Why Does Netanyahu Reject Obama’s Overtures?

Barack Obama has justified his address to the Islamic world from the podiums of Ankara and Istanbul by saying that Turkey “is not where East and West divide – this is where they come together.”

Palestine, the land and identity, is a part of the East with all its religions, peoples, civilizations, and cultures. What about Israel?

Geographically, Israel is eastern, not western. From the viewpoint of identity and belonging, the majority of the ruling Israeli establishment wants Israel to be a part of the West. This is how it has behaved since it was transplanted by the European and American West in the midst of the Arab countries. Today, however, she stands at a momentous crossroad. Some Israelis dare to declare openly that they are not a part of the American West.

In Turkey, Obama emphasized that his country “is not and will never be at war with Islam” and indirectly justified his choice of Turkey as an observation platform to view the Muslim world, their problems and their unsettled issues with the U.S. He said, “the United States and Turkey can help the Palestinians and Israelis make this journey…So now, working together, we must not give into pessimism and mistrust. We must pursue every opportunity for progress, as you’ve done by supporting negotiations between Syria and Israel.”

From this simple stand, Obama moved on with more detail, emphasizing his administration’s support for “the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. That is a goal shared by Palestinians, Israelis, and people of goodwill around the world. That is a goal that the parties agreed to in the road map and at Annapolis. That is a goal that I will actively pursue as president of the United States.”

In a meeting with college students from different Turkish universities, Obama shed some light on his method of rapprochement to end the struggle in Palestine, saying that “the assumption in the Muslim world that Israel is responsible for everything lacks balance, because there are two sides to every dispute.” He then modified his statement, saying, “This does not mean that [if] one side committed an error, we should not blame him.” In a message to the Israelis, he added, “I say the same thing to my Jewish friends: You must take into account the Palestinian viewpoint. Try to put yourselves in their position.”

How can we achieve all that? Obama replies that “both sides have to offer concessions. What we need now is a strong political will.”

It seems that no Arab official commented negatively on the subject of mutual concessions. On the contrary, all hailed Obama’s proposition without any reservations. In contrast, Mr. Glad Erdan, the Israeli minister of environment, who is close to Prime Minister Netanyahu, said that Israel “does not receive its directives from the American president. By voting for Netanyahu, Israelis expressed their desire not to be the fifty-first state of the United States.”

Erdan’s statement reveals two things. The first is that Netanyahu’s government is not interested in approving the two-state solution, the Road Map or Annapolis accords – i.e., not prepared to give concessions as the U.S. president demands. Second, that Israel is in reality the fifty-first state and the Israelis vote intended to extract Israel from that position.

No matter what the concessions that Obama demands from Israel, a serious question persists: Can Israel actually get out of the embrace of the United States, let alone be independent of it?

The obvious answer is “no,” for a thousand political, economic, military and cultural reasons. What Erdan said reflects the fact that Israel can reject Obama’s proposition to offer concessions without losing its dependence on America or its status as the fifty-first state.

First, Israel depends on its deeply rooted influence in American leadership, including both Democratic and Republican parties and all political and economic sectors in addition to civic institutions. Secondly, Israel can fabricate disturbances and possibly mini wars with its neighbors, especially Lebanon and Syria, which would hamper Obama’s plan. Thirdly, Israel can insist on demanding concessions that the Palestinians could not offer. This, in coordination with the Jewish lobby inside the USA, can hinder Obama’s proposition, while possibly putting the blame on the Palestinians for its failure. That is precisely happened in the Camp David negotiations between President Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat and Barak Ehod when Israel demanded that Yasser Arafat should offer concessions he could not deliver, especially concerning Holy Jerusalem. Arafat was blamed for the failure of the talks.

Israel has always resisted attempts to settle the subject of the Arab-Israeli struggle by not accepting conditions, and it has succeeded in halting all attempts, American and non-American, to settle the issue. This is facilitated by the current situation of imbalances in the region’s power in favor of Israel. Such imbalances are still present, which makes it impossible to move Israel from its current position. How can we cure that lack of balance or minimize its effect?

There is no Arab country that is seriously attempting to develop itself into a regional force capable of real confrontation with Israel, like Egypt did in the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Without a major international power (such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which was capable and willing to arm an Arab state to become a regional power), resistance becomes the only choice. It is an effective and promising choice. The experienced Palestinian resistance, which defeated the Israelis in Gaza, and the Lebanese resistance of Hezbollah, which defeated the Israelis in 2006, are two proven examples of the efficacy and validity of resistance. We need to bet on this option at present and in the foreseeable future. If anyone doubts the choice of resistance, he should read a report published by the Washington Post on April 6, 2009, about a study by the Department of Defense about the lessons of the 2006 war and its disastrous effects on the Israeli army.