks of intervention in the Ukrainian conflict.
But the U.K. also had a huge part in the construction of the directorate of Europe. Last summer, the Labor Party, led by Keir Starmer, defeated the Conservative Party in great style, as it was mired in broken Brexit promises. But Britain's return to the EU, or even to the customs union or the single market, remained out of the question. The British wanted to forget the divorce trauma. But without the U.K., a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it's impossible to build a European defense; the same goes for reliable support for Ukraine. Cooperation within the directorate of Europe proved to be an excellent solution here as well.
From the beginning, integration was based on the “community method,” focused on Brussels, and the “intergovernmental method,” promoted by the largest EU countries. The latter prevailed, especially when the German chancellor and the French president communicated well. Such an opportunity arose again with the rise to power of Friedrich Merz. Leaders of Spain and Poland, and even Italy, are on the same wavelength, since Giorgia Meloni turned out to be more moderate than feared. Everyone wants to support Ukraine and build a European defense.
Immediately after joining the EU, Poland relied on the “community method,” hoping that Brussels would defend it from the dominance of the largest member states. Now it has become its own “big” country with its own potential. However, it remains to convince our smaller neighbors that a united Europe is also in their interests. Even when there is no room for them at the negotiating table.
Over the weekend, the leaders of Poland, France, Germany and the U.K. traveled to Kyiv to present an ultimatum to Moscow: Agree to a cease-fire or face severe new sanctions. The initiative made such an impression that Donald Trump called the European four, allowing Europeans to negotiate peace for the first time. In response, Vladimir Putin made his services available Saturday night and presented an alternative proposal for direct negotiations with the Ukrainians to prevent the resurgence of trans-Atlantic unity. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa could only dream of such effectiveness.
But this wasn’t a one-off move. On Monday, the foreign ministers of what’s now known as the “Big Five”— Poland, Germany, France, Italy and Spain — met with their U.K. counterpart in London. On Friday, defense ministers will meet in the same format. In between, the ministers of the six countries are staying in remote contact.
Defense Is an Area Where Brussels Has Little Sway
In this way, something in the shape of a directorate of free Europe has emerged. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski made the first move on Nov. 19 last year by inviting his counterparts from France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. to Royal Łazienki Park in Warsaw. The move caught Spain by surprise: Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, who was touring Latin America at the time, contacted those gathered at the last minute (the British [Foreign Secretary] David Lammy was contacted in the same way, but this was planned in advance). The Spanish rightly saw the risk that spending little on defense and being situated far from the greatest conflict of modern Europe, their state could easily be marginalized in the new power play.
It is no coincidence that the Łazienki meeting was called exactly two weeks after Trump's election victory. The new U.S. president immediately proved to be an existential challenge for the EU, which only grew stronger over time. Would America stop defending Europe? Would it desert Ukraine and make a deal with Putin? Would it declare a trade war, pushing the Old Continent into recession? All these questions had to be answered immediately because of the pace that Trump set. The sluggish Brussels institutions, having insufficient legitimacy, were incapable of doing that. All the more so since Hungary and Slovakia were obstructing their actions.
But it was not only the need for immediate action that led to the creation of the European directorate. An even more important factor was the nature of the challenges that Trump presented to Europeans. They concerned, in particular, defense against Russian imperialism and the reconstruction of the arms industry — areas in which Brussels essentially had no competence.
The Directorate of Europe Is a Good Way To Build Cooperation with the UK
The format initiated by Sikorski developed very quickly. After the French president (and three days later, the U.K. prime minister) had meetings at the White House, summits of the leaders of Europe’s largest countries were organized alternately in Paris and London. Thus the "coalition of the willing" was born, with the goal of sending a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine. This is the language Trump understood: Europeans bearing the lion's share of the costs and risks of intervention in the Ukrainian conflict.
But the U.K. also had a huge part in the construction of the directorate of Europe. Last summer, the Labor Party, led by Keir Starmer, defeated the Conservative Party in great style, as it was mired in broken Brexit promises. But Britain's return to the EU, or even to the customs union or the single market, remained out of the question. The British wanted to forget the divorce trauma. But without the U.K., a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it's impossible to build a European defense; the same goes for reliable support for Ukraine. Cooperation within the directorate of Europe proved to be an excellent solution here as well.
From the beginning, integration was based on the “community method,” focused on Brussels, and the “intergovernmental method,” promoted by the largest EU countries. The latter prevailed, especially when the German chancellor and the French president communicated well. Such an opportunity arose again with the rise to power of Friedrich Merz. Leaders of Spain and Poland, and even Italy, are on the same wavelength, since Giorgia Meloni turned out to be more moderate than feared. Everyone wants to support Ukraine and build a European defense.
Immediately after joining the EU, Poland relied on the “community method,” hoping that Brussels would defend it from the dominance of the largest member states. Now it has become its own “big” country with its own potential. However, it remains to convince our smaller neighbors that a united Europe is also in their interests. Even when there is no room for them at the negotiating table.
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