Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’: A High-Stakes Gamble in the Western Hemisphere
In a recent interview with CNN, Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff and homeland security advisor, was blunt: “We live in the real world that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.” This amounted to the starkest commentary yet on the “Donroe Doctrine,” Trump’s version of a new Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. military’s surprise strike on Venezuela did not just shake the Maduro regime; it sounded the alarm for the post-World War II international order.
While the “iron law” Miller referenced may have held true throughout the long course of human history, getting rid of the “law of the jungle,” according to which the strong prey upon the weak, is precisely why the post-World War II international system was established. Yet now, the Trump team seems intent on transforming from rule-keepers into rule-breakers, embracing the idea that “might makes right.” Trump’s designs on Greenland are not driven by economic considerations; after all, Denmark subsidizes the island to the tune of roughly $600 million annually. What Trump has his eye on is the absolute strategic value that is emerging as the polar ice cap melts: undersea situational awareness along the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. Gap, monitoring of Russian submarines entering the North Atlantic passage, and control over emerging Arctic trade routes. But as early as 1951, the United States and Denmark signed an agreement establishing the former’s legal obligation to defend against any attack on Greenland, and the two have since maintained strong ties. Trump’s insistence on acquiring Greenland through purchase or coercion is not just superfluous — it risks the disintegration of the NATO system.
For Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, the most far-reaching impact of the “Donroe Doctrine” lies in the dangerous signal it sends to Beijing and Moscow. If the United States can go about pursuing unilateralism with impunity in the Western Hemisphere, treating Latin America and the Arctic like its own backyard while disregarding the sovereignty of its allies, then China’s gray-zone operations in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, along with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, will gain a degree of legitimacy on the basis of “great power spheres of influence.” As Washington focuses its strategic attention on Venezuela and Greenland, its focus on China appears to be waning, and U.S.-China relations are sliding toward a G2 configuration of great powers divvying up their spheres of influence. And this is decidedly bad news for Taiwan, sitting on the geopolitical front lines.
With Trump’s attention turned to Greenland, any hope that he might change course or back down at a critical moment is unrealistic. Denmark cannot trade substantive concessions for procedural commitments, nor can it expect to reach a final agreement by sacrificing some interests. No unilateral concession, whether for mining rights or expanding military bases, will satiate Trump’s appetite; instead, it would be read as weakness and encourage him to make even more absurd demands. In response to the territorial crisis, the EU should therefore seek an agreement with Denmark and Greenland to symbolically deploy forces to assist in Greenland’s defense. This would not be for purposes of clashing with the U.S. military, but to establish that, if Trump remains intent on a takeover “by force,” he will have to face the enormous political cost of capturing allied forces. It is exceedingly unlikely that the U.S. Congress would approve a military gamble that could precipitate NATO’s collapse, isolate the United States, and allow China and Russia to reap the benefits.
In the final analysis, true strength does not stem from plundering allied territory. If the United States continues to indulge in the emphasis on power and military might articulated by Miller, and if it ignores the rule of law and the alliance system that have made the United States great, then that power and might will eventually slip through its fingers and fall into the hands of its competitors. Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” gamble in the Western Hemisphere is not just about ownership of Greenland; it is also about the unity of the democratic camp and the survival of the international order.
The author is a research associate at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei.
While the “iron law” Miller referenced may have held true throughout the long course of human history, getting rid of the “law of the jungle,” according to which the strong prey upon the weak, is precisely why the post-World War II international system was established. Yet now, the Trump team seems intent on transforming from rule-keepers into rule-breakers, embracing the idea that “might makes right.” Trump’s designs on Greenland are not driven by economic considerations; after all, Denmark subsidizes the island to the tune of roughly $600 million annually. What Trump has his eye on is the absolute strategic value that is emerging as the polar ice cap melts: undersea situational awareness along the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. Gap, monitoring of Russian submarines entering the North Atlantic passage, and control over emerging Arctic trade routes. But as early as 1951, the United States and Denmark signed an agreement establishing the former’s legal obligation to defend against any attack on Greenland, and the two have since maintained strong ties. Trump’s insistence on acquiring Greenland through purchase or coercion is not just superfluous — it risks the disintegration of the NATO system.
For Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, the most far-reaching impact of the “Donroe Doctrine” lies in the dangerous signal it sends to Beijing and Moscow. If the United States can go about pursuing unilateralism with impunity in the Western Hemisphere, treating Latin America and the Arctic like its own backyard while disregarding the sovereignty of its allies, then China’s gray-zone operations in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, along with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, will gain a degree of legitimacy on the basis of “great power spheres of influence.” As Washington focuses its strategic attention on Venezuela and Greenland, its focus on China appears to be waning, and U.S.-China relations are sliding toward a G2 configuration of great powers divvying up their spheres of influence. And this is decidedly bad news for Taiwan, sitting on the geopolitical front lines.
With Trump’s attention turned to Greenland, any hope that he might change course or back down at a critical moment is unrealistic. Denmark cannot trade substantive concessions for procedural commitments, nor can it expect to reach a final agreement by sacrificing some interests. No unilateral concession, whether for mining rights or expanding military bases, will satiate Trump’s appetite; instead, it would be read as weakness and encourage him to make even more absurd demands. In response to the territorial crisis, the EU should therefore seek an agreement with Denmark and Greenland to symbolically deploy forces to assist in Greenland’s defense. This would not be for purposes of clashing with the U.S. military, but to establish that, if Trump remains intent on a takeover “by force,” he will have to face the enormous political cost of capturing allied forces. It is exceedingly unlikely that the U.S. Congress would approve a military gamble that could precipitate NATO’s collapse, isolate the United States, and allow China and Russia to reap the benefits.
In the final analysis, true strength does not stem from plundering allied territory. If the United States continues to indulge in the emphasis on power and military might articulated by Miller, and if it ignores the rule of law and the alliance system that have made the United States great, then that power and might will eventually slip through its fingers and fall into the hands of its competitors. Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” gamble in the Western Hemisphere is not just about ownership of Greenland; it is also about the unity of the democratic camp and the survival of the international order.
The author is a research associate at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei.
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