The Tea Party Pushes the Right Toward a Reinvention
Published in Le Temps
(Switzerland) on 15 October 2010
by Olivier Meuwly (link to original)
(Switzerland) on 15 October 2010
by Olivier Meuwly (link to original)
Translated from
by Allison Ahlgrim.
Edited by Heidi Kaufmann.
The American tea party and the European populist and nationalist parties: All of these movements were born from the resentment of a “liberticide” State and have prospered, thanks to the right’s abandonment of certain conservative foundations.
For several months now, the Tea Party movement, born in the United States, has been making headlines worldwide. The fast-approaching legislative elections have propelled this rally into stardom, claiming to be the last authentic example of true conservatism. Will it affect the traditional struggle between Democrats and Republicans? Will it breathe new life into peripheral ideas, presented as a new ideological realm? Or does it instead run the paradoxical risk of rescuing the Democratic majority by highlighting the rifts in the other party, which is actually its closest neighbor?
These issues will of course be key in determining the future of the Obama presidency. However, the United States is, after all, quite accustomed to hostile movements against the central government, [such as those] opposing tax increases and supporting the fundamental freedom of the individual. On the left, the movement in the 1970s usually referenced [Henry] David Thoreau, one of the bards of American anarchy, who preferred to exile himself near his Walden Pond. On the right, many groups have distinguished themselves, from the first anarcho-capitalists, such as Lysander Spooner, to the libertarians and neoconservatives, by rejecting authority in any form.
So how should this movement in particular interest us? The Tea Party appears to be the American variation on a theme that we know quite well in Europe — an atmosphere usually considered to be populist. This could be a fair assessment, because it examines the more global connections woven between diverse movements instead of getting lost in specific case studies.
However, the Tea Party invites observers to dive a bit deeper and rediscover the ideological foundations of this phenomenon. It poses a question that has not yet been completely explored: Why are individuals drawn to support these types of movements? To respond, we must realize that the normal definitions of right-wing populism will not suffice. If mainstream right-wing populists offer simple answers to the current issues, they will only raise more issues, which will not be so simple.
Everyone watching is quick to point out the apparent lack of ideological consistency which distinguishes most of these populist movements. The leaders of all these movements — from the American tea party to the Swiss UDC [Democratic Union of the Centre, or Swiss People’s Party], through the Netherlands and Austria — have united their supporters through the sole factor of highlighting their resentment. The resentment of destabilization thanks to globalization; the hatred of a modernism which cripples traditional values; the forced retreat of “politically correct” egalitarians; the denial of a liberal democracy which too heavily favors the homeless, foreigners and anyone with a new lifestyle — these also breed a rejection of the liberal State, which they feel they’ve been forced to support via taxation and which they feel is hunting them.
But can resentment alone determine a political stance? And, related, although possibly more “politically incorrect”: What if these movements reflect a more substantial ideological current than first impressions lead us to believe?
What do the supporters of the tea party and their European predecessors claim? Their speeches, of course, proclaim a feeling of betrayal: They see themselves as the losing party of the “Grand Compromise” between the bourgeoisie and the socio-democrats in every democracy since the close of World War II, which in turn has given rise to the free market economy and a need for a social State opposing communism. The key issue is a loss of trust in institutions.
But they go further. They defiantly revive conservative ideas that the right had banished, while simultaneously attacking liberals by targeting the very notion of liberty, their central nervous system. They see the liberal State of any democracy — a self-styling guarantor supposedly fighting against the encroaching government — as an accomplice of all-encompassing bureaucracies. They also accuse liberals of not proffering any responses. These same liberals have watched unblinkingly as their fundamental ideas have been swept up in the modern left, who have, since the 1970s, been prone to rebrand State interventionism as the only way to guarantee that liberty.
In this cooperative postwar society, haven’t both the liberal and conservative parties had to sacrifice their principles in the name of pragmatism, despite all their successes? Their ability to adapt is certainly beneficial, but they have become spinelessly flexible on values that are not always their own.
Thus, a space has opened to the right of self-proclaimed liberal and “classic” conservative parties — a space which will soon be filled by new movements fueled by two major philosophies: the neoliberalism of the 1990s, heralding “purer” right-wing freedoms, along with the libertarian freedom of the 1970s; and a neoconservatism rooted in the patriotic nation instead of the bureaucratic State, the true limits of freedom.
Neither the “traditional” right nor the left, distracted by fascist branches at every turn, recognized the emerging right-wing libertarian call to action. The movement then blocked itself off behind a wall of electioneering, amassing contradictions in its approach to the State and narrowing its concentration to fight against outsiders. It varies according to the country. Still, the desire to ignore all of the “anti-everything” tirades presented by these movements must not overshadow the murky waters of their more complex ideological depths.
This virtual rift at the heart of the liberal right, which had long been able to unite both its statist and conservative platforms under one banner, will be bitter and painful. The European right — from Sarkozy to Fini, from Cameron’s Big Society to the PLR/PDC [Free Democratic Party of Switzerland/Democratic Christian Party] — will work incessantly to rebuild. One major problem that they face is this: How do they take this fringe of their electorate into consideration, which has finally dared to speak out after long remaining silent, claiming that the State is developing into something that resembles liberticide?
Even Germany, a country that had considered itself immune to all forms of extremism, is beginning to doubt itself. They had long congratulated themselves on their populists’ lack of impact, and rightly so. Now comes the “Sarrazin” affair, named for a socio-democratic banker who splintered off with a pamphlet denouncing the takeover of Germany by foreign immigrants. Even newspapers like Die Zeit, which is not a right-wing publication, are worried: By making their platforms more attractive, is the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] creating a hole in the right to be filled by a surge of strong, yet unsound organizations?
Can liberalism escape from this situation? It could possibly lead Obama, who has refused to stigmatize the Tea Party, to blacklist the vague resentment being expressed. However, we also ought to wait and see if the current liberal and conservative parties can reconcile with this old-guard conservatism that has declared its secession. Will liberals be able to respond well enough to calm the unrest stirring at the right? A commonsensical liberalism may work, on the condition that it is covered by a pragmatic veil worthy of its title. Believe us: The overwhelming majority of the electorate drawn to support these movements are not on Sarah Palin’s level; they don’t have the tea party for a muse. They are delivering a message regarding the notion of freedom and the limits thereof, of the modern State and of ways to re-appropriate it in this day and age — all in a post-crisis climate, which doesn’t simplify anything. Liberalism cannot afford to ignore these issues. The coherence of its entire platform depends on it.
The author will participate in a colloquium: “Swiss Liberalism: Its History, Nature and Future,” which will be held in Berne on Nov. 12 and 13. To register: http://www.libinst.ch/?i=li-kolloquium-liberalismus--en
For several months now, the Tea Party movement, born in the United States, has been making headlines worldwide. The fast-approaching legislative elections have propelled this rally into stardom, claiming to be the last authentic example of true conservatism. Will it affect the traditional struggle between Democrats and Republicans? Will it breathe new life into peripheral ideas, presented as a new ideological realm? Or does it instead run the paradoxical risk of rescuing the Democratic majority by highlighting the rifts in the other party, which is actually its closest neighbor?
These issues will of course be key in determining the future of the Obama presidency. However, the United States is, after all, quite accustomed to hostile movements against the central government, [such as those] opposing tax increases and supporting the fundamental freedom of the individual. On the left, the movement in the 1970s usually referenced [Henry] David Thoreau, one of the bards of American anarchy, who preferred to exile himself near his Walden Pond. On the right, many groups have distinguished themselves, from the first anarcho-capitalists, such as Lysander Spooner, to the libertarians and neoconservatives, by rejecting authority in any form.
So how should this movement in particular interest us? The Tea Party appears to be the American variation on a theme that we know quite well in Europe — an atmosphere usually considered to be populist. This could be a fair assessment, because it examines the more global connections woven between diverse movements instead of getting lost in specific case studies.
However, the Tea Party invites observers to dive a bit deeper and rediscover the ideological foundations of this phenomenon. It poses a question that has not yet been completely explored: Why are individuals drawn to support these types of movements? To respond, we must realize that the normal definitions of right-wing populism will not suffice. If mainstream right-wing populists offer simple answers to the current issues, they will only raise more issues, which will not be so simple.
Everyone watching is quick to point out the apparent lack of ideological consistency which distinguishes most of these populist movements. The leaders of all these movements — from the American tea party to the Swiss UDC [Democratic Union of the Centre, or Swiss People’s Party], through the Netherlands and Austria — have united their supporters through the sole factor of highlighting their resentment. The resentment of destabilization thanks to globalization; the hatred of a modernism which cripples traditional values; the forced retreat of “politically correct” egalitarians; the denial of a liberal democracy which too heavily favors the homeless, foreigners and anyone with a new lifestyle — these also breed a rejection of the liberal State, which they feel they’ve been forced to support via taxation and which they feel is hunting them.
But can resentment alone determine a political stance? And, related, although possibly more “politically incorrect”: What if these movements reflect a more substantial ideological current than first impressions lead us to believe?
What do the supporters of the tea party and their European predecessors claim? Their speeches, of course, proclaim a feeling of betrayal: They see themselves as the losing party of the “Grand Compromise” between the bourgeoisie and the socio-democrats in every democracy since the close of World War II, which in turn has given rise to the free market economy and a need for a social State opposing communism. The key issue is a loss of trust in institutions.
But they go further. They defiantly revive conservative ideas that the right had banished, while simultaneously attacking liberals by targeting the very notion of liberty, their central nervous system. They see the liberal State of any democracy — a self-styling guarantor supposedly fighting against the encroaching government — as an accomplice of all-encompassing bureaucracies. They also accuse liberals of not proffering any responses. These same liberals have watched unblinkingly as their fundamental ideas have been swept up in the modern left, who have, since the 1970s, been prone to rebrand State interventionism as the only way to guarantee that liberty.
In this cooperative postwar society, haven’t both the liberal and conservative parties had to sacrifice their principles in the name of pragmatism, despite all their successes? Their ability to adapt is certainly beneficial, but they have become spinelessly flexible on values that are not always their own.
Thus, a space has opened to the right of self-proclaimed liberal and “classic” conservative parties — a space which will soon be filled by new movements fueled by two major philosophies: the neoliberalism of the 1990s, heralding “purer” right-wing freedoms, along with the libertarian freedom of the 1970s; and a neoconservatism rooted in the patriotic nation instead of the bureaucratic State, the true limits of freedom.
Neither the “traditional” right nor the left, distracted by fascist branches at every turn, recognized the emerging right-wing libertarian call to action. The movement then blocked itself off behind a wall of electioneering, amassing contradictions in its approach to the State and narrowing its concentration to fight against outsiders. It varies according to the country. Still, the desire to ignore all of the “anti-everything” tirades presented by these movements must not overshadow the murky waters of their more complex ideological depths.
This virtual rift at the heart of the liberal right, which had long been able to unite both its statist and conservative platforms under one banner, will be bitter and painful. The European right — from Sarkozy to Fini, from Cameron’s Big Society to the PLR/PDC [Free Democratic Party of Switzerland/Democratic Christian Party] — will work incessantly to rebuild. One major problem that they face is this: How do they take this fringe of their electorate into consideration, which has finally dared to speak out after long remaining silent, claiming that the State is developing into something that resembles liberticide?
Even Germany, a country that had considered itself immune to all forms of extremism, is beginning to doubt itself. They had long congratulated themselves on their populists’ lack of impact, and rightly so. Now comes the “Sarrazin” affair, named for a socio-democratic banker who splintered off with a pamphlet denouncing the takeover of Germany by foreign immigrants. Even newspapers like Die Zeit, which is not a right-wing publication, are worried: By making their platforms more attractive, is the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] creating a hole in the right to be filled by a surge of strong, yet unsound organizations?
Can liberalism escape from this situation? It could possibly lead Obama, who has refused to stigmatize the Tea Party, to blacklist the vague resentment being expressed. However, we also ought to wait and see if the current liberal and conservative parties can reconcile with this old-guard conservatism that has declared its secession. Will liberals be able to respond well enough to calm the unrest stirring at the right? A commonsensical liberalism may work, on the condition that it is covered by a pragmatic veil worthy of its title. Believe us: The overwhelming majority of the electorate drawn to support these movements are not on Sarah Palin’s level; they don’t have the tea party for a muse. They are delivering a message regarding the notion of freedom and the limits thereof, of the modern State and of ways to re-appropriate it in this day and age — all in a post-crisis climate, which doesn’t simplify anything. Liberalism cannot afford to ignore these issues. The coherence of its entire platform depends on it.
The author will participate in a colloquium: “Swiss Liberalism: Its History, Nature and Future,” which will be held in Berne on Nov. 12 and 13. To register: http://www.libinst.ch/?i=li-kolloquium-liberalismus--en
It is a gross mistake to compare the American Tea Party to populist movements in Europe. The Tea Party is merely an extension of the American Revolution. No one in the media is telling you the truth. The Tea Parties are focused on the American Constitution, Declaration of Independence and the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers.
European style liberalism, or statism where the individual is subordinated to the state is the same environment from which our founding fathers declared independence. Now, our own government has become an enemy to that independence.
Historically, our nation has been and remains a center-right nation. 60% of the people consider themselves somewhat or very conservative. Only 30% consider themselves “liberal”. By liberal, of course, we mean socialist.
Our government officials are by definition public servants. Their job is to exercise our will, not to impose theirs upon us. The current President and Congress have violated their oaths of office in defying the will of the American people. The upcoming elections are a response to that presumptuous and totally unacceptable behavior.
Historically, in Europe, government officials are rulers. Your populist movements are nothing like ours, we operate from an entirely different paradigm.
If you want to understand the Tea Party, you must study the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the U.S., and the Federalist Papers. All are available online. Happy studying.
Best regards,
Gail S
http://www.backyardfence.wordpress.com