If There Is a New Cold War, It Will Differ from the Last

Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence affects the fact that Moscow is finally completely accepting the rules of the game that have been set down by Washington and Brussels. After winning the 45 year Cold War, the West had decided that it is right in all things, at all times and it is allowed to do anything. That’s why it began to break up the existing world order and did not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Kosovo and Iraq became the epitome of that style of behavior.

“It’s Strange But True”

Until the very end, Russia tried to remain the guardian of the present system that is customarily called “Yaltian.” Probably, this was the case not because of the Kremlin’s love for international law, but its weakened state due to the low price of oil. It was simply in Russia’s interest.

The West vehemently destroyed previous pacts agreed to in 1945 at Yalta and Potsdam, as the price of oil grew, so did Russia’s wealth and, therefore, its strength. Moscow decided that it was pointless to save what was already destroyed, since it wasn’t a part of the Russian Federation. As the folk saying goes: if one has strength, it’s a sin not to use it. Thus Russia imitated in Georgia what the West did in Serbia between 1999 and 2008, except it took Russia less than a month to accomplish what it took the West nine years.

Oddly, the West took offense. It thought that they were the only ones allowed to do everything. Moscow showed that it wanted to pursue a parallel policy and that nobody could do anything about it. It would be a very costly step for Europe to refuse the import of Russia’s oil and gas. Likewise, to limit the export of goods to Russia’s growing market wouldn’t be convenient either. Because of these factors the chances of a new Cold War don’t seem high.

Also, the basis of the last Cold War was an ideological opposition, which is lacking today. Russia has fully accepted the Western political and economic model and, as stated above, the Western model of international relations. It may be odd, but the last point may be the basis of a new Cold War, at least theoretically.

“Not Ready for Confrontation”

From a military point of view, a Cold War must take an obvious turn–a rearmament. As known, this weakened the USSR that was, at the time, allied with countries in the Warsaw Pact. Today instead of the USSR, there is Russia, that is smaller in all spheres; all of the former Warsaw Pact countries are now a part of NATO, as are parts of the former Soviet Union. Other parts of the USSR are also hoping to join the North Atlantic alliance. The sum of that alliance is 30 times larger than the military forces of Russia. Obviously success in a race to rearm would be slim for Moscow.

The problem deepens when one considers that the Russian Federation wasted many essential military industrial complex pieces of technology and personnel. Thus catastrophically weakening Russias remaining military strength in comparison to their counterparts in NATO in terms of lines of communication, intelligence gathering, internet web warfare, lines of command, etc. This lag began during Soviet times and today is insurmountable, at least without an extraordinary effort. An analogy from Brazilian soccer history during the 1960s and 70s may be fitting. Their motto was: “You score on us as much as you can, and we on you as much as we want.” In the case of a full scale armament, NATO will produce as much weaponry as it wants and Russian as much as it can.

Unfortunately, the experience of the last couple of years illustrates, that we are capable of almost nothing. More money is spent on the army and navy, while less is spent on rearmament. Also, almost everything that is put on sale was created during the Soviet period.

Also, our society has lost an essential component for waging a Cold (not to mention a hot) War: a military mindset. The stirring up of anti-Western hysteria by carefully aimed propaganda has produced a societal result in which NATO is seen as a primary threat and the USA as an Evil Empire. But this does not mean that people are willing to risk their newly gained comforts for an objective not completely understood.

With whom and for what are we getting ready to fight? Will people donate to a defense fund? Or join the military en masse (either through a draft or contract)? One could believe this, but only by losing all track of reality.

“Worse Than in Russia”

By the way, on the other side of “front” the situation is similar.

During the whole period after the last Cold War, the North Atlantic alliance has continually reduced their military strength. When comparing all different classes of weaponry, the present NATO of 26 (sic) nations, is smaller than its 1991 equivalent, which contained 16 states. The procurement of new military technology in no way compensates for old models. Also, the majority of the purchased equipment lessens in quantity during numerous negotiating processes and this happens often.

Regarding the Western military mindset, at the least, is even worse than in Russia. It isn’t for nothing that almost all European nations have switched the assembly of their military ranks from a compulsory duty to a volunteer army. As for countries that have kept the draft (like Germany), more than half of the potential “defenders of the homeland” choose an alternative service. Europeans don’t have a desire to line up at the call to duty.

The NATO operation in Afghanistan has shown that the North Atlantic alliance today is a typical “paper tiger.” Regardless of continuous and vehement requests from Washington, London and Ottawa, the capitals of continental Europe categorically refuse to commit their troops to serious military operations.

The events in Georgia have highlighted the expected reputation of the “aggressive imperialistic block,” as NATO was called during the Soviet period. On the one hand, the phrase can be used as a unanimous condemnation of Russia’s actions and on the other hand the lack of help for Tbilisi. No weaponry was even moved there, there is no mention of an offer of combat troops by NATO. Operations like the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49, are a thing of the past. Today’s West has a weak stomach. It couldn’t even produce a clear political resolution at the NATO conference.

The epitome of powerlessness was the sending of NATO warships into the Black Sea. The act was that of weakness. The U.S. sent one ship called “McFall” that has the capacity to strike at targets inland. But one can’t fight with one ship; and Americans are certainly not fighting. In reality, sending numerous other naval vessels to the shores of Georgia reflected a clear message to Moscow: “We aren’t even thinking of fighting, but are trying to save face by pretending to help Georgia. Don’t even bother taking notice of our ships.” Unfortunately, our propaganda machine made much of these little ships, even to a point of hysteria that was really just beneath us.

The European Union, as expected, had the option to place on Russia either soft or hard sanctions as punishment for the invasion of Georgia: they chose neither.

In connection to this, it’s hard to believe that European countries will roll back their domestic socialist programs, so as to build up a major defense industry for armament and military technology. Europe has a social problem: it’s too advanced, it seems. So much so that it doesn’t have enough money to spend on every welfare parasite. No one there needs cannons rather than butter. And for what? Georgia? Where’s that again?

The United States, of course, still has a military mindset. They can maintain single-handedly an anti-Russian front. But the resources of that country are at their limit. The events in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that volunteer soldiers aren’t good for prolonged conflicts, coupled with an uncertain level of possible casualties. Likewise, the U.S. military budget is beyond bounds. America spends beyond what all other countries in the world spend on defense combined. They couldn’t possibly spend more and it seems like a good time to decrease the budget–an Obama presidency would surely have that as a policy.

So as to wage a total Cold War against Russia, the U.S. would have to close down one of its campaigns in the Middle East or both at the same time. Also, it would be best to bring back the draft. Neither the former not the latter is possible for consideration politically.

“An Exchange of Nastiness”

From what is stated above, it can be concluded that a new Cold War is unlikely and the opposing parties are neither ready nor capable of it. Neither side has any idea about how to mobilize their population for a conflict with serious casualties.

The worst that the West and Russia are capable of in the near future, if relations worsen, are major and minor bouts of nastiness in the periphery regions of both sides.

For example, the West could take Ukraine, Georgia, and let’s say Azerbaijan into NATO. In reality the military block would just be weaker: the defense of an enlarged territory would lessen the alliance’s strength and hysteria from Moscow would be a guarantee.

In truth, Saakashvili has decreased the chance of Georgia becoming a part of the North Atlantic alliance by his adventure in South Ossetia. The Europeans will set up every bureaucratic roadblock to complicate Georgia becoming a member as they can’t just say that they have no intention of sending their soldiers to dies in a totally unneeded Georgia the next time in decides to reestablish its territorial integrity.

Ukraine can be dealt with easier and more affectively. It can actually be too easy, if Moscow decides to complicate Ukraine’s NATO membership process by stirring up the Crimean problem. The decision to take that step won’t be something that’s officially announced and we hope that it never happens.

Russia, on the other hand, can arm “rogue” states like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, North Korea, Sudan, etc. Here a new set of problems arise. Even if Iran and Venezuela can afford the weapons, the rest of those countries may not be able to. Is Moscow ready to return to the Soviet practice of arming “brother countries”? How much money is it willing to set aside when the problem of supplying its own military fully is a near catastrophic problem? Nastiness as a goal is low for a country that seeks to be a great power. But this will in all likelihood be Russia’s choice. And it can take us far.

Tit for tat nastiness in the periphery regions will result in an escalation of hostilities. And then there will be an increase in the chance of a real new Cold War and a direct arms race–something that is not likely today. It must be repeated that Russia, then, will have no chance of success. To obtain that chance, a coordinated modernization of the state is needed, alongside the defense industry.

As the war in Georgia showed, our army has remained Soviet–no “rebirth of might” is evident. We were just lucky that we were also facing a Soviet army, just a much weaker one. We don’t usually make adequate conclusions from victories. A “tiny victorious war”, a contribution of an influx of petrodollars, the political and military impotence of Europe, coupled with the Iraq-Afghanistan dead-end for America, make the heads in the Kremlin dizzy. This is very dangerous. To feel strong when you don’t have serious military abilities, can lead to a crossing of a Rubicon that should not be crossed. To realize this is hard. But to do so later, may be too late.