Turkish Contradictions on Iran and Their Reflections in Domestic Politics

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu spoke to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the phone for 45 minutes yesterday evening. There is a minor but significant contradiction in the details of their talk as released to the press by both countries.

According to the American news, Secretary Clinton suggested that diplomacy on the Iranian issue hereafter should be led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the “5+1 Group,” which consists of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, rather than any individual country. In this statement, America appears to be advising Turkey not to act on its own on this issue anymore and perhaps even to take a step back and leave the work to others. The Turkish news, in contrast, said no more than that Secretary Clinton praised Turkey’s diplomatic efforts so far. Perhaps she did congratulate Turkey, but we do not know if she also made the statement seen in the American news and, if so, how it was perceived by the Turkish news (or whether they have perceived it yet).

Turkish foreign policy appears to have reached an impasse following its various success stories in recent years. The main reason for the deadlock is the events revolving around the Iran–Israel–Turkey–U.S. quadrilateral. Iran’s nuclear program worries Israel more than anyone. The obvious reason is that Iranian leaders have said many times that Israel “should be destroyed” and have maintained that rhetoric. Relying on this rhetoric, Israel keeps threatening to act on its own to prevent Iran from having nuclear power if the world, particularly the United States, sits idly by.

Iran’s threat should be taken seriously because, while it is true that this country does not yet have nuclear warheads, it possesses the capacity to launch them, even on the intercontinental scale. In other words, Iran has the capacity to hit any target in the world at the moment.

Israel’s threat to act on its own is the principal urge behind the West’s efforts, led by the United States, to stop Iran. It might also not be wrong to say that although Turkey and Brazil managed to make a deal with Iran for the exchange of nuclear material along the same lines the U.S. and the West had previously desired, the principal aim of the U.N. sanctions on Iran was to alleviate Israeli concerns.

It seems that Turkey either believes that Israel is bluffing the whole world with its threat to stop Iran on its own, or Turkey is indeed persuaded that the Iranian nuclear program has peaceful purposes. But Turkey, as I see it, believes that even if Iran develops a nuclear warhead, it will not hit Israel, and Israel can be thwarted from acting alone, if the U.S. wants to stop them. Turkey makes its calculations based on the assumption of a united Middle East, whose future is built on the balance of nuclear destruction.

Regardless of the calculations and predictions for the future and the strategic outlook, the deadlock in the Middle East on the Iran–Israel axis leaves Turkey in a tough position with regard to the West and forces Turkey into a not-so-amicable conjecture. I believe Turkey has made a few serious mistakes in its policy toward Iran. The most important of these mistakes was a statement by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which made it clear that he was on Iran’s side. I suppose that Turkey’s credibility problem began after this statement by the prime minister, which brought into question its reliability as a mediator between the West and Iran.

This impasse has reflections in Turkish domestic politics as well. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) — which still sees itself bitterly fighting with the “state establishment” for survival, although it has been in government for the last eight years — is jeopardizing its “Western-oriented, pro-Western government” appearance, which has been its most significant argument against the charges of the state establishment.

This has allowed the hot “shift-of-axis-in-foreign-policy” debate, which is groundless and not based in reality, to continue unabated. The government feels obliged to counter the speculation by repeating that “there is no shift of axis,” and the pro-AK Party groups accuse columnists, newspapers or retired diplomats who express support for the “shift of axis” of having “ties to Ergenekon structures.”

In a nutshell, the impasse in Turkish foreign policy influences the AK Party’s conception of itself and forces it to adopt a more defensive position. This position actually does nothing more than make the state of deadlock in foreign policy even worse. Standstill in foreign policy produces a defensive position in domestic politics, more impasse in foreign policy, a more aggressive defensive position in domestic politics. …

This has been the vicious cycle lately. Breaking out of it is up to the government.