The US and China Should Cooperate To Hasten the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
According to U.S. and South Korean intelligence, an impending fourth North Korean nuclear test is likely to be postponed. In the view of this author, China has been a steady anchor within this wave of opposition to Pyongyang's nuclear tests, and has acted as a responsible party. The U.S. should continue to cooperate closely with China to hasten the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula rather than pursue the return to Asia that is clearly directed against China.
The major stop on U.S. President Obama's most recent trip to Asia was Japan, where he supported the lifting of restrictions on Japan's collective security and heavily favored Japan on the question of the Diaoyu Islands. Done with a mind to contain China, this was short-sighted and detrimental to the establishment of a new model of great power relations between the U.S. and China. Meanwhile, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has taken a much more sensible approach. Before Obama touched down in South Korea, she called Xi Jinping to request that China act to curb preparations for North Korea's fourth nuclear test, gaining the immediate approval of the Chinese president.
According to a report by South Korea's Chosun Ilbo, after the news circulated that North Korea was getting ready to proceed with its fourth nuclear test, the Chinese foreign ministry summoned the North Korean ambassador to China, Ji Jae Ryong, to engage in stern discussions. The foreign ministry has neither confirmed nor denied the report. Prior to Obama's tour of Asia, U.S. intelligence analysts suggested that North Korea was in the midst of preparations for its fourth nuclear test to express its dissatisfaction with joint U.S. and South Korean military exercises. Additionally, South Korea's National Intelligence Service indicated that the previous three North Korean nuclear tests were all conducted approximately one month after their respective announcements. As North Korea's foreign ministry openly stated on March 30 that it would "not rule out a new form of nuclear test," it was estimated that the fourth nuclear test would be performed in late April or early May.
This author has always believed that North Korea is impetuous enough to perform a fourth nuclear test, and such a test coming in response to the various military exercises of the tightly-knit U.S., Japan and South Korea is simply business as usual. North Korea conducting nuclear tests every so often in this fashion is actually a form of staged strategic counterattack. In other words, the tests are a means to probe dangerous boundaries. More importantly, North Korea's previous three nuclear tests have mainly been tests of atomic weapons, i.e. the achievement of nuclear fission; since it has already declared that it possesses nuclear fusion technology, or the technology for a hydrogen bomb, a fourth test is now required to prove the point. Furthermore, shrinking the size of its nuclear weapons is a process that must be perfected through testing.
Aside from joint military exercises, there is little the U.S. and South Korea can do as they face down North Korea. Because the U.S. and South Korea leveled harsh sanctions against North Korea early on, aside from a meager amount of foodstuffs and humanitarian aid, the country has been sealed off from most goods. Even the food supplied has been in the form of biscuits rather than rice, for fear that Pyongyang would put all of the aid toward feeding its military. Therefore, even if they wish to do so, there is little left for the U.S. and South Korea to issue sanctions on.
North Korea's food and energy lifelines, such as corn, coal and oil, are all transported from China. Information from South Korea's Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) shows that China has not exported crude oil to North Korea in the first three months of this year. In 2013, Beijing only sent oil in the months of February, June and July. Under normal circumstances in the past, China would supply North Korea with 300,000 to 500,000 tons of oil per month.
South Korean statistics also show that the amount of food imported to North Korea from China during the first quarter of 2014 was only 48 percent of the 54,178 tons imported during the same period last year, shrinking by approximately half. Some analysts believe that the decreased quantity of food imports was the result of favorable harvest conditions last year for North Korean crops. However, [U.N.] World Food Program data shows that last year North Korean food production reached 5.03 million tons, an increase of only approximately 5 percent over the previous year, and that a reliance on domestic production alone would fall well short of fulfilling demand.
These circumstances once more prove that there is broad space for cooperation between the U.S. and China, a fact that U.S. strategists should wake up to.
The major stop on U.S. President Obama's most recent trip to Asia was Japan, where he supported the lifting of restrictions on Japan's collective security and heavily favored Japan on the question of the Diaoyu Islands. Done with a mind to contain China, this was short-sighted and detrimental to the establishment of a new model of great power relations between the U.S. and China. Meanwhile, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has taken a much more sensible approach. Before Obama touched down in South Korea, she called Xi Jinping to request that China act to curb preparations for North Korea's fourth nuclear test, gaining the immediate approval of the Chinese president.
According to a report by South Korea's Chosun Ilbo, after the news circulated that North Korea was getting ready to proceed with its fourth nuclear test, the Chinese foreign ministry summoned the North Korean ambassador to China, Ji Jae Ryong, to engage in stern discussions. The foreign ministry has neither confirmed nor denied the report. Prior to Obama's tour of Asia, U.S. intelligence analysts suggested that North Korea was in the midst of preparations for its fourth nuclear test to express its dissatisfaction with joint U.S. and South Korean military exercises. Additionally, South Korea's National Intelligence Service indicated that the previous three North Korean nuclear tests were all conducted approximately one month after their respective announcements. As North Korea's foreign ministry openly stated on March 30 that it would "not rule out a new form of nuclear test," it was estimated that the fourth nuclear test would be performed in late April or early May.
This author has always believed that North Korea is impetuous enough to perform a fourth nuclear test, and such a test coming in response to the various military exercises of the tightly-knit U.S., Japan and South Korea is simply business as usual. North Korea conducting nuclear tests every so often in this fashion is actually a form of staged strategic counterattack. In other words, the tests are a means to probe dangerous boundaries. More importantly, North Korea's previous three nuclear tests have mainly been tests of atomic weapons, i.e. the achievement of nuclear fission; since it has already declared that it possesses nuclear fusion technology, or the technology for a hydrogen bomb, a fourth test is now required to prove the point. Furthermore, shrinking the size of its nuclear weapons is a process that must be perfected through testing.
Aside from joint military exercises, there is little the U.S. and South Korea can do as they face down North Korea. Because the U.S. and South Korea leveled harsh sanctions against North Korea early on, aside from a meager amount of foodstuffs and humanitarian aid, the country has been sealed off from most goods. Even the food supplied has been in the form of biscuits rather than rice, for fear that Pyongyang would put all of the aid toward feeding its military. Therefore, even if they wish to do so, there is little left for the U.S. and South Korea to issue sanctions on.
North Korea's food and energy lifelines, such as corn, coal and oil, are all transported from China. Information from South Korea's Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) shows that China has not exported crude oil to North Korea in the first three months of this year. In 2013, Beijing only sent oil in the months of February, June and July. Under normal circumstances in the past, China would supply North Korea with 300,000 to 500,000 tons of oil per month.
South Korean statistics also show that the amount of food imported to North Korea from China during the first quarter of 2014 was only 48 percent of the 54,178 tons imported during the same period last year, shrinking by approximately half. Some analysts believe that the decreased quantity of food imports was the result of favorable harvest conditions last year for North Korean crops. However, [U.N.] World Food Program data shows that last year North Korean food production reached 5.03 million tons, an increase of only approximately 5 percent over the previous year, and that a reliance on domestic production alone would fall well short of fulfilling demand.
These circumstances once more prove that there is broad space for cooperation between the U.S. and China, a fact that U.S. strategists should wake up to.
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