The Dutch Government Can Derive Confidence from Resolving the Iraq Issue

The government’s reaction to the Davids Committee report represents a cautious middle course between constitutional power and political sensitivity. In the Dutch coalition culture, that is almost inevitable, but transparency is rarely well served by it. The result is often described as “high politics,” and from the “middle course” perspective, it is so. In this case, the outcome, however, is in every respect reasonable and clear.

The most positive news is that the government survived this. It would have been a disgrace if it had fallen over this issue. The financial-economic crisis demands a missionary team of ministers who can make decisions. The turbulent social environment is also served by stability and the strength of rule. The government can now derive new confidence from resolving this thorny issue in order to tackle the difficult decisions still waiting.

This is not to say that the Iraq issue — whether and under what circumstances the Netherlands may give political or military support to the war — is too insignificant for a casus belli. Therefore, it wasn’t so strange that the government took its time to react to the Davids report. In the sensational news climate, one forgets once in a while that political conflict sometimes comes down to the smallest detail.

As for the core question, the government has drawn sensible lessons from the mistakes that were made in 2003 with respect to the decision to give political support to the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq. Those errors, such as the lack of an adequate international mandate, are now more or less explicitly acknowledged. That is progress. In a serious decision to go to war, there is no room for recklessness. Moreover, this does not mean, according to the government, that agreement in the Security Council is always necessary. One can think of situations where, even without U.N. approval, the use of military force may be legitimate, such as during the looming humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in 1999.

The government also promises to improve the way in which Parliament is informed in such situations. It acknowledges that the information during the run-up to the Iraq war should have been more elaborate and explicit. That is the same as “incomplete and inaccurate,” but politically loaded terms are avoided in the letter. Parliament should have made a point of this, if it had not been sleeping at the time itself.