Iraq, a Chronically Unfinished Endeavor

When, on March 20th, 2003, American bombs lit up the sky over Baghdad, and as CNN announced the televised revival of the first Gulf War, everything should have been decided after a month of attacks. Instead, five years later, we once again find ourselves talking about Iraq as a chronically unfinished endeavor. A war that, according to the designs of the Bush Administration, should have resolved itself decisively, without second thoughts or doubts of any kind.

For five years, and who knows for how many others it will remain so, Iraq has instead divided the public conscience in America (where it has created disagreements not only among the public but also within the Departments of State and Defense) as in Europe and the West. It was a costly war in terms of financial means but also in terms of victims. It would be unfair to say that everything, or almost everything, has gone badly. Without the American occupation of Iraq, the country would not have known those freedoms from tyranny (of press, of institutions) that were denied under the regime of Saddam Hussein. One would like to say that this is no small achievement, except for that fact that the errors made surpass and overwhelm the goals reached.

The experts say that, for at least the first four years, it was a poorly fought war. It was fought poorly because, substantially, it did not target its objectives. Of these one failed almost immediately, after it was discovered that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction. If it is true that Saddam Hussein was toppled, condemned, and then brought to justice by his people, it is also true that the post-invasion period showed itself to be, for the most part, a disaster, with a result that with time the American military presence in Iraq contributed to the destabilization of the region, rendering precarious a Pakistan that was once considered a stronghold and increasing the influence of Iran in the region.

But the principle failed objective is the true pacification of Iraq because after five years the nation remains weak, with its armed forces and its police still appearing to be divided among the various factions that are struggling for power. In Iraq there are currently different wars. It is not just that of the insurgents against the United States, but above all those brewing between the Shiites and the Sunnis, and those taking place internally among Shiite factions. And meanwhile, if that were not enough, the monster of Al Qaeda has been able to violently introduce its tentacles into the conflict.

But if the war in Iraq has shown the limits of American power, it has at the same time highlighted, at least in the last year, an undeniable readiness in Washington to make attempts to correct the damage that has been done. The so-called ‘surge’ of men and of money set up in January 2007 by General Petraeus has been recognized by the preeminent International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (one might see the 2008 report under the title ‘Military Balance’) as a tactical success of not unimportant significance. American and Iraqi forces went on the offensive, preventing enemy forces from assuming control of territory. “Even if the level of violence remains high,” the report reads, “in the space of one year the ‘surge’ has substantially reduced the number of murders and terrorist attacks.” However, the document concludes, progress on the political level has not accompanied these military decisions and much remains to be accomplished, while the immediate future is full of questions; because none of the presidential candidates has the miraculous solution in hand.

Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama (not the Republican McCain) call for withdrawal. But whoever will occupy the White House from 2009 onwards will have to put aside every populist temptation and face the reality of the facts, which say that if the United States leaves Iraq, what would be created in the short, medium, and long term would be a more heated civil war. Whether the Presidency goes to Obama, Clinton, or McCain, they will accordingly find themselves faced with the same dilemma: as President could they risk accepting the responsibility of an inevitable bloodbath, once they decide on a withdrawal of troops?

The more realistic scenario is that he or she will need to evaluate and consider the cost of remaining in Iraq and the unknown effect leaving will have. If the level of violence on the ground is measured in containable terms, the next President of the United States will probably not ponder significant changes. If, on the other hand, the situation should worsen in terms of human lives and carnage, then it is equally probable that the American people will tend to force the hand of the White House, demanding the last word on a situation becoming more and more unacceptable. At any rate a solution will not be easy to come by; because America, at heart, finds itself a captive of a problem it created.