Returning from Asia with a Stricken Spirit, Obama Should Reflect Deeply

Obama, who suffered disappointments from the recent midterm elections, has failed to find solace and self-confidence from his recent Asian tour. Be it from a bilateral or a multilateral standpoint, his trip has failed to accomplish the targeted goals. Not only did America fail to establish the scheme of crushing China’s united front, it has now become boxed into a sore spot. Instead, Obama should at least learn from this trip that the “China card” will not help much in America’s strategy to return to Asia. Considerable adjustments to the foundation of its policy are imperative if the U.S. wants to see the fulfillment of its ambitious dream of establishing American leadership in Asia.

All of this was because America was overconfident. Granted, many countries felt threatened by China and thus hoped that the U.S. could exert greater influence in the Pacific Rim. Upon America’s rallying cry these countries would then gather around America. Moreover, it has a world-class political figure in Obama with his glorious halo, where America came within reach of forging a “chariot of self-interest.” However, America has had an inflated opinion of itself. Obama’s inefficacious tour to Asia has at long last taught Americans that establishing “leadership in Asia” is no easy task.

In contrast, Obama was more relaxed in interviews conducted in India and Indonesia. Nevertheless, both countries were very cautious on the issue of alliance with the United States. India wants to raise their global status through the medium of America, but that doesn’t mean that they are positively disposed to the idea of serving as a tool in America’s balancing against China. On the other hand, Indonesia hopes that they can strengthen their status in ASEAN through the U.S., but at the same time they are careful not to develop an overly intimate relationship with America. Furthermore, they refuse to jump on the anti-China bandwagon despite American pressure. Obama’s “A New Beginning” is but another bounced check following the speech in Cairo.

Obama has returned empty-handed from South Korea and Japan. The highly anticipated South Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) was unfruitful. During the G-20 and APEC summits, Obama’s appeal to place pressure on the yuan went unanswered. To make matters worse, America was instead besieged by other countries regarding its own currency. America’s dash to print more money, thereby transferring the burden of the crisis onto other countries, was intensely criticized, embarrassing Obama greatly. At all the multilateral and bilateral events on the trip, apart from restating their original viewpoints and positions, the U.S. accomplished very little else of significance. Even the Americans feel ashamed. They acknowledge that the influence America exerts on the world is quickly dwindling and that Obama’s “celebrity effect” is now gone for good.

It is well-known that Obama’s visit to Asia was definitely not an ordinary visit. Rather, it was a vital part in America’s strategy to return to Asia. However, Obama came as a “salesman,” pushing America’s self-interests onto Asia and everything done was done on the basis of maximizing their own advantage and giving little in return. In employing the strategy of divide and conquer in confronting Asian countries, Obama was doomed to fail from the beginning.

Since July 2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that America was going to return to Asia in a high-profile manner, this strategy of theirs has been well under way and in the process of being instituted. Nevertheless, when a closer look is taken at their “return-to-Asia” strategy, several characteristics can be easily spotted: 1) the orientation to exaggerate the need to guard against “the China threat,” 2) the focus on fortifying military intervention, 3) the strengthening of traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea, and the focus on hauling more associates onto their wagon. The recent actions that the U.S. has taken in Asia revolve around the few points mentioned above.

Despite all this, however, Asia remains cooperative and partial hot-spots will by no means affect the general propensity of peaceful development. When cooperating and working with China, many countries realize that rather than constituting a threat, the development of China actually creates more opportunities. In view of this, if America refuses to make significant changes, it will find it difficult to gain approval from Asia. And thus the ambitious American dream of leading Asia will remain nothing but a dream.