A World Without Poles

When George W. Bush first set foot on European soil seven years ago, we still lived in a polar world. We had just left the bipolar world of the Cold War. On the way to Slovenia, Air Force One landed in Torrejón where the awaiting José María Aznar quickly demonstrated his willingness to assist in the plans of the US president. Although these did not reach their full intensity until after 3/11, the ideas rattling around in the heads of the US leadership were clear: it was necessary to organize the world according to the economic, military and political power of the sole superpower. The world had already spent a decade trying to organize itself according to a single pole, but it was still not mono-polar. Now, the aim was to have the world recognized as being such in the relations between countries and by international organizations. The new world order imagined by Bush Sr. and pursued by Bill Clinton, the spread of law and democracy, political progress through trade; all these ideas were thrown out in favor of a new world in which Washington was to become master and lord, the sole benchmark and yardstick. And Bush would be the president who be the driving force of this new American century. Aznar’s instinct wasn’t flawed: he wanted to get closer to this inviting tree so that he could find refuge under its cool shadow.

Now as the US president returns to Europe for the seventh time, again starting with Slovenia – though this time without a stopover in Spain – the fusion of the poles has been fully accomplished, but the surprise is that the new world does not even have a pole. We live in a world without poles. Non-polar, or apolar, whatever you want to call it.

It has been said and written by an authority on the subject, Richard Haas, president of the US Council on Foreign Relations in the journal, “Foreign Affairs” (The Age of Nonpolarity, May/June 2008). Haas believes that, at first sight, the world still seems multipolar given that five superpowers make up 75% of global GDP and 80% of defense spending. But later he begins to assess the significance of the regional powers (ranging from Brazil to Nigeria); adds that of the large multinational corporations whose leadership sometimes wields more influence than heads of State and Government; accounts for international organizations, takes note of large cities and regions of growing political and economic importance (from California to Shanghai); and then the global media, informal militias like Hamas or Hezbollah, drug cartels, and terrorist movements.

Fareed Zakaria calls it “the power of the rest or the remainder” (also in the same issue of Foreign Affairs) with the understanding that there is one single superpower, and then the others, who necessarily have to be taken into account .

Bush’s project has failed and the occupation of Iraq has been the principal cause of the fiasco. But not the only cause. Haas puts forth an objective reason, one that Bush and his neocons could do little about, together with three subjective reasons that stem from the policies in Washington.

The objective reason: the rise of new powers and forces, and the dispersion of power itself, which corresponds to a historic trend. The subjective reasons: energy policy, which has turned North America into the financier of the emerging powers, in many cases hostile; the cutting of taxes, accompanied by a rise in expenditure, turning the $100 billion surplus inherited from Clinton into a deficit of $250 billion in the last year; and Iraq, where to leave would be bad and irresponsible, and to stay would be worse and unbearable.

The USA is preparing to organize itself in this apolar world which Bush has unwittingly instigated. If seven years ago, the president behaved arrogantly towards the world, specifically Europe, he now has no choice but to take a more humble approach.

In this world of diffused power, many things now happen behind the president’s back – the talks between Syria and Israel, on the fringes of the Annapolis conference, which Bush sponsored; Saudi oil production, which has not increased despite Bush’s pleas; The Lebanese national accord, through which Hezbollah consolidated its power, and all the things that are controlled from the Kremlin. In his twilight days, this president Bush is of little significance to Europe, and his presence underscores the colossal tasks which await the next president, who will have to restore the standing of the USA and mend transatlantic relations, increasingly important in this world without poles.