Reading the American- Russian Strategic Framework

In the last summit for the American and Russian presidents before they leave the White House and the Kremlin, there was an attempt to bridge the political gap between the two based on their shared interests.

The “Sochi Summit” was not able to address all of their points of contention but did open the road for Moscow and Washington to address them in order to avoid another Cold War era atmosphere, like the one many commentators and observers have predicted. But this type of war is no longer inevitable because of the interdependency of international interests in the age of Globalization, and in the face of Russia’s preparations to join the WTO at the end of next year, as well as the material and political difficulties of starting such a war considering America’s recent state of recession and the level of development seen in Russia’s economy during the Putin years.

Ten points were included in a joint American-Russian statement that was issued at the end of the “Sochi Summit” under the title “towards a strategic framework” which attempted to aid the future presidents of Russia and the United States in addressing these issues in the future, and to stress points of agreement and shared interests. These ten points will surely be greatly influential to all of international relations and the world system. They are:

Strategy: The joint statement assured that Russia and the United States will not return to a state of enmity, and that they will not become strategic threats for one another. This means avoiding a new Cold War. Conflicts may still arise based on politics and vested interests, and these conflicts could also lead to a serious political dispute, or even a large-scale crisis. All of these are possibilities, but still far from a return to a Cold-war type conflict in this current age of Globalization.

Expanding NATO: The two sides hope to start a discussion concerning the contentious issues concerning NATO. Although this issue is the central point of contention the two sides have focused on coming to a mutual understanding while addressing the details of expanding NATO eastward without threatening to anger Moscow. There has been attempt now to return to the previous state of bilateral relations seen under the presidency of Yeltsin when Russia entered into a strategic partnership for the sake of peace, and within the framework of NATO. This involves a new partnership but now with more favorable conditions for Russia after having rebuilt its economic system, and having tried to restore the effectiveness of its system of strategic defense.

Disarmament: There is now a strong desire to reduce the nuclear arsenal of the two countries, similar to the approach taken during the presidency of Gorbachev when the Soviets and the Americans signed an agreement (Start 1) to limit their strategic weapons stockpile and then later signed another agreement (Start 2) with the same aim. Although he remaining stockpiles are still sufficient to destroy the entire World, strategic disarmament has become a clear international policy objective and requires a specific process in order to avoid political clashes.

The Missile Defense Shield: There is a shared interest in establishing a joint missile defense shield that will include Russia, the United States and Europe. This would resolve the complex issue of the threat to Russia’s security, and build an atmosphere of trust with the European Union which does not want a return to a Cold War with Moscow either. This would also bring comfort to the Czech Republic and Poland after the security threat they faced by the installation of a Missile Defense Shield. As well Moscow will find a way to address this issue as separate from that of the threat of Iran and to separate itself from the policy of conflagrating the Iranian threat like the American’s have been doing.

Intermediate Nuclear Forces: The two sides will study the threats from new types of missiles, and to find ways to address these threats. They hope to draw up a new conception of shared security and to have an idea of what threatens the security of both Europe and Russia, whether the threats come from inside the European-Russian territory or from without, which implies Iran and others.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: The joint statement affirmed the work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and from other types of WMD’s. This includes additional pressure on Iran and North Korea but not on Israel. This is a continuation of the joint American-Russian position held in the Security Council and outside of it.

Nuclear Energy: The United States supports Russia’s initiative for the establishment of a new Global structure for the production of nuclear energy. Any techniques that produce nuclear energy, be it in the production of alternative energy other than gas and oil, will remain within the American-Russian framework. This strategy for the future is separate from the attempt by emerging countries to acquire technology for the production of alternative energy.

Terrorism: The two sides agreed to increase cooperation, and especially in the realm of information sharing, in the fight against terrorism. This is a reiteration of the cooperation that was decided upon earlier, but is meant to quell the Moscow’s fear of the threat of separatist movements inside of the Russian Union as well as lend legitimacy to America’s aspirations since September 11, 2001.

WTO: Russia’s acceptance into the organization is now open and clear after a series of economic and political steps taken by the two sides during the last few years. Russia’s entrance into the organization at the end of this year is an additional impetus for cooperation with the exigencies of the globalized economy enshrined institutionally in the WTO.

Relations with Iran: The two sides agreed to peacefully restrict Iran’s nuclear program by limiting its access to technology and preventing their use. As well, international pressure will remain on Tehran so that its nuclear program remains under surveillance, and under constant political pressure. The principal point of contention here is Moscow’s previous refusal to pressure Tehran by threatening the use of force as has been alluded to by the Americans in the last two years.

This American-Russian “Strategic Framework” shows that there will not be a new Cold War even despite the clear controversies between Moscow and Washington involving many regional and national issues, as well as the desire by Washington to stop the ascension of any other international power to the summit of the international system. It also shows its attempt to defend its principal strategic interests. In the era of Globalization, with its varied dimensions and complexities, makes it much more difficult to create a political atmosphere similar to that of the Cold War.