Washington and the Sudanese Referendum: Vote “Yes” or “No Objection”?!

Is it reasonable that the greatest head of state became “involved” by saying that the failure to hold the referendum in Southern Sudan will lead to the deaths of millions of people? Who told him this, who will validate such baseless and reckless claims? How can a decades-old crisis finally no longer tolerate delay, and only for a few months? How do the deadlines and requirements acquire all of this “holiness” in Sudan and remove all manifestations of holiness and respect in Palestine? Any ambivalence and any bias for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and diplomacy was obvious despite the U.S.’ cleverness and propriety.

Before the U.S. president, the chief of U.S. diplomacy rashly discussed the results of the referendum in the southern region. Before the vote even occurred, Mrs. Hillary Clinton started speaking about the post-separation period in the south. This is, we can say, at the very least indecent, and it complicates matters rather than helping to resolve them. Further, it taints the image of the United States, adding to the accumulated effects of negative opinions related to Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan.

After the election of the first black president of the United States came the first appointment of a black person to the United Nations Security Council by the United States, Mrs. Susan Rice, who warned of the consequences of the postponement of the referendum without taking the trouble herself to listen to the different points of view found within Sudan. Instead, she led the Security Council on an expedition into the jungles and deserts of Sudan with one simple goal: to gain support for Selvakir Mayardit in his quest for the deployment of international forces between the divided north and south Sudan. This move is opposed by Khartoum, as it still considers southern Sudan to be a part of Sudan and thus subject to its sovereignty. The need to separate the nation via a wall of international forces is a decision to be made by the central government in Khartoum and not through hopeful recommendations of the Juba government.

In fact, the American discourse surrounding the Sudanese crisis resembles that of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In both cases, there is an ongoing and consistent group that opposes the other, that often acts to limit their crimes and to suppress and justify them, even if it leads to the promotion of a policy of impunity.

The SPLM is at war with the enemies of the people in the south. One of the opponents of the arrangement, Sadiq al-Mahdi, testifies that the SPLM engaged in the worst form of “bullying” in the recent elections in their region, something never condoned by Washington. Further, the SPLM violated agreements with Khartoum, moving toward a unilateral approach in the south and Abyei. All this has occurred without any comment or “threat” from Washington and shows the lack of concern over the disregard of these important measures, as has occurred whenever a disagreement with the Bashir regime arises.

Ultimately, the United States wants to fragment Sudan, and from this standpoint, the policy line is unchanged in proposing a vote of “yes” or “no objection” in favor of the separation. The U.S. will spare no effort to create a “southern state of Christian democracy” as it has done with the “Israeli state of Jewish democracy.” More accurately, Washington, you want to create “Israel two” in southern Sudan, making it a base for your war on “terrorism” and an invasion front for the security and military intelligence mechanisms that will supply Israel from the depths of Africa. A state to serve as a barrier between Arab north Africa on the one hand and the countries of the non-Arabic countries of sub-Saharan Africa on the other — just as the creation of Israel came to be a barrier to preventing communication and cooperation between the African and Asian wings of the Arab world.

We are certain that Washington will not care about the “credibility” of the referendum, which is welcomed as long as it will lead to the succession of the south. However, at the very least, it will not raise concern over the surprising exclusion of the voice of the south speaking in favor of unity. The issue of credibility will be just as important as was the “credibility” of Iran’s recent presidential elections.

It does not matter that a stable democracy may arise from the referendum; the free will and volition of the people also does not matter (it was not respected in Palestine); it does not matter if the state is corrupt (there is none more corrupt than Karzai and his cronies, and the Palestinian Authority today is no less corrupt than the late Yasser Arafat). What is important is to keep systems and governments tied to the will of such communities and allies, a friend of Washington and an ally of its ally Israel. Then there can be corruption, fraud and dictatorship, and it will be seen as nothing more than a “misunderstanding” between the “good guys.”

The American position on the Sudanese issue, its recklessness and bias, double standards and selfish accounts are enough to write off all I have tried with this administration to intervene and improve the reputation of Washington and its image and credibility for almost two years. All of which stems from the question: Why do they hate us? Why all of this hostility toward the United States in the Arab and Islamic world?