Who Is the Common Threat for Turkey and the U.S.?

It is actually possible to summarize the problems between Turkey and the United States in the last 20 years with a basic analysis. The two countries no longer share a definition and perception of a “common enemy” the way they did during the Cold War. The problem is this simple.

The common threat during the Cold War, that many Turkish and American experts who are old enough to remember and nostalgically reminisce, was of course the Soviet Union and the communist system that it represented. There was not any kind of a situation that would create a disagreement about “the common enemy and common strategy.”

In the 1990s, after the Soviets dispersed and communism became history, the case started changing rapidly. Problems began to emerge between Turkey and the U.S. regarding the definition of common threat and common strategy that did not occur between 1950 and 1990.

The main threat for the U.S. in the ‘90s was Iraq and Saddam Hussein. However, for Turkey, Iraq did not pose a serious threat. The number one threat to national security for Ankara had become the PKK. The situation became more complicated when the U.S. carried out Operation Provide Comfort to weaken Saddam and protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

What was worse than Turkey and the U.S. not agreeing on a common threat was that Washington had become “the protector of the Kurds” in the eyes of the Turkish public. Thus, the U.S. and its plans in the region started to be perceived as a threat by Turkey. In this situation, as the power of the PKK and Kurdish nationalism increased, opponents of the U.S. in Turkey increased proportionately.

After September 11, 2001, radical Islamic terror became the number one threat for the U.S. This actually created an opportunity for a common threat perception. But still, a common definition of terrorism and threat perception did not develop. For Turkey, the threat was a terrorist movement based on ethnicity. The PKK is a movement founded on Kurdish nationalism, after all. On the other hand, Al Qaeda had no ethnic foundation and was an “ideological” threat and did not threaten Turkey as much as it did the West. In other words “the PKK and Al Qaeda” did not create a perception of a “common threat and common strategy” at the level that “the Soviet Union and communism” did. After 9/11, when the furious U.S. decided to occupy Iraq, Turkish-American relations deteriorated even more. Turkey’s opposition and the March 1 memorandum was a shock for the U.S. Those who thought that “things would get better if Bush left” are now having the same problem with the Obama administration regarding Iran. Just like the March 1 memorandum was a shock for the Bush administration, Turkey’s attitude of investing in Iran has been a shock for the Obama administration. Ankara’s “no” vote in the UN Security Council — especially when countries like China and Russia were in sync with the U.S. — was a serious disappointment for Washington.

There is still the underlying lack of an undeveloped “common threat” perception. Just like Iraq and Saddam Hussein did not pose a serious threat in the 1990s, Iran does not cause a national security concern for Turkey today. The recent “Missile Shield” debate contains the same dynamics. Ankara does not want the missile shield to be against Iran. Despite the mention of Iran in the NATO documents, Ankara believes that the missile shield mission should be in the framework of “a collective security understanding” and should be defined without naming specific countries. Ankara and Washington, who cannot even come to an understanding on a common enemy, will have even more serious problems in the future when it is time to implement a “common defense strategy.” The Post-Cold War era is confusing like that.