The US Violated Our Trust
Published in Volkskrant
(Netherlands) on 17 February 2010
by Theo van den Doel (link to original)
(Netherlands) on 17 February 2010
by Theo van den Doel (link to original)
Translated from
by Anne Hukkelhoven.
Edited by Alex Brewer.
Dutch governments have proven over the last decades to be unfit for conducting power politics. Their blind loyalty is continuously violated.
In the discussion of the David report, the emphasis over the past few weeks has been on the lack of international legal legitimacy. Not international law, but political power interests that can tip the scales at the U.N. Security Council. With that knowledge, the U.S. decided, without approval of the Security Council, to declare war on Iraq. In making such a decision, a superpower carries a special responsibility. It could be said that the U.S. entered this war like a blind horse. The Dutch government could and should have known this.
Delegation
In January 2003, I was part of a delegation to the NATO assembly to Washington. There was fierce discussion then about the necessity of an additional Security Council resolution as legitimacy for the war against Iraq. Quickly, it became clear during our visit to the State Department that the U.S. would start this war no matter what. The preparations were fully underway. However, a new resolution was considered welcome, given that all permanent members of the Security Council would support it.
The French parliamentarian in our group clearly stated that France would block such a resolution. Scorn and mockery fell upon him. Members of Congress did not understand the European attitude one bit. The Americans had freed Europe in 1945 and now Europe deserted the U.S. French wine was flushed down the streets of American cities.
It became painfully clear that the American government had fully counted on the cooperation of the European allies. They had a simple plan. The U.S. would overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein and after that the European allies would take care of the rest. They were good in reconstruction, after all. Even though they did not have any promise that this would happen, this scenario was considered to determine the necessary capacity (troops, material). Also, the opinion of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld turned out to be predominating. He barely listened to his military advisers and wanted to send fewer troops to Iraq compared to what his highest military men asked for.
Quicksand
It can be assumed that the Dutch ambassador in Washington was well informed and so the Dutch government should also have known what the general opinion was. They therefore gave political support to a war they knew beforehand stood under a bad star, resting on political and military quicksand.
Also not considered is the dissonant Dutch position within the E.U. Germany and France have turned against the war, just like our Benelux partners. Did the Dutch government, blinded by its trans-Atlantic loyalty, not have an eye for the European arguments against the war?
It remains amazing that, with the knowledge of the other countries’ positions, the Dutch government has positioned itself so uncritically behind the U.S. In 1995, the U.S. left Holland completely standing in the cold in the Srebrenica case. The superpowers had decided not to defend the Bosnian enclaves. They were a drag on them.
Destroy
In March 1995, it was already clear that General Mladic had given orders from Belgrade to destroy Srebrenica. The U.S. knew this, but left their “loyal ally” in the dark. Even when American satellites documented the slaughters, the Dutch government was not informed by the U.S. The then-minister of defense had to learn a month later from the newspapers that Americans had these images at their disposal. Dutch governments have proven over the last decades to be unfit for conducting power politics. Since the Second World War, Holland, as a “middle-sized country,” has favored taking action via international forums. It is therefore better to stick to this political course and not allow for another solo effort.
The trust gets violated again and again.
In the discussion of the David report, the emphasis over the past few weeks has been on the lack of international legal legitimacy. Not international law, but political power interests that can tip the scales at the U.N. Security Council. With that knowledge, the U.S. decided, without approval of the Security Council, to declare war on Iraq. In making such a decision, a superpower carries a special responsibility. It could be said that the U.S. entered this war like a blind horse. The Dutch government could and should have known this.
Delegation
In January 2003, I was part of a delegation to the NATO assembly to Washington. There was fierce discussion then about the necessity of an additional Security Council resolution as legitimacy for the war against Iraq. Quickly, it became clear during our visit to the State Department that the U.S. would start this war no matter what. The preparations were fully underway. However, a new resolution was considered welcome, given that all permanent members of the Security Council would support it.
The French parliamentarian in our group clearly stated that France would block such a resolution. Scorn and mockery fell upon him. Members of Congress did not understand the European attitude one bit. The Americans had freed Europe in 1945 and now Europe deserted the U.S. French wine was flushed down the streets of American cities.
It became painfully clear that the American government had fully counted on the cooperation of the European allies. They had a simple plan. The U.S. would overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein and after that the European allies would take care of the rest. They were good in reconstruction, after all. Even though they did not have any promise that this would happen, this scenario was considered to determine the necessary capacity (troops, material). Also, the opinion of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld turned out to be predominating. He barely listened to his military advisers and wanted to send fewer troops to Iraq compared to what his highest military men asked for.
Quicksand
It can be assumed that the Dutch ambassador in Washington was well informed and so the Dutch government should also have known what the general opinion was. They therefore gave political support to a war they knew beforehand stood under a bad star, resting on political and military quicksand.
Also not considered is the dissonant Dutch position within the E.U. Germany and France have turned against the war, just like our Benelux partners. Did the Dutch government, blinded by its trans-Atlantic loyalty, not have an eye for the European arguments against the war?
It remains amazing that, with the knowledge of the other countries’ positions, the Dutch government has positioned itself so uncritically behind the U.S. In 1995, the U.S. left Holland completely standing in the cold in the Srebrenica case. The superpowers had decided not to defend the Bosnian enclaves. They were a drag on them.
Destroy
In March 1995, it was already clear that General Mladic had given orders from Belgrade to destroy Srebrenica. The U.S. knew this, but left their “loyal ally” in the dark. Even when American satellites documented the slaughters, the Dutch government was not informed by the U.S. The then-minister of defense had to learn a month later from the newspapers that Americans had these images at their disposal. Dutch governments have proven over the last decades to be unfit for conducting power politics. Since the Second World War, Holland, as a “middle-sized country,” has favored taking action via international forums. It is therefore better to stick to this political course and not allow for another solo effort.
The trust gets violated again and again.
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