Dawn of Peace in East Asia Revealed

Former American President Jimmy Carter recently visited North Korea, and although the purpose was to rescue the detained American teachers, it also seems to have borne the task of diplomacy. Pyongyang mentioned by name the arrival of the 86-year-old Carter in order to communicate North Korea’s desire to return to the six-party talks and reaffirm its denuclearization commitment. Regardless of what their true intentions are, this at least would help stabilize the strategic balance of the Asia-Pacific and show a glimmer of hope for peace in East Asia.

Late in March of this year, as a result of the Cheonan warship explosion incident, the East Asian security situation immediately sunk into uncertainty. Sino-American relations had originally been experiencing friction on account of American sales of military equipment to Taiwan and the issue of national sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea that progressed to the naval confrontation in the Yellow Sea. North Korean enhancement of their combat readiness and the display of their nuclear deterrence power also added to the uncertainty of military conflict in Northeast Asia. Today, it is only because of Carter’s diplomatic mission that we can change the crisis into a turn for the better. The present dramatic change in East Asia’s security situation can’t help but call into question the outcome of meticulous Chinese and American planning.

When Carter visited Seoul in March, he warned that the United States and South Korea must bear the disastrous consequences of a failure in nuclear talks while urging the United States to open a direct dialogue channel with Pyongyang. Originally, the six-party talks aimed to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. At the moment, it has been reordered as a meeting mechanism for Northeast Asian foreign ministers to promote and consult about general security affairs. In other words, it no longer has the communicating mechanism of previous six-party talks. Therefore it will become very difficult for North and South Korea to unilaterally resolve problems similar to the Cheonan warship crisis. Since the start of the six-party talks in August of 2003, six rounds of talks have been held. During this period, a certain number of agreements were signed, including a consensus that North Korea should abandon its nuclear weapons. This was seen especially in the 2005 “919 [Sept. 19th ] Joint Statement”, in which Pyongyang promised it would abandon all plans to develop nuclear weapons and return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as accept the supervision and verification of international institutions.

The six-party talks have continued to stall, and the reason for this is that there is little mutual trust between the United States and North Korea. According to documents, America demanded North Korea disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities before the end of 2007 and to provide a full report on its nuclear program in order for the U.S. to fulfill its promise of aid. In June 2008, in response to Pyongyang’s violation of this commitment, President Obama put into effect a “National State of Emergency” aimed at North Korea’s economy through a series of economic sanctions. This led directly to the stalling of the six-party talks. North Korea announced in mid-April of the following year that it was withdrawing from the six-party talks and in May would carry out a nuclear test for the second time.

In the past, the United States did not adhere to internationally acknowledged methods of economic sanctions. In fact, the U.S.-led international sanctions against North Korea have already caused the North Korean economy to become more fragile, and it seems Kim Jong Il’s grip on North Korean politics have also become unstable. Pyongyang expressing a desire to return to the six-party talks at this moment suggests that external pressure could be the primary cause behind North Korean behavior. The problem is that, in the past, few of the international community’s economic sanctions were able to achieve its aims. The result of more than two years of American and South Korean sanctions on North Korea has only led to North Korea becoming more dependent on China. Whether North Korea returns to the six-party talks, or even if a stable peaceful balance can be established on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing’s influence is not to be underestimated.

China has the leverage to resolve the Korean nuclear issue, as seen from the previous rounds of six-party talks. In late August, Beijing sent a special envoy, Wu Dawei, to shuttle back and forth between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and the United States. They even went so far as to allow Kim Jong Il to visit Beijing twice, where he sought political support and economic assistance from the Chinese. Hu Jintao’s positive reading of the possibility of the resumption of the six-party talks and the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula explains in particular Beijing’s diplomatic conduct towards the Northeast Asian regional conflict, combining the concepts of “cool observation” and “proper response”. America ought to recognize this reality; otherwise Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will not be able to prevent the Chinese and American Yellow Sea naval power display from escalating. She should tell the international media that Beijing will work in “close consultation” and “mutually cooperate and discuss how to cope” with the Korean nuclear problem.

The six-party talks will not only help ease the military tensions between North and South Korea; it should also ease tensions in Sino-U.S. relations. In any case, since the United States is able look on the substantial improvement of cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China favorably, how can we sit by and watch Sino-U.S. relations deteriorate to the brink of conflict?