American Hypocrisy in Kosovo
State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley, as well as his top legal advisor, the respected jurist Harold Hongju Koh, have not tired of repeating today, before the insistent questioning of the foreign press, that the resolution by the International Court at the Hague is specific to Kosovo and cannot be extrapolated in any way to other cases.
However, it is difficult to argue that the case of Kosovo is very different from, for example, the case of Abkhazia or South Ossetia [separatist regions in Georgia]. When the International Court makes the general interpretation that the integrity of states mentioned in the U.N. Charter refers only to possible invasions by other states, and not to internal independence movements, how can such an interpretation be limited to only apply to Kosovo?
I hope the illustrious Hongju Koh will forgive me, but from a legal point of view his position is extremely dubious. Since when, in a democracy, does a constitutional interpretation only apply to a specific case? It would be as if, after the Supreme Court upheld that the Second Amendment provided the right to bear arms, Mr. Obama tried to make us believe that this interpretation only applied to one specific case, and that in another lawsuit it could be interpreted differently, perhaps as the right of a state to form a militia.
Looking beyond the propaganda of Crowley and Hongju, the reality is that the U.S. position on Kosovo is based entirely on geopolitical considerations, not international law, although this is how they sell it to the outside world. Only when it is in Washington’s interest do they recognize the secession of a stateless nation.
In contrast, in those cases where independence might favor a political adversary, such as the Russian-sponsored Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Washington is vehemently opposed. Of course, this form of hypocrisy is not limited to the U.S., but applies to most of the countries of the world, whose main criterion for action is national interest, which comes well before international law.
As much as some may complain bitterly about the resolution, and others may raise a glass in celebration, the truth is that very little will change. The Court is completely correct to consider that a declaration of independence is a political act, and therefore not a violation of international law.
With this argument the Court is simply recognizing reality — that the processes of independence will succeed or fail according to the interests of the most powerful members of the so-called international community, rather than international law. And this is why Lithuania has a seat in the U.N. and is openly recognized as a sovereign nation, while Taiwan is barely recognized by 20 small countries.
However, it is difficult to argue that the case of Kosovo is very different from, for example, the case of Abkhazia or South Ossetia [separatist regions in Georgia]. When the International Court makes the general interpretation that the integrity of states mentioned in the U.N. Charter refers only to possible invasions by other states, and not to internal independence movements, how can such an interpretation be limited to only apply to Kosovo?
I hope the illustrious Hongju Koh will forgive me, but from a legal point of view his position is extremely dubious. Since when, in a democracy, does a constitutional interpretation only apply to a specific case? It would be as if, after the Supreme Court upheld that the Second Amendment provided the right to bear arms, Mr. Obama tried to make us believe that this interpretation only applied to one specific case, and that in another lawsuit it could be interpreted differently, perhaps as the right of a state to form a militia.
Looking beyond the propaganda of Crowley and Hongju, the reality is that the U.S. position on Kosovo is based entirely on geopolitical considerations, not international law, although this is how they sell it to the outside world. Only when it is in Washington’s interest do they recognize the secession of a stateless nation.
In contrast, in those cases where independence might favor a political adversary, such as the Russian-sponsored Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Washington is vehemently opposed. Of course, this form of hypocrisy is not limited to the U.S., but applies to most of the countries of the world, whose main criterion for action is national interest, which comes well before international law.
As much as some may complain bitterly about the resolution, and others may raise a glass in celebration, the truth is that very little will change. The Court is completely correct to consider that a declaration of independence is a political act, and therefore not a violation of international law.
With this argument the Court is simply recognizing reality — that the processes of independence will succeed or fail according to the interests of the most powerful members of the so-called international community, rather than international law. And this is why Lithuania has a seat in the U.N. and is openly recognized as a sovereign nation, while Taiwan is barely recognized by 20 small countries.