The Curse of Deterrence Theory

Yesterday was the anniversary of Okinawa’s return to Japan from the United States. Though it has been 38 years since the administrative reversion, 75 percent of U.S. bases in Japan are still concentrated in Okinawa, which prompts consideration about the state of Japan-U.S. relations.

The Democratic Party of Japan boasted a 70 percent Cabinet approval rating at the inauguration of its government. However, after only eight months the party is in deep distress as the Cabinet approval rating has plummeted to 20 percent. One major reason is the growing doubt regarding the relocation of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station.

At first, Prime Minister Hatoyama promised to reduce the burden of hosting bases on Okinawa residents. He also promised that at very least the replacement facility would be outside the Okinawa prefecture. Now, he raises a red flag to express that moving the base outside of the prefecture will be “difficult.”

Excuses for Inability to Keep Public Promise

The Prime Minister explains that moving the base outside of the country or prefecture is difficult because “U.S. forces in Okinawa are logistically linked, and the deterrence offered by their presence could be better maintained if they are together.” This reasoning is not convincing. Rather, he has introduced the concept of deterrence into his excuse for failing to commit to his public promises.

It seems that the self-imposed decision deadline at the end of May will be pushed back. The government must first admit its clumsy handling of the issue and apologize to its citizens, starting with the Okinawa constituents.

The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, the only permanent foreign deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps, is stationed in Okinawa. Likewise, the Futenma Air Station houses Aircraft Group 36, which provides helicopters and re-fueling aircraft. The Prime Minister claims that moving this air unit to the coastal area of Camp Schwab, located near the Henoko district of Nago, would not affect the deterrence capability of the U.S. presence. He has yet to substantiate this claim.

The U.S. has deployed the Marines stationed in Okinawa to Iraq and Afghanistan. They frequently take part in training and exercises conducted in the Pacific region. Despite this deployment, no one says that the U.S. ability to provide deterrence in the Far East has diminished.

Even If Not in the Okinawa Prefecture

It is natural to see the stability of this region as based on the deterrence provided by the entirety of U.S. forces stationed in Korea and Japan, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the South Korean military and the Japanese Self-Defense force. However, if there is an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. Marine Corps’ role would be to evacuate U.S. citizens and secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction. This is rapid mobility, not deterrence.

If the Chinese military and American military were to confront each other, the outcome would be a competition over air superiority and naval control of the region. In this instance, the U.S. naval air capabilities would be more important than the Marine Corps. The defense of the Senkaku Islands is the responsibility of the Japanese Self-Defense Force, and whether the Marine Corps would intervene is uncertain.

In an emergency, additional Marine reinforcements would come from the United States, which contradicts the notion that regional deterrence is impossible without the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa. Why, then, is the U.S. administration unable to speak of relocation outside of the country or the prefecture? It is because there are issues that the U.S. does not want to raise, even after a change in administration.

The U.S. military bases, the burden of expenses and the inequality that marks the Japan Status of Forces Agreement are remnants of the U.S. occupation. The Prime Minister claims a “close and equal U.S. alliance,” but he needs to clarify the political problems caused by current plans to relocate the base within the prefecture. He should regroup and begin candid discussions with the U.S about the appropriate relocation of the military station.

The Prime Minister keeps flip-flopping on his position and the Japan-U.S. alliance is in a state of crisis. These problems are not necessarily all bad for Japanese citizens. Regardless of intent, the issues of American deterrence and the feelings of the Okinawa constituents have brought the entirety of Japan together. In Okinawa, people openly refer to the heavy burden of hosting the Marines as discrimination at the hands of the Japanese mainland.

Originally, the Marines in Okinawa were based in the Gifu and Yamanashi prefectures. In 1956, due to the Sunagawa incident and other anti-base movements on the Japanese mainland, U.S. bases on the mainland moved to Okinawa, which at the time was still under U.S. military governance.

If the U.S. presence in Japan is indispensable for the stability of the East Asian region, all Japanese citizens should pay proportionately for these expenses. Forcing U.S. bases on Okinawa in the name of maintaining the Japan-U.S. mutual security structure is an empty argument. With the reduction of the burden on Okinawa in mind, the Hatoyama Cabinet is currently talking to all the governors of Japan. The Governor of the Osaka Prefecture, Hashimoto Toru, has expressed a positive attitude.

Sharing the Burden

Of course, the majority of residents must accept the idea, but if the maintenance of security policy is important, then the nation as a whole should shoulder the burden that Okinawa citizens bear. If Prime Minister Hatoyama believes this is too difficult, then he should seek to relocate the base outside of Japan. Deterrence theory is just an excuse to keep the U.S. bases in Okinawa. To release ourselves from this spell, we must relieve Okinawa’s unequal burden.