Politics and Strategy in Afghanistan

Ever since the new American Democratic administration took office in the beginning of the year, the war in Afghanistan has been classified as a top priority. The controversy over the opportune infiltration of the McChrystal report into The Washington Post is causing an enormous debate among NATO allies in the North American political setting.

The U.S. press made the debate more ardent by interpreting it as a simple “strategic reconsideration” of a perceived confrontation between the president and his general in the operation zone. In this case, we are talking about Obama and McChrystal. It brings a reminiscent recollection of other clashes, like Lincoln’s with McClellan during the Civil War and Truman’s with McArthur in Korea.

Destiny seems to have set the Gaelic prefix “Mc” as the counterpoint for White House tenants in times of war. False assumptions should not be made, however. It could not be any other way – the president’s authority will always prevail.

This past March, President Barack Obama was defining the objectives of his strategy regarding the zone as “disorganize, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” He also added that “a stronger strategy” that was “adequate and integral” was necessary, to disallow the “Taliban’s progress and promote a more capable and reliable Afghani government.”

This strategy was then revealed to NATO allies, who were solicited for support. A focus was suggested so that “integrated” action, undertaken in a diplomatic, economic, military and informed way, would allow the Afghan state to stabilize and reconstruct the nation. The situation and preexisting conditions, in military terms, were such that an antecedent counterinsurgency campaign was passing, which established the necessary security environment. However, such a campaign would entail prolonged efforts, with the objective of protecting the population by separating it from the insurgents. Under these circumstances, defeat is easily identifiable but victory is only vaguely defined.

The actual situation, as noted by Dr. Kissinger in Newsweek, is not new. It begs for avoidance of the defeatism produced by similar controversies in previous conflicts where one had to confront enemies that used guerrillas as a means of war.

On one hand, we are witnessing logical tensions within the new administration, which is trying to assert its power through a display of media in an era of information with the use of virtual realities. On the other hand is the reality of such acts. Previously, things functioned differently. Acts related to a nation’s vital interests were not ordinarily transformed during, nor incorporated into, the electoral campaign.

However, it seems that in this current situation things are being approached differently. Tension is derived from the nature of politics and has to be resolved under this political scope. In case the strategic environment is corrupted, the resultant alteration produced could be interpreted as “defeat,” which, for a country as powerful in the international community in the U.S., could be serious.

Another point of view is that a big and costly engagement in Afghanistan would only be justified in American public opinion if vital North American interests could not be resolved any other way.

Therein resides part of the problem. During the electoral campaign, costs were not explained. The course to follow in Afghanistan depends a lot on the opinions of White House counselors, but also of Admiral Mullen and generals like Petraeus and McChrystal. However, to achieve balance, the secretary of defense has to act as the pointer on the scale. In the end, political necessity is scrutinized as part of a Great Strategy. It can only be half-explained by reducing the American military to a “trace” in the Islamic lands and to accommodate it to the expectations set forth in Obama’s speech in Cairo.

It is a fact that vast American military interventions in Mesopotamia and the Indo-Kush foothills have reduced the liberty of U.S. strategic action on a global level. In the case of a counter-insurgent campaign emerging in Afghanistan, it is implied that the situation would require the intervention to be extended. Moreover, American military “confinement” to Iraq and Central Asia liberates other, strategic dynamics in Africa, South America and other parts of Asia where there is great potential for threats to emerge. To specify, one such threat would be a nuclear Iran.

Afghanistan’s current situation, however, represents a problem that can be postponed. The war in Iraq has been going on for six years and is now rotten. The U.S. has proven General Marshall’s maxim that “a democracy can’t get involved in a war that would last six years.” The war in Iraq has already entered its eighth year. The necessary action in Afghanistan and Pakistan exceeds the “strategic patience” of democracies – and this is where the problem resides.

Another characteristic of the situation is that the current American administration has not yet issued its strategy for national security. NATO is also in the process of preparing its strategic concept, which shouldn’t be an impediment to identifying the conflict’s consequences on a regional and global level.

If the Afghan conflict is not isolated, the contagion of the conflict has the ability to extend not only to Pakistan, but also to India, China, former Soviet countries of central Asia and even to Russia – places where Islamic minorities have the potential to be radicalized.

The traditional American form of resolving strategic problems, based on firm belief in the existence of universally-applicable norms, also denominated as “unique universal stature,” needs to adjust to a new environment in which geopolitical tensions tend to be revived. In this debate and in making decisions, the participation of all allies is indispensable. The defense of our resources and security requires it that way.