Malaysia’s Goodfellas of Industry, America’s Corleones of Capital

Recently in Malaysia, internal power struggles at a publicly listed company holding government contracts worth billions of Malaysian ringgit have unexpectedly exposed the opaque and tangled web of ties between politics and business, making the term “corporate mafia” a focal point of public discourse. This is a phenomenon that has long existed locally, though it has rarely surfaced in the past. Within the gray area of political patronage, concentrated resources and lax regulations, in particular, certain enterprises or individuals with close ties to powerful elites have been able to flourish.

But if we take a step back and consider the global financial landscape, we find that the distortion of markets by power is not unique to Malaysia. On the other side of the world, a different type of political power has been emerging in the United States, reshaping the underlying logic of global capital markets in more brazen and destructive fashion. U.S. President Donald Trump is a prime example: Compared to our domestic corporate “goodfellas,” Trump could be regarded as the “Don Corleone” of the capital markets.

In Malaysia, the corporate mafia’s operating logic is relatively primitive and direct. At its core, it is a type of plundering of resources by power. Rather than relying on innovation or efficiency-based competition, it instead appropriates private wealth by colluding with influential officials and leveraging the power of the state. This is a classic form of crony capitalism, leading not only to the misallocation of national resources, but also to the throttling of private enterprise.

By contrast, the “Don Corleone” of the U.S. capital markets has elevated the exercise of power from the realm of “tangible resources” to that of “psychological expectations.” Trump’s political style exemplifies the art of “variable manipulation”: Although he is the scion of a real estate magnate, he is not a financier in the traditional sense, nor is he a Wall Street investment banker. Yet his words, actions and policy decisions can shake global equity, bond and currency markets in the blink of an eye. While this phenomenon of political figures heavily influencing market sentiment is not exactly new, it has seen a marked increase in frequency and intensity in the Trump era, almost becoming a predictable market rhythm.

It is against this backdrop that the term “TACO trade” has gradually gained popularity (“TACO” being the acronym for “Trump Always Chickens Out”). It was coined by Robert Armstrong, a columnist for the Financial Times, to describe a market phenomenon: Whenever the Trump administration rolls out radical trade or financial policies, or whenever Trump himself makes a statement on social media regarding war, tariffs, sanctions or industrial policy, it tends to result in severe market fluctuations. But subsequently, as backlash from the business community and the public intensifies, these policies may be suspended or adjusted, prompting a swift market rebound. For example, following Trump’s announcement of tariffs on China in 2018 and globally in 2025, as well as his recent comments about the U.S.–Iran war, American and global stock markets initially experienced significant volatility. A few weeks later, however, once signals of negotiations had emerged, the markets quickly recovered.

As a result, for some investors, policy shocks have become signals to buy at low prices rather than warnings to retreat. This is no longer investment theory; it is a form of arbitrage based on patterns of political behavior. Even more intriguingly, prior to Trump’s words and actions triggering severe market volatility, there are invariably signs that certain well-connected interests — some of whom are viewed as part of Trump’s inner circle — have already positioned themselves in advance. This does not necessarily imply illegal insider trading. But at a minimum, it reflects the reality that, in a market characterized by a significant degree of information asymmetry, proximity to the seat of power can itself become a competitive advantage.

Market structures and volatility such as this are deeply unsettling. In the long run, they will erode market fairness and regulatory credibility, making the financial system more vulnerable to political shocks.

Thus, the “goodfellas” and the “Corleones” of the capital markets are in fact different manifestations along the same power spectrum: The former represent the infiltration of industry by the powerful elite, disrupting the order of the private economy; the latter symbolize the domination of the market by politics. What they have in common are the unchecked exercise of power and the absence of checks and balances, but what sets them apart is the scope of their influence. The former are largely limited to the economy and the allocation of public resources domestically; the latter can drive global capital flows and shape the financial order on an international scale.

Ultimately, under the pall cast by industry “goodfellas” and capital market “Corleones,” the greatest variable in the market is no longer just interest rates or oil prices, but politics itself. Especially when political figures are both policymakers and the biggest variables in market sentiment, financial markets face not just economic cycles, but the long shadow of power.