More Constructive Sino-U.S. Cooperation?

How Can the Sino-U.S. Military Cooperation be More Constructive?

The tenth consultation conference between Sino-U.S. defense ministers was held in Beijing over the past 2 days. This is the first of its kind since the two sides halted all military communications and cooperation last October, and that means previous Sino-U.S. military communication and cooperation can now resume. However, from some episodes therein we can find some clues which bring up ideas concerning how the two sides will face upcoming complications in a rational and practical way.

Weapon Sales to Taiwan: Sticking to Principle vs. Being Practical and Flexible

After the congress passed a resolution on weapon sales to Taiwan last October, the military of mainland China severed all communications with U.S. This February the two sides held some consultations on an operational level, but the all-around communication has yet to resume. I know that in the consultations the Chinese military came up with a few principles for the Sino-U.S. military communication; these are: respect, mutual trust, equality and mutual benefits. However, the U.S. military believed that outright acceptance of those principles was a muddleheaded move and rejected them.

Actually, from the halt of communication last October to the principles this February, subtle changes on the Chinese military side have been implied. First, on the issue of weapon sales to Taiwan, their stand is to stick to principles while being rational, practical and flexible.

Since Ma Yingjiu was sworn in, cross-straits relations have become easier. The Ma Yingjiu government has adjusted its defense policy; at the same time it cut some purchases of weapons from U.S. To keep its small but effective military power, it continues buying weapons from U.S.

From a strategic point of view, over a long period the U.S. can be a negative factor in the process of reunification of mainland and the island, but in a short to medium period the U.S. can share some ground with both Beijing and Taipei. For Beijing, the bottom line is no-independence by Taiwan; for Taipei it’s to keep Taiwan’s esteem; for U.S. it’s no war across the strait. From this point of view, the weapon sales to Taiwan have changed somewhat in terms of effectiveness and impact since the time of Chen Shui-bian.

Sino-U.S. Military Relations are Becoming Diversified and Complicated

From a larger point of view, Taiwan was the central concern for Sino-U.S. relations. But for the past few years, as the tensions of cross-strait relations have eased remarkably, Taiwan has been marginalized in the issue of Sino-U.S. relations. Now the concern has shifted to the kind of potential competition of state power which consists of two focuses: one is conflict in trade, and the other is military competition.

China’s military has obviously noticed it, and they put forward four principles during the consultations this February. This also can be taken as a way to get out of the Sino-U.S. deadlock over the issue of weapon sales to Taiwan. Either the U.S. military really didn’t know it would be Chinese culture to do so, or it pretended that it didn’t know; in the end the two sides didn’t reach an agreement on the four principles.

For the past year, continuous conflicts over the Southern Sea have been the most sensitive part of relations between the two sides. This reflects the fundamental differences between the dealings of China and the U.S.: the emerging confrontation between a full fledged global power and a fledging one. Reasonably, being conservative and defensive, the former will be worrisome, skeptical and wary toward the latter; and being aggressive, the latter will be challenging towards the former. Consequently, over the past few years the U.S. military has not only been collecting intelligence on the PLA’s power, but also been figuring out the PLA’s strategies from talks with it.

The Korean Peninsula: a New Domain of Sino-U.S. Cooperation?

Based on the situation we just analyzed, the future relationship of the Chinese and U.S. military will include a series of ongoing conflicts. There are some points which should not be ignored: first, there must be some motivation for running at the issues from two sides; second, some mechanisms must be working; third, as a result of each group’s adherence to its own side, there must be a stopping point determined before either side goes so far as to stall any progress; forth, both sides should actively develop and keep domains of cooperation.

As far as domains of cooperation are concerned, with the exception of cracking down on pirates, there emerged a new need for cooperation on handling North Korea’s nuclear crisis. The nuclear experiment does not only make those Korea-based U.S. troops nervous, but it also makes China vigilant on its northern security. If North Korea becomes unstable politically in the future, the Chinese and U.S. military must work together, with preparation for any unexpected incidents.

But some historic problems remain in the way of Sino-U.S. cooperation on this issue. First, there has never been a peace agreement on the Korean War, therefore, theoretically, the two sides remain adversaries. Second, as China and the U.S. are respectively allies of North Korea and South Korea, once a war breaks out between the Koreas, China and the U.S. must back their respective ally.

Though there has not yet been a situation leading China and the U.S. to fight a war over the Koreas, as volatile as the situation of the Korean Peninsula is, the agenda of how to avoid such a war legitimately needs to be attended to now. At the same time, the two sides also need some plans to enforce the guarding of South Korea and China’s borders in case of some unexpected political shift in North Korea.