Decisions About Afghanistan
President Obama has taken more than three months of intense advising to respond to the report by the top representative of the North American forces and NATO in Afghanistan (ISAF) about the delicate situation in the country. The debate over the means of employment, of very high military content, has centered on the exhaustive work of the president and his collaborators and has come to satisfy, in the long-term, the majority of the strategic requirements.
In said report, the operations commander in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal, created serious doubts and great awareness of the possibility of completing the mission in this strategic country when, less than six months ago, general institutional enthusiasm for the merit of the new Af-Pak strategy reigned, a sentiment that was also felt at the last NATO Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. What happened to cause this free fall in expectations and combat morale in Afghanistan?
In the first place, the sentiment communicated by McChrystal with regard to the situation was alarming, above all for a seasoned military man familiar with those indicators and the keys to a counter-insurgency strategy (COIN). The general described the moment as serious and as a loss of initiative against the Taliban, an aspect that, when translated into military terms, signifies a deficiency of necessary freedom of action, a basic principle for the success of any operation. It is like being dragged along by events in an impasse dominated by an insurgency that imposes the “timing” of the action.
McChrystal criticizes the ISAF, to which he dedicates, in an advisory tone, the greater part of his enormous report. It is about a problem of attitude and a matter of funding. He indicates that “it is poorly configured for COIN (counterinsurgency), inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare.” Stated in general terms, his report is tough on the current NATO force when he says that it does not adequately execute the fundamentals of a counter-insurgency war and should improve “the operational culture of ISAF to focus on protecting the Afghan people, understanding their environment and building relationships with them.” Finally, he described the organizational momentum of the ISAF, which he said should “transform itself to be operationally more efficient and effective, creating more coherent unity of command within ISAF, and fostering stronger unity of effort in the international community.”
Finally, McChrystal shows us, in his analysis, a strategy that was already presented last March by President Obama, which has also taken up time in military and civilian advising. This coincidence behind the scenes with the president was perhaps an incentive for him to issue the report. It is possible that his communication, via mandate to NATO and the Pentagon, has a character of implementation, but it does not discover anything new in relation to the strategy and it would be worthy of inclusion in any counter-insurgency manual.
In the days prior to familiarizing himself with the observations of the operations commander in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates referred to the increase of troops as a possibility but not a certainty. He said this bearing in mind that the effects of the last 21,000 troops sent in March have not yet been felt and that the civil funds promised for reconstruction and governability had not materialized, aspects that will surely have an effect in the next 12 to 18 months. He also championed a policy of quantifiable results, keeping in mind the number of Afghans considered to be protected by the coalition, and agreeing completely on this information with the commanding officer of ISAF.
Caution about McChrystal’s petitions appeared immediately, above all when the report was interpreted in political code by Gates, who referred to the necessity of avoiding, by means of an increase in troops, a situation in which Afghanistan appears more like a country occupied by the United States than a classic operation of stabilization. Maybe the response to these doubts lies in determining the minimum threshold of troops capable of avoiding said feeling but able to carry out the mission. This premise has served, probably, to bracket the solution that was found.
Vice President Biden, who supports an indirect, counter-terrorist solution applied to the Al-Qaeda refuges on the border with Pakistan and an increase in speed of the creation of an Afghan army and police force, distances himself from the counter-insurgent philosophy proposed by McChrystal, which was sent to the strategic commander of operations and head of central command, Gen. Petraeus, and was approved. It constitutes an alternative that disregards the Taliban as a threat and, as such, also its potential to regain power in Afghanistan. It overestimates the reality of the Afghan security forces, whose speed of training is naturally slow. Therefore, it appears to be an ill-advised solution.
McChrystal asks member countries of ISAF for “less protection and distance from the Afghans” in order to reach and protect them, to reverse the ascension that the Taliban is achieving. Those aspects go against the recommendations of the vice president and of democratic senators consulted by the president and, curiously, close to the Spanish theory and practice of stabilization. McChrystal’s ideas are clear and fit perfectly with a counter-insurgency strategy that is much more complete than the one previously recommended, which only sought to apply a strategy of simple counter-terrorist actions. It was less complicated and less costly in terms of resources, but of indeterminate effect in the long term.
The message sent to participating countries is clear and in the process of implementation.
- ISAF should radically transform itself into a more integrated organization with a greater operative rapport with Afghan security forces.
- ISAF should support the controlled governability of the country by working within many regions and districts.
- The operations of ISAF will be focused, first and foremost, on regaining the initiative and turning around the current situation.
- ISAF will use its troops in the most threatened zones.
It is obvious that doubts exist about the final attitude of the North American allies, who have yet to end their presence in Iraq. Even keeping in mind that the army and the marines have already spent years at the limit of their relief capacity, time will still be needed to send more troops to Afghanistan. Those in charge, however, know that there is no solution other than to increase troops if they want to ensure that Afghans will be protected once they are liberated from Taliban influence, although the increase should be shared among the allies.
This means a new effort for the United States, but the members of ISAF will have to rethink their actions, move in the direction indicated by Gen. McChrystal, prioritize their conduct with Afghans, improve their attitude toward the lengths that are taken to benefit the protection of the Afghan force and reverse the tendencies that currently characterize the insurgency initiative.
For Spain, it is a golden opportunity, given that many of the issues the operations commander in Afghanistan promotes coincide with the practices of our armed forces in operations in support of peace.
In said report, the operations commander in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal, created serious doubts and great awareness of the possibility of completing the mission in this strategic country when, less than six months ago, general institutional enthusiasm for the merit of the new Af-Pak strategy reigned, a sentiment that was also felt at the last NATO Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. What happened to cause this free fall in expectations and combat morale in Afghanistan?
In the first place, the sentiment communicated by McChrystal with regard to the situation was alarming, above all for a seasoned military man familiar with those indicators and the keys to a counter-insurgency strategy (COIN). The general described the moment as serious and as a loss of initiative against the Taliban, an aspect that, when translated into military terms, signifies a deficiency of necessary freedom of action, a basic principle for the success of any operation. It is like being dragged along by events in an impasse dominated by an insurgency that imposes the “timing” of the action.
McChrystal criticizes the ISAF, to which he dedicates, in an advisory tone, the greater part of his enormous report. It is about a problem of attitude and a matter of funding. He indicates that “it is poorly configured for COIN (counterinsurgency), inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare.” Stated in general terms, his report is tough on the current NATO force when he says that it does not adequately execute the fundamentals of a counter-insurgency war and should improve “the operational culture of ISAF to focus on protecting the Afghan people, understanding their environment and building relationships with them.” Finally, he described the organizational momentum of the ISAF, which he said should “transform itself to be operationally more efficient and effective, creating more coherent unity of command within ISAF, and fostering stronger unity of effort in the international community.”
Finally, McChrystal shows us, in his analysis, a strategy that was already presented last March by President Obama, which has also taken up time in military and civilian advising. This coincidence behind the scenes with the president was perhaps an incentive for him to issue the report. It is possible that his communication, via mandate to NATO and the Pentagon, has a character of implementation, but it does not discover anything new in relation to the strategy and it would be worthy of inclusion in any counter-insurgency manual.
In the days prior to familiarizing himself with the observations of the operations commander in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates referred to the increase of troops as a possibility but not a certainty. He said this bearing in mind that the effects of the last 21,000 troops sent in March have not yet been felt and that the civil funds promised for reconstruction and governability had not materialized, aspects that will surely have an effect in the next 12 to 18 months. He also championed a policy of quantifiable results, keeping in mind the number of Afghans considered to be protected by the coalition, and agreeing completely on this information with the commanding officer of ISAF.
Caution about McChrystal’s petitions appeared immediately, above all when the report was interpreted in political code by Gates, who referred to the necessity of avoiding, by means of an increase in troops, a situation in which Afghanistan appears more like a country occupied by the United States than a classic operation of stabilization. Maybe the response to these doubts lies in determining the minimum threshold of troops capable of avoiding said feeling but able to carry out the mission. This premise has served, probably, to bracket the solution that was found.
Vice President Biden, who supports an indirect, counter-terrorist solution applied to the Al-Qaeda refuges on the border with Pakistan and an increase in speed of the creation of an Afghan army and police force, distances himself from the counter-insurgent philosophy proposed by McChrystal, which was sent to the strategic commander of operations and head of central command, Gen. Petraeus, and was approved. It constitutes an alternative that disregards the Taliban as a threat and, as such, also its potential to regain power in Afghanistan. It overestimates the reality of the Afghan security forces, whose speed of training is naturally slow. Therefore, it appears to be an ill-advised solution.
McChrystal asks member countries of ISAF for “less protection and distance from the Afghans” in order to reach and protect them, to reverse the ascension that the Taliban is achieving. Those aspects go against the recommendations of the vice president and of democratic senators consulted by the president and, curiously, close to the Spanish theory and practice of stabilization. McChrystal’s ideas are clear and fit perfectly with a counter-insurgency strategy that is much more complete than the one previously recommended, which only sought to apply a strategy of simple counter-terrorist actions. It was less complicated and less costly in terms of resources, but of indeterminate effect in the long term.
The message sent to participating countries is clear and in the process of implementation.
- ISAF should radically transform itself into a more integrated organization with a greater operative rapport with Afghan security forces.
- ISAF should support the controlled governability of the country by working within many regions and districts.
- The operations of ISAF will be focused, first and foremost, on regaining the initiative and turning around the current situation.
- ISAF will use its troops in the most threatened zones.
It is obvious that doubts exist about the final attitude of the North American allies, who have yet to end their presence in Iraq. Even keeping in mind that the army and the marines have already spent years at the limit of their relief capacity, time will still be needed to send more troops to Afghanistan. Those in charge, however, know that there is no solution other than to increase troops if they want to ensure that Afghans will be protected once they are liberated from Taliban influence, although the increase should be shared among the allies.
This means a new effort for the United States, but the members of ISAF will have to rethink their actions, move in the direction indicated by Gen. McChrystal, prioritize their conduct with Afghans, improve their attitude toward the lengths that are taken to benefit the protection of the Afghan force and reverse the tendencies that currently characterize the insurgency initiative.
For Spain, it is a golden opportunity, given that many of the issues the operations commander in Afghanistan promotes coincide with the practices of our armed forces in operations in support of peace.
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