The Beginning of a Post-Hegemonic Era: A New Normal for International Relations

Following the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the international order has moved into the early stages of a post-hegemonic era. This shows not only the changes in the distribution of international power, but also indicates the deep, fundamental shift in the international order. The U.S. is no longer taking the initiative to be responsible for systematic global governance. However, within the loosening system, deconstruction of values and changing methods of interaction, the U.S. still profoundly leads in defining and shaping this new era through the way in which it has retreated, the actions from its policies and its strategic attitudes.

The characteristics of the international order at the beginning of a post-hegemonic era are as follows:

First, unipolar dominance switches to multipolar co-construction: The unipolar system in which the U.S. has been the sole leader since the Cold War is no longer sustainable. Trump and his administration clearly deny that the U.S. should take the role as leader of the world order. In an interview soon after he took office, Secretary of State Marco Rubio clearly stated that the unipolar world was a historical exception, not a norm that should be continued. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” emphasizes America First and ferrets out the interests of allies who are weighing down the U.S. This changing role of the U.S. promotes a multipolar structure of power centers, such as the U.S., China and Russia. Although the tussle between the U.S. and China is ongoing and the leadership power has yet to be divided, the era of one leader is over.

Second, confrontation and opposition become opposition and the beginning of coexistence: Structural contradictions among countries’ institutional values, strategic interests and political cognition cannot easily be erased. However, unlike the approaches of resistance and rejection used in the past few years, figuring out how to coexist and build a “shock-absorbent peace” and preserving functional cooperation and risk management will be the primary logic used in interactions. A bit of this can be seen from America’s approach. On the one hand, Trump is hitting China with trade and technology wars. On the other, he has kept open the window for economic exchange and military communication. Rubio stressed that U.S. diplomacy can cooperate with those with whom it has “no shared value.” This oppositional yet not entirely confrontational mode of interaction makes up the most prominent diplomatic view in an era of early post-hegemony.

Third, the international system becomes diverse and complex: The liberal international order is no longer the only platform for cooperation. During Trump’s time in office, the U.S. has chosen to withdraw from, marginalize or ignore various international institutions, causing power to be redistributed among them. Subsequently, there will be at least three trends: First, large powers will lead together and amend existing institutions (such as the World Trade Organization and World Health Organization). Second, regionalism will strengthen (such as integration of the EU, East Asia and ASEAN countries). Third, multilateral groups will rise and link together institutionally (such as the G20 and BRICS nations). Although independent, these institutional platforms have overlapping functions, indicating a trend toward diversity in international institutions and modular governance.

In the face of the abovementioned changes to the structural order, the way countries interact is also adjusting. In addition to traditional alliances and institutional cooperation, increasingly more countries will interact and cooperate under the precondition of differing values and oppositional positions. This kind of “strategic limited cooperation” model stresses strategic dealings, with particular emphasis on functional cooperation and risk management. Its key characteristics can be represented as follows:

• Cooperation exists but is shallow and nonbinding. Although both sides oppose each other on high-level political issues, they may still maintain cooperation in the areas of economics and trade, energy and technology.

• The structure for interaction is built in a modular fashion. The topics on which countries cooperate are independent of each other. They are not deeply integrated on an institutional level, nor are they necessarily tied to high-level political interaction.

• The focus is on pragmatism, flexibility and risk. The point of international interaction is to solve problems, satisfy mutual needs and minimize risk. It is not to build common values or long-term trust.

The real world in the early stages of a post-hegemonic era is one in which interaction must continue but systems are not integrated, values are not cohesive and power is not concentrated. International policies no longer center around system integration and stable alliances. Instead, they must be focused on risk management, flexible issues and diverse platforms. Post-hegemony does not equal a loss of order; rather, it will be a new international order that moves from unipolar to multipolar. In this kind of world, the key to determining if a country can remain operational will be whether it can nimbly pivot its thoughts, cognition and operational methods.

The author is a professor in the Department of Political Economy at Sun Yat-sen University.