And What If There Were No Nukes?

Next week, President Barack Obama will come to Moscow. Against the background of a “perezagruzka” (reset) of the Russia-American relationship he will need to focus on the practical matter of reaching a new agreement on limiting strategic offensive armaments, which will replace START I, set to expire in December. Right before the start of negotiations, a group of authoritative former American officials (including former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary William Parry) proposed an initiative to reach “global zero”- a gradual universal nuclear disarmament. Both President Obama and Medvedev responded positively to this initiative.

“Global zero” is not a new concept. All of the signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty took up the responsibility of moving towards a complete nuclear disarmament more than forty years ago. However, in practice, disarmament has raised a lot of questions. First, what type of nukes should there be zero of? The authors of the initiative speak about the strategic triad of nuclear weapons (ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles on submarines and strategic bombers). In other words, they propose to destroy everything that can reach American soil when fired from Russia, and vice versa. However, what happens to non-strategic nuclear weapons? Russia is surrounded by American military, air, and naval bases; the same can’t be said about the United States. “Zero” strategic nuclear armaments will result in an absolute American superiority when it comes to non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Moreover, are we talking about “zero” deployed warheads or also the ones stored away, but ready to deploy? Until now Americans were ready to negotiate exclusively on the deployed stockpile, but refused to discuss the ones stored away, bringing up the issue of “retaliatory potential.”

It is not clear how the movement towards a “nuclear zero” can be compatible with the sharp growth of conventional weapons that we are witnessing around the globe. When it comes to conventional weapons, NATO countries far exceed Russia. Strategic rocket forces -the most combat effective and combat ready part of the Russian armed forces- is the guarantor of our safety. These are the forces that we have been asked to get rid of. With that said, most of the Western counties have not ratified the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The typical dialog with our Western partners goes as follows: “Why are you Russians so afraid of NATO expansion? Do you really think that you might be attacked?”- “And why wouldn’t we be?”- “You have nuclear weapons!” What will happen if we didn’t have nukes?

Another issue that should be clarified on the way to “global zero” is what the other members of the nuclear club think about this idea. Great Britain’s nuclear potential is so closely integrated with America’s that it would not be an exaggeration to talk about their unified nuclear capabilities. France has reintegrated its military into NATO. China has been playing a noticeably more important role in the military-strategic issues. This does not even include the countries which have nuclear weapons but are not part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – Israel, India, and Pakistan. North Korea is also now part of that group, and possibly Iran. The number of unofficial members of the nuclear club might grow. I have personally heard from representatives of the “rogue” states that after Yugoslavia and Iraq, no one will convince them of the non-necessity of nuclear weapons, since the United States doesn’t attack nuclear countries.

The axiom of disarmament is the interrelation between the offensive and defensive systems. The movement towards “zero” under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty clearly cannot be accompanied by the growth of anti-ballistic missile systems- the United States left the agreement unilaterally. It is appropriate ask if the United States is planning to return to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Is there a future for conventional arms control? Will our proposals about prohibiting the militarization of space be accepted?

However, this doesn’t mean that at the summit, Moscow shouldn’t strive for concrete understandings on further reductions of strategic armaments. What parameters can be considered reasonable from the viewpoint of providing Russian and global security? First, the quantity of the warheads permitted by the Moscow agreement (1700-2200 units by the end of 2012) must be reduced. Our military men have concluded that 1,500 warheads are sufficient for guaranteeing the defense capability of the country. This should solve the problem of “retaliatory potential.” Second, the number of carriers in the triad can be radically reduced in comparison to START-I. But in no case should we allow the destruction of that component of triad in which we are strongest: ground-based rockets. Finally, there needs to be an understanding of the interrelation between the reduction of the strategic arms and not developing ABMs. It is necessary to clearly outline the mechanisms of control for the observance of the agreement. Once these conditions are met, the agreement will increase our safety as opposed to decreasing it.