Afghanistan: A Test Case for Obama

After only two weeks, Afghanistan has become an important first test for President Obama. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, called Afghanistan “the greatest military challenge at the moment” last week. With this, Gates didn’t say one word too many. One day later, Afghan Electoral Board authorities decided to postpone the presidential elections–that were to be held in April–until August 20th. The reason? The country is not secure enough to hold democratic elections.

Earlier this week, a suicide bomber gained access to a police-training center in Tarin Kowt. Practically under the noses of the Dutch forces, 21 Afghan agents perished in this attack. Less than a day later, a bridge was blown up in Pakistan. Transport across the Khyber Pass–a route that derives its name from the eighties when the Soviet Union thought it ran the show–has thus become impossible. Half a day later, Kyrgyzstan made it known that the U.S. military base in this ex-Soviet republic must be closed this year. Western troops that had been active in Afghanistan under NATO command since the end of 2001 now find themselves increasingly isolated.

NATO finds itself in a difficult position. The alliance now needs Iran to keep the logistical lines open. Last month, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer explicitly pleaded to involve Iran more in diplomatic consultations in the region. De Hoop Scheffer is right. Iran can play a positive role in the region. But after so many years of Western pacification policies in Afghanistan, the plea by the outgoing Secretary General is not a sign of self-confidence.

In an interview with this newspaper last Saturday, Willem van de Put, director of the non-governmental relief organization HealthNet that has been active in Afghanistan for 15 years, expressed his doubts about the effectiveness of Western pacification. “It is wonderful that the Netherlands puts in such an effort.” But, “the fact is that the Western approach is often counterproductive,” said Van de Put. Regardless of how painful it is, that analysis must be taken seriously. Right now, as a president with far-reaching ambitions for Afghanistan has come to power in Washington, NATO must ask a few basic questions. What is the purpose of the alliance in Afghanistan? Is it to provide modest control over the violence, if only to prevent the fall of a nuclear-armed Pakistan? Or is it attempting the reconstruction of a country that has been at war for 30 years?

Officially, NATO has the latter in mind. Unofficially we see other things, such as from Secretary of Defense Gates. It is time for the alliance to set aside its pretences. In theory, all kinds of lofty goals are ascribed to the mission, while everyone knows just how trite the practices really are. Support for the mission is not reinforced, but rather undermined.

It is now time for honesty. Can De Hoop Scheffer contribute to something so unprecedented during his last months as Secretary General?