The Way to a Nuclear-Free World

View from the United States

Nikolay Zlobin, director of Russian and Asian programs at the Institute for International Security, Washington DC, USA.

“Rossiiskaya Gazeta”- federal issue number 4913 (89) May 20th, 2009.

The U.S. president is visiting Russia from July 6th through 9th. The government of both countries is trying to do everything possible to improve bilateral relations, though it’s obvious that they are trying to bring out at least some progress in the least amount of time. In my opinion, both sides are agreed on two positions; the first one concludes that the main problem in improving American-Russian relations is a tremendous level of political distrust that has a broad and mutual nature that will be difficult to overcome. Besides, if it were possible to overcome that mistrust, it will not happen soon. And if the mistrust between two countries and elites are going on, then how can we count on an improvement in the situation concerning their relations?

Second, where everybody in Moscow and Washington agree, is that it is necessary to start restoring relations between countries through working on the new Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, for the current treaty expires on December 5th of this year. Russia and the United States can’t help prepare the new treaty, because it will be an absolutely unacceptable option for both countries. Russia does not agree to extend the current treaty, which makes provision for such a case. That means that two countries face a difficult task: in a short time-less that half a year-not only to prepare and agree on a new treaty, but also manage to hold it through the ratification process in the Duma and the Congress. If the ratification in the Duma is not going to foresee any big problems, than the U.S. Congress will treat that process informally, analyzing every digit and every detail in a very meticulous and critical way.

During the endorsement of the new treaty, problems naturally couldn’t help to appear that either the negotiators or the political leaders of the two main nuclear superpowers would have to solve. Thus, Russia today links the possibility of concluding a treaty with U.S. plans to deploy by 2013 a new area of its missile defense in Eastern Europe. Moscow logic concludes that any reduction of strategic offensive arms should take into account the possibility of missile defense. There was a time when there were discussions about the issue of missile defense in Eastern Europe will be closely linked with Iran and Moscow’s ability to influence Tehran to halt development of its nuclear program. Now it’s clear that there will be no exchanges from Washington’s side, even if they were supposed to be.

Another problem is the possibility of equipping strategic delivery precision with non-nuclear weapons. Moscow has quite a rational argument that any reduction of its nuclear potential would only emphasize the imbalance in conventional weapons; the smaller nuclear weapons, the more important among the ratio of conventional weapons.

There are still problems with the system of mutual control and prevention, with measures of confidence, the existence of large-and medium-range cruise missiles which can be used towards the destruction of strategic offensive arms. Today, the United States is closer than Russia on the issue that with any reductions it is necessary to take into account not only the warheads themselves, but also the carriers, that is their means of delivery. Big problems can arise from the reluctance of the American side to make new treaty rules regulating the number of warheads that have an “off” alert status, but are not destroyed, as well as demanding Russia to agree on a non-weaponization of outer space, etc. However, Moscow should consider that the treaty thar Obama will sign can not be not aligned with or approved by the American political elite. Already we can say that, for example, the present significant advantage in the Russian tactical nuclear warheads, which did not fall under the new contract, could become a political issue of its ratification in Washington.

Obama’s administration is now talking about reducing nuclear weapons, meaning the real prospect of its elimination over the next few decades. The possibility of nuclear terrorism in the United States today is a number one threat, and naturally the most radical solution of that problem is a complete liquidation of nuclear weapon worldwide. Some prefer it was done with regards to chemical and biological weapons. During a meeting with Barack Obama in London, Dmitry Medvedev, has signed a joint declaration which stated that the two countries will strive for a world without nuclear weapons. And not as something distant and not likely real, but with a very specific political goal, which was put in front of them today. A movement for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is gathering strength in the United States, becoming one of the mainstream movements in the area of arms control. There is political will trying to achieve this, although everybody is perfectly aware that doing so would be extremely difficult, taking into account the political ambitions of Russia, the views of the other nuclear countries and the apparent lack of global parity in conventional weapons. Although neither Moscow nor Washington are ready today to go with drastic reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons, Washington is seriously considering the possibility of so-called global zero. As is known, Russia is much more skeptical, because it proceeds from the fact that its nuclear capability would not only ensures its security today, but would be politically elevated to the status of a superpower that will force the United States to speak on its terms.

Russian sources include different data, often disagreeing and contradicting each other. An authoritative independent organization – the Federation of American Scientists- has just released data on the current (April 2009) U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. They show that the two countries have 22,400 warheads. In doing so, the U.S. has 5,200 warheads, including 2,500 on standby. Russia has 8,330 warheads, including 3,500 units in reserve. The United States has 2,700 warheads in the workplace, including 2,200 tactical and 500 tactical. Russia has 4,830 warheads in the workplace, including the 2,780 Strategic and tactical 2,050. Today, the United States has 4,200 warheads awaiting destruction, while Russia has 4,670 pieces. In other words, to add up the total balance, there are 9,400 warheads in the United States today, while Russia has exactly 13 thousand. In reality, Obama’s critics in Washington say that there are about 1500 strategic nuclear missiles in operation, which is much smaller than those in America. It is believed that Moscow will be able to easily reduce its arsenal to 1,500, because that would mean a unilateral reduction on the U.S. side.

The two countries now find themselves in a situation where, given the workload, it is extremely difficult to finish a new contract due to the little time they have and the problems faced by the negotiators. But they can not afford not to sign the treaty because it would not be only the collapse of attempts to restart bilateral relations, but also will cause irreparable blow to the security of the world, the responsibility for which inevitably will fall on both states.

At least, that’s the way it seems to me from Washington.