The Maliki-Sadr Agreement and the U.S. Position

The agreement between Prime Minister Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr announced on Friday Oct. 1, 2010, has uncovered another page in the dossier of contradictions in U.S. foreign policy, especially those policies concerning America’s stand on the political process in Iraq. The first reaction on the part of the administration was to welcome the agreement, judging by the comments of the spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State. However, James Jeffrey, the American ambassador to Iraq, voiced a contradictory position some six days later, stating that any formal role granted by the Iraqi government to the movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr will have a negative impact on Washington’s ability to forge a strategic partnership with Baghdad.

The truth is that there is no possibility of a strategic partnership with Baghdad because of the absence of balance between the two parties and the lack of commitment from the American side to provide means of support and development to the political process. To be fair, talks about a strategic partnership with a country in the Middle East or the Third World — and probably one in the “fourth world” such as Iraq — figure among the methods of political propaganda that do not help. Actually, it is tantamount to “throwing ashes in the face,” as some would say. By merely reading the paragraphs and articles of the security agreement between the two countries, we come to understand the meaning of partnership and on what legal foundations the agreement was written. It was indeed an agreement between the strong and the weak and written on the basis of acceptance of the status quo by the Iraqis.

The ambassador himself went on to describe the Sadr movement as no different from the groups that are involved in impeding the democratic process in Iraq. The Sadr movement entered the last elections as an Iraqi political entity in accordance with the constitution and with the approval of the Independent High Electoral Commission, and it won 41 seats. The question here is: How is it that this movement was allowed to participate in the elections if it was not a political party but instead an outlawed, armed militia? This is the contradiction of the American position in dealing with the political process. I say this not to defend the movement but to try to throw light on this kind of policy, which was — and still is — a major reason for the worsening of the political scene in Iraq. Anyone following U.S. policy in terms of words and deeds will come to this conclusion of contradiction.

The U.S. administration has repeatedly stated through both Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — not to mention the statements by the American ambassador in Baghdad — that the United States does not interfere with the political process in Iraq. It has also said many times that Iraq is a sovereign country and no other party can interfere in its internal politics. Moreover, the ambassador himself said previously that the formation of a government was purely an Iraqi issue. Regarding positions on the crisis itself, when some politicians asked the U.S. administration to interfere and help with resolving the crisis, it declined. But when we go back to the security agreement signed between the two countries, we find a paragraph clearly stipulating U.S. interference in the political process to support and help at the request of Iraqis. This contradiction is likely to continually block the road ahead of the political process.

The reality is that the political scene in Iraq will continue to suffer crises. For example, in agreements and alliances there is a crisis; in holding ministers accountable there is a crisis; in selecting a prime minister there is a crisis; in dismissing a governor there is a crisis; in providing services there is a crisis and in providing electricity there is a bigger crisis. The explanation for all this, dear readers, is that the political process started from “the big crisis,” which is sectarianism. Sectarianism is considered an iron collar that will continue to shackle the future of all Iraqis, and I firmly believe that Iraqi leaders will soon be compelled to institute a new ministry called the “Ministry of Crisis Resolution.” But all the powers on earth will be unable to solve the sectarian crises in Iraq as long as the Iraqis themselves do not decide to banish the principle of sectarianism from the constitution and replace it with the principle of Iraqi national identity, over which nothing is given priority, in order to build our dear homeland and secure a respectable, safe future for our children. This should not be asking too much of the Iraqi people!