The Only Achievement: a Resumption in Talks

The U.S. peace envoy, Senator George Mitchell, described his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, convened yesterday, as fruitful and good. On the other hand, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said that he will be meeting with the Palestinian leadership on Saturday in order to obtain a green light for resuming indirect negotiations.

It is difficult to understand Senator Mitchell’s optimism. Perhaps he heard something new from Netanyahu regarding settlements which encourages him to convince an (already convinced) Palestinian side to quickly return to the negotiating table.

The issues put on the table for indirect talks are the same ones that were up for discussion during the direct marathon-length negotiations, which began with the signing of the Oslo Agreements seventeen years ago. The issues: settlements, final borders of the anticipated Palestinian state, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. It is unlikely that an agreement will be reached about these complicated issues in only four months.

Netanyahu approaches the indirect negotiating table wishing to avoid a collision with the current U.S. administration, and to buy more time to well-prepare, away from American pressure, for the forthcoming war against Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is conceding on all his previously-held tough stances and is returning to the negotiating table because he knows well that his refusal to return will mean the end of his rule. For this reason, he wants to amass more time, not in order to prepare for war, or to light the fuse of Intifada, but rather so that he can remain in power for the longest period possible, and to continue paying the wages of its employees, whose number exceeds 100,000.

The Obama administration wishes to take charge of indirect negotiations because it does not want the current status quo to remain. In other words, it wants to see a change in the complete freeze in the peace process — while increasing its threats against Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas — because this freeze embarrasses its moderate Arab allies. It could also leave a political vacuum which extreme Islamic organizations could rush to fill, particularly Hamas.

The conclusion we wish to draw here from analysis of the tri-party indirect negotiation process is that every party has its goals. But nowhere among these goals is the wish to see the negotiations succeed, or advancement on the core issues. All that could possibly result are superficial, irrelevant and sedative “agreements”: knocking down a few barriers and reinstating an “illusory” (Palestinian) control over some Palestinian cities by handing it over to the forces of an authority that fully cooperates with its Israeli counterpart.