Lessons Learned in Libya

Published in El País
(Spain) on 27 August 2013
by Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Michael Belzil. Edited by Philip Lawler.
All the usual signs point to an inevitable and imminent strike against Syria, with Washington heading a new "coalition of the willing" — not to be confused with multilateralism. Although every case is unique and there are many examples of the human capacity for making the same mistake again and again, it is worth taking into consideration our past experiences to figure out how we got here and what to expect next.

At this point, Obama is not considering a full intervention as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not even toppling the regime, as in Libya. Indeed, he has reached this point having learned his lesson in Libya where he was forced into yet another messy military conflict in the region by following the same playbook that he thought was going to get him out. What he learned from Libya was that it is better to be in the company of Islamic allies — Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar and Turkey — in order to avoid problems of conflict between West and East. He is also aware that, if he has political control, the existence of U.N. support is little more than an inconsequential formality; the lack of such support in Iraq did not stop Western adventurism, and in Libya they overstepped the bounds set by the two approved resolutions, arming the rebels, attacking targets outside of the mandate and deploying special forces units. Most of all, he understands that the problem is not removing a dictator, such as Saddam Hussein or Moammar Gadhafi, so much as it is finding a reliable alternative. Finally, he knows that arming the so-called rebels could in chaos and confusion, result as in Mali, Niger and also Tunisia, when the main objective is stability much more so than democracy.

Meanwhile, thinking that he would satisfy those who demanded greater military involvement from him, Obama made it clear that the use of chemical weapons was a line that could not be crossed without serious consequences. He thought that nobody in his right mind would dare to cross it, and he could count on his policy to help him avoid a large scale deployment of his troops. Then he could start negotiations between the most flexible rebels, without arming them too heavily, and the representatives of a regime that he still saw as a lesser evil — since, at the end of the day, the regime does not threaten any of Washington's vital interests and is preferable to the al-Nusra Front. But now that John Kerry has publicly accused the regime of using chemical weapons, Obama is obligated to do something to preserve his country's international credibility — even if it is only because others, like Pyongyang or Tehran, could also decide to cross their own supposed lines.

In light of this, we can expect Obama to make an effort to limit the scope of the strike to the chemical weapons and some key command and control facilities. Even though he knows that he will face criticism from many of those who, until now, insisted that he act, he would rather pay the cost of breaking international law than provide further arms to rebels that he does not trust — and rightly so. However, he does trust that the expected missiles as well as the airstrikes will be "clean," without American casualties and without "collateral damage" — which is just shy of asking for a miracle. He also seems to be hoping al-Assad and his allies get the message that there is no intention of ousting him, but rather taking him to Geneva II to negotiate a solution that won't leave Syria fragmented and in the hands of jihadis. Moreover, Obama hopes both that the Syrians won't retaliate against him if he carries out his attack and that there will not be any further chemical attacks before the arsenal is destroyed. One can always hope.


Con la parafernalia habitual todo apunta sin remedio a un inminente ataque selectivo contra Siria, con Washington liderando una nueva “coalición de voluntad” (que no debe confundirse con multilateralismo). Aunque cada caso es distinto y múltiples ejemplos muestran la capacidad humana para tropezar incesantemente en la misma piedra, interesa tomar en consideración la experiencia acumulada para determinar qué ha llevado hasta aquí y qué cabe esperar de inmediato.

Ahora no se contempla una intervención en fuerza (Afganistán e Irak) y ni siquiera el derribo total del régimen (Libia). En realidad, Obama ha llegado a este punto tras aprender de lo ocurrido precisamente en Libia y forzado por un guión que él mismo creyó que le libraba de volver a empantanarse militarmente en la región. De Libia ha sacado la conclusión de que es mejor hacerse acompañar por socios islámicos (Arabia Saudí, Jordania, Catar y Turquía) para evitar lecturas de confrontación civilizacional. También sabe que, si hay voluntad política, la existencia de un aval onusiano es apenas una formalidad sin consecuencias (en Irak su inexistencia no evitó el aventurerismo occidental y en Libia se forzaron más allá de lo admisible las dos resoluciones aprobadas, armando a los rebeldes, atacando objetivos fuera del mandato y desplegando unidades de operaciones especiales). Y, sobre todo, entiende que el problema no es tanto derribar a un dictador (sea Sadam Husein o Muamar el Gadafi) como encontrar una alternativa fiable. Por último, es consciente de que armar a los llamados rebeldes puede derivar (ahí están Malí y Níger, pero también Túnez) en un desbarajuste de muy difícil gestión cuando el objetivo principal es mucho más la estabilidad que la democracia.

Por otro lado, creyendo que así satisfacía a quienes le demandaban una mayor implicación militar, Obama hizo saber que el uso de armas químicas era una línea roja que tendría serias consecuencias. Colocando tan alto el listón pensaba que nadie en sus cabales osaría traspasarlo y así, parapetado tras ese argumento, podía evitar el despliegue masivo de sus tropas, mientras procuraba atraer a la mesa de negociaciones a los rebeldes más flexibles (sin armarlos en exceso) y a los representantes de un régimen que seguía viendo como un mal menor (a fin de cuentas, no cuestiona ningún interés vital de Washington y es preferible a los Al Nusra y compañia). Pero ahora, cuando ya John Kerry ha acusado públicamente al régimen del ataque químico, Obama está empujado a hacer algo para no perder la credibilidad securitaria de su país (aunque solo sea porque otros, como Pyongyang o Teherán, podrían animarse a traspasar también otras supuestas líneas rojas).

Visto así, es previsible que Obama se esfuerce por limitar el alcance del golpe contra los arsenales químicos y algunas instalaciones de mando y control. Aunque sabe que será criticado por muchos de los que hasta ahora le exigían hacer algo, prefiere asumir el coste de saltarse la legalidad internacional a armar mucho más a unos rebeldes de los que (con razón) desconfía. En lo que confía (y eso es poco menos que pedir la Luna) es en que tanto los previsibles misiles como los ataques aéreos sean “limpios”, sin bajas propias y sin “daños colaterales”. También debe soñar con que El Asad y sus aliados capten el mensaje —entendiendo que no hay pretensión de defenestrarlo, sino de llevarlo a Ginebra 2 para encontrar una solución negociada que no deje a Siria fragmentada y en manos yihadistas— y, ya puestos, que no ejecuten represalias contra quienes ahora van a atacarlo y que no recurra a nuevos ataques químicos antes de que su arsenal sea destruido. Por pedir, que no quede.
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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