NATO: Learn from the Mistakes in Afghanistan

Friday and Saturday in Lisbon will feature a historic summit. NATO’s 28 heads of state will descend on the Portuguese capital to review the Alliance’s long-term strategies. They will also meet with Russia’s President Medvedev to initiate fresh peaceable agreements with Moscow, lightening the Cold War-like tensions lingering from the end of the Bush era.

The Atlantic Alliance’s strategies haven’t been reviewed since 1999. That was before the fateful day of Sept. 11, before the resulting military offensive launched by the Americans in Afghanistan, whose government, the Taliban, had been accused of harboring terrorists. For the first time since it was founded in 1949 as a bulwark against the USSR, NATO invoked Article 5 of its Charter, the basis for a collective defense: an attack against one is an attack against all.

Thus, little by little, NATO was launched into the Afghan (mis)adventure. There are currently 150,000 troops deployed at the edge of the earth, all of them at the Alliance’s command: 100,000 of them are American and 600 are Belgian. Close to 10 years after the first offensive, and in spite of some progress, NATO is trying to withdraw from this quagmire, opposed as its armies are by fierce internal resistance. There have already been 650 deaths in the NATO ranks this year, while the civilian death toll soars ever higher.

Now that NATO is considering its future, it is more important than ever that it learns from its mistakes in Afghanistan. Deprived of its former enemy, the Alliance, like any restructuring organization, is of course looking for a new conscious objective. And new threats have of course emerged, which pose security risks to Alliance members: maritime piracy, digital sabotage, and, obviously, terrorism — to name a few. However, territory defense must continue to be NATO’s essential mission. And it’s expected to be, at least in theory. NATO must not justify reaching beyond its Euro-Atlantic sphere “if necessary” with the claim of “protecting its interests”— not if it will lead to new follies of war. Especially not wars that are easily begun, but from which no one knows how to withdraw.