Has Iran Turned Over a New Leaf?
The Sept. 27 telephone conversation between Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani is a historic event. It is the first official contact between a president of the United States and his Iranian counterpart since the 1979 revolution and a turning point that surpasses all expectations. The “historic handshake,” which was publicly expected from the Iranian president did not take place, although many hopes were pinned on this once-in-a-lifetime, simultaneous presence of both heads of state in New York. What passes for a regrettable missed opportunity in the eyes of both Iranian and western commentators instead reflects both the worry of both parties that an unforeseen factor could ruin what seems like a milestone in the process of establishing real negotiations. Obama’s official justification for canceling the meeting was that the situation is still complicated for the Iranians at this stage. It was a way of inviting Rouhani to confirm his position with the Supreme Leader, a decisive element of such a breakthrough. The conservatives are presumably still extremely reluctant to let their guard down.
Second, the Iranian negotiation measures are not completely finalized — probably because there are power struggles hidden behind the allocation of roles. Although the highly experienced minister of foreign affairs was clearly appointed as the operation's pilot alongside the president, we have noticed that there are still some teething problems, namely regarding the articulation of responsibilities between the minister and the Supreme National Security Council, whose secretary was traditionally the chief negotiator, like Saeed Jalili. Similarly, Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, the oil minister's last-minute decision not to join the Iranian delegation signals that managing these measures remains a delicate task.
It should also be considered that the White House wanted to ensure the P5+1 meeting with the Iranians would allow it to gauge whether Tehran really intends to reach a realistic compromise regarding its nuclear program before any “handshaking.” In fact, even P5+1 participants had understood that Mohammad Javad Zarif wanted to handle this issue with a new and calmer tone; they needed to verify that the Islamic republic was capable of providing essential answers to the attacks formulated against it. They were pleasantly surprised to see that their counterparts presented different and more realistic approaches than their predecessors, thus laying the groundwork for negotiations: Therein lies the reason for past breakdowns, and not just in the atmosphere of the exchanges, which were more relaxed incidentally. The impromptu, bilateral meeting between Zarif and John Kerry was not just a simple exchange of amicable pleasantries; both men understood that they had things to say to each other.
A Conclusive Test
The various “messages,” declarations, presentations and interviews Rouhani and Zarif delivered during this visit to New York were intended to give a new image of Iran — that of a country that has become “hospitable,” now even having a representative of the Jewish community in the Iranian delegation. But more importantly, Obama has sent some very precise signals to Tehran using a language, whose “code” is all too familiar to the lonely Iranians. Re-affirming the “respect” due to Iran and referring to Ali Khamenei’s fatwa that would ban the possession of a bomb — which would certify Tehran’s will to give it up — represents a real signal from Obama: Respect is a long-standing demand of the Iranians. As for the leader’s fatwa, regularly branded by Iran as a guarantee of the absence of a nuclear military program, it has barely convinced westerners. By referring to it, Obama is actually acknowledging that Khamenei did give Rouhani the authority to negotiate in the name of “heroic flexibility.”
Rouhani and Obama Are Pressed for Time
Furthermore, there has been a spectacular acceleration of very quick and simultaneous dialogue, where only a gradual progression was expected. At the same time, the bilateral contact with Washington also has accelerated, thus producing an appeasement with the P5+1 and even the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Rouhani catalyst is therefore spectacular but forces us to ask ourselves what the real reasons for the acceleration are. It is the product of an unprecedented unification. Contrary to what one might think, it is not the ghost of an Israeli intervention, despite Netanyahu’s obsession that a compromise between Tehran and Washington would destroy the Israeli alibi of the “existential threat.” In reality, Rouhani and Obama deem it urgent that an appeasement be reached. Although Tehran denied it for a long time, it can no longer hide that the country is in dire straits. Its cupboards are bare. The government is not even sure it can pay its general allowances. Obama knows he is reaching the end of his mandate and that Congress will block any step forward he tries to take. Both men are pressed for time.
France arrived late in the day to realize the need to find its place in this negotiations, as shown by the meeting between François Hollande and Rouhani. However, the key to a resolution is largely in the hands of Obama and Rouhani. That being said, it is of the utmost urgency that France adapts its diplomatic strategy in Tehran, where its embassy staff — much more than a trade mission — was removed. French companies are expected in Iran, whereas France’s Italian, German and British competitors lay siege to their economic and political leaders. But there is worse to come: A large American group has launched a vast press campaign in the Iranian media with the theme, “We are back!” and is preparing to take the place of the French with its industrial partners. As we can tell by the opening of an Iranian-American chamber of commerce, American companies had anticipated this appeasement. Washington’s strategy is clear: to flush out all competition in the Iranian market with the help of sanctions and political pressure, so that it can come back strong after this “cleanup.”
The U.S. is a disloyal competitor, to whom Hollande must react by asking Obama to commit to not sanctioning France. It must be done quickly, for tomorrow will be too late. Furthermore, re-establishing an economic and commercial pathway and supporting French businesses is an absolute priority in order to ensure a level playing field.
Second, the Iranian negotiation measures are not completely finalized — probably because there are power struggles hidden behind the allocation of roles. Although the highly experienced minister of foreign affairs was clearly appointed as the operation's pilot alongside the president, we have noticed that there are still some teething problems, namely regarding the articulation of responsibilities between the minister and the Supreme National Security Council, whose secretary was traditionally the chief negotiator, like Saeed Jalili. Similarly, Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, the oil minister's last-minute decision not to join the Iranian delegation signals that managing these measures remains a delicate task.
It should also be considered that the White House wanted to ensure the P5+1 meeting with the Iranians would allow it to gauge whether Tehran really intends to reach a realistic compromise regarding its nuclear program before any “handshaking.” In fact, even P5+1 participants had understood that Mohammad Javad Zarif wanted to handle this issue with a new and calmer tone; they needed to verify that the Islamic republic was capable of providing essential answers to the attacks formulated against it. They were pleasantly surprised to see that their counterparts presented different and more realistic approaches than their predecessors, thus laying the groundwork for negotiations: Therein lies the reason for past breakdowns, and not just in the atmosphere of the exchanges, which were more relaxed incidentally. The impromptu, bilateral meeting between Zarif and John Kerry was not just a simple exchange of amicable pleasantries; both men understood that they had things to say to each other.
A Conclusive Test
The various “messages,” declarations, presentations and interviews Rouhani and Zarif delivered during this visit to New York were intended to give a new image of Iran — that of a country that has become “hospitable,” now even having a representative of the Jewish community in the Iranian delegation. But more importantly, Obama has sent some very precise signals to Tehran using a language, whose “code” is all too familiar to the lonely Iranians. Re-affirming the “respect” due to Iran and referring to Ali Khamenei’s fatwa that would ban the possession of a bomb — which would certify Tehran’s will to give it up — represents a real signal from Obama: Respect is a long-standing demand of the Iranians. As for the leader’s fatwa, regularly branded by Iran as a guarantee of the absence of a nuclear military program, it has barely convinced westerners. By referring to it, Obama is actually acknowledging that Khamenei did give Rouhani the authority to negotiate in the name of “heroic flexibility.”
Rouhani and Obama Are Pressed for Time
Furthermore, there has been a spectacular acceleration of very quick and simultaneous dialogue, where only a gradual progression was expected. At the same time, the bilateral contact with Washington also has accelerated, thus producing an appeasement with the P5+1 and even the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Rouhani catalyst is therefore spectacular but forces us to ask ourselves what the real reasons for the acceleration are. It is the product of an unprecedented unification. Contrary to what one might think, it is not the ghost of an Israeli intervention, despite Netanyahu’s obsession that a compromise between Tehran and Washington would destroy the Israeli alibi of the “existential threat.” In reality, Rouhani and Obama deem it urgent that an appeasement be reached. Although Tehran denied it for a long time, it can no longer hide that the country is in dire straits. Its cupboards are bare. The government is not even sure it can pay its general allowances. Obama knows he is reaching the end of his mandate and that Congress will block any step forward he tries to take. Both men are pressed for time.
France arrived late in the day to realize the need to find its place in this negotiations, as shown by the meeting between François Hollande and Rouhani. However, the key to a resolution is largely in the hands of Obama and Rouhani. That being said, it is of the utmost urgency that France adapts its diplomatic strategy in Tehran, where its embassy staff — much more than a trade mission — was removed. French companies are expected in Iran, whereas France’s Italian, German and British competitors lay siege to their economic and political leaders. But there is worse to come: A large American group has launched a vast press campaign in the Iranian media with the theme, “We are back!” and is preparing to take the place of the French with its industrial partners. As we can tell by the opening of an Iranian-American chamber of commerce, American companies had anticipated this appeasement. Washington’s strategy is clear: to flush out all competition in the Iranian market with the help of sanctions and political pressure, so that it can come back strong after this “cleanup.”
The U.S. is a disloyal competitor, to whom Hollande must react by asking Obama to commit to not sanctioning France. It must be done quickly, for tomorrow will be too late. Furthermore, re-establishing an economic and commercial pathway and supporting French businesses is an absolute priority in order to ensure a level playing field.