Transparency Conceals Fear

On May 3, the U.S. announced that, from 1967 to September 2009, it had reduced its total number of nuclear weapons by 84 percent, from 31,225 to 5,113. It also released the details of changes in nuclear weapons since 1962, as well as the number dismantled since 1994. Many analysts hold this to be a sign that the U.S. is taking the lead in nuclear transparency, and is trying to pressure China and other nations to follow suit.

Transparency Conceals Fear of China

Once again, the issue of nuclear transparency has returned to the U.S.-China negotiation table. The U.S. Department of Defense "Nuclear Posture Review Report" published in April mentioned China over 30 times, often together with Russia, and the term “transparency” appeared 17 times, often in relation to China.

“While facing the increasingly urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China.”

At the same time, “ ... the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain concerned about China’s current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs — their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guides them — raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions."

The U.S. " ... must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents."

The report also emphasizes that, in order to increase transparency and trust with Russia and China, the U.S. may lay down conditions for establishing a nuclear-free world to build a solid foundation for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fighting nuclear terrorism. The goal of U.S.-China nuclear strategic talks is to establish a place and mechanism for strategic, policy, program and other types of exchange, increasing trust and transparency while reducing misunderstandings.　

“Transparency” is what America keeps demanding of China. On the surface, it would seem that the modernization of China’s military, particularly its non-transparency regarding nuclear stores, is a problem. But at the same time, this year’s "Nuclear Posture Review" gives one the sense that fear is the hidden motivation for demanding transparency from China. Why isn’t America aggressively pursuing other nations, such as England or France, who possess nuclear weapons and have kept the details of their stores a secret? The original U.S. target was Russia, and now China has been ranked behind it, showing how worried the Americans are.

What direction will the Chinese nuclear program take? Will it be defying international trends if it increases nuclear weapons while the U.S. and Russia are promising large-scale reductions? On a larger scale, this would go against the U.S. call for a nuclear-free world. More specifically, it would upset the nuclear balance among the three powers and threaten American dominance. This shows that pressing demands for transparency regarding China’s nuclear strategies, policies, and stores reflects widespread American fear of the modernization of China’s national defense.

The U.S. Has No Reason to Fear China

Upon consideration, it is apparent that these fears are rather groundless and unnecessary.

First of all, China’s nuclear power is limited, representing a fraction of Russia or America’s. Even if both cut their weapon stores by half, China’s nuclear weapons would affect neither the so-called “strategic stability” nor their positions of advantage. America and Russia’s newly-established disarmament goals will take at least a decade. In September, Chinese chairman Hu Jintao told the U.N. Security Council Summit on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation that other nations would join international disarmament when the time was right. Of course, China was included among those other nations.

China’s policy regarding nuclear disarmament is that it should be complete, comprehensive, and led by the major powers; therefore, the U.S. and Russia, who possess over 90 percent of the world’s total nuclear weapons, have an obligation to reduce their stores. At the current stage, negotiations between the U.S. and China would be fruitless because of the wide disparity in their nuclear capabilities; the U.S. has a global missile defense system, as well a general advantage.

Second, small nations always keep the details of their nuclear programs a secret to prove their reliability, and China is no exception. Its nuclear policies and stores are maintained primarily with the economy in mind, which is due to how the first generation of leaders understood nuclear weapons, and is still being determined by China’s unique national defense policy, which is to maintain a small amount of weapons. China’s deployment stance is also unique in that, rather than aiming nuclear weapons at any country, it simply maintains a counter-attack force to be alerted in case of nuclear threat. The U.S. and Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the other hand, can be fired within a matter of minutes. The difference lies in China’s policy of self-protection, which is unlikely to change in the future because this would require costly and unnecessary alterations to its military structure, alertness level and weapons systems.

Third, given the current international situation, China will not go against current trends and increase its nuclear stores. Since the economic liberalization thirty years ago, the nation has prioritized economic development, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that they would prioritize military expenditures at the expense of the economy. Beijing’s goals in advancing nuclear weaponry are purely defensive, including upgrading nuclear information, ensuring safety and reliability, and improving defense, response and precision striking capabilities.

Several agreements were reached during the recent U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Will progress be made on nuclear issues? I think it will be slow because, both for China and the U.S., the nuclear issue is a sensitive issue that is fundamentally different from the economic one. Beijing is not going to be particularly interested in or eager to respond to the numerous strategic dialogues organized by the U.S., because the time is not yet right and the disparity between their levels of nuclear power is too great. It is more interested in building trust by making clear the goals of its nuclear policies and modernization programs. There is also no need for Washington to worry or obsess over China’s nuclear development, because it will never start an arms race or threaten the “strategic stability” or “strategic balance.”