We Must Go Further

The ratification of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), signed in April by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, is a long-awaited event, the result of a tenacious struggle. Even just a few weeks ago, the fate of the treaty seemed to hang by a thread.

But today we can talk about a serious step forward for the U.S. and Russia. Judging by a report on a telephone conversation between the two presidents, they are optimistically looking at the prospect of the two countries having a partnership in various areas.

In the finishing stage, President Obama put his authority and political capital on the line in order to achieve ratification of the treaty. It is good that there was a sufficient number of Republicans in the American Senate who put the real security interests of their country and the world higher than partisan interests.

Opponents of the treaty did not have convincing arguments, and it is for that reason that the number of its proponents grew steadily. I think that the weighty words of former President George H. W. Bush and Secretaries of State George Shultz, James Baker and Henry Kissinger played their role. The veteran Republicans displayed wisdom and responsibility in supporting the Democratic president. This is an important precedent for the future.

There were costs involved. Striving for ratification of the treaty, Barack Obama made substantial concessions to the military industrial establishment. The president promised to allocate tens of billions of dollars in upcoming years with the goal of modernizing the U.S. nuclear complex, which is hardly compatible with the move toward a world without nuclear weapons.

The issue of missile defense remains a potentially thorny one. Over the course of the debate, many senators cast doubt on wording about the interconnection of defensive and offensive tools that was carried over from the first START treaty, signed in 1991, to the new treaty. Others tried to disrupt ratification, attaching the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and even conventional weapons to the treaty.

It is very important that these attacks by opponents of the treaty were defeated. At the same time, we need to understand that all of these issues must be discussed. We need to come to an agreement about missile defense. Difficult negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons lie ahead, as well as the search for a realistic agreement on the issue of conventional weapons in Europe. The near future will show whether we are dealing with a matter of rhetoric, doublespeak and masking the ambition for military dominance, or a real readiness to agree on a reduction of the military burden.

I believe that the highest priority, demanding the most immediate decision, is the issue of ratifying a treaty on a complete ban of nuclear testing. It is absolutely necessary, primarily in the interests of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, to break out of the deadlock that has already bogged down this most important matter for more than 10 years.

I remember how difficult movement in that direction was during the second half of the 1980s. We then announced a unilateral moratorium on conducting testing, but the U.S. continued the testing, and we had to respond.

But at the same time we maintained our fundamental position: It is essential to have a complete prohibition on nuclear testing under strict international control with the use of seismic methods and on-site inspections.

This position eventually prevailed, and in 1996 the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was signed. It differs from other treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the particular requirements necessary for it to go into effect; the treaty needed to be signed and ratified by all 44 countries that fit into the category of “possessors of nuclear technology.”

Today 35 countries have done that, including three members of the “nuclear club” — Russia, France, and Great Britain. However, the list of “refusers” is formidable: the U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The last three did not even sign the treaty. Each of these countries has its own reasons, but the share of responsibility varies. The ratification process came to an abrupt halt after the U.S. Senate rejected the treaty in 1999. The excuse for the refusal was supposedly that the monitoring system was not adequately effective and that “technical supervision” of weapon conditions was required. But I think that the real reason was a desire to do a little more testing.

Nevertheless, in the 21st century only one country, North Korea, decided to conduct nuclear detonations. There was effectively a multilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The fact that testing is unacceptable to the international community and to the dominant majority of people is becoming more and more obvious. Meanwhile, the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization created an effective inspection system. 250 monitoring stations (80 percent of the anticipated number) are already functioning. The inspection system has demonstrated its competence by detecting relatively small-scale North Korean nuclear detonations.

So should we maybe leave everything as it is and be content with a de facto moratorium? No, because the obligations, not recognized and not secured legally, can easily be violated. And if this happens, then it will be possible to shoot down any attempts to influence countries that have now become a “headache” for the U.S., and not only for them. This is what the American senators should be pondering. As George Shultz recently said, “[Republicans] might have been right voting against it some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, based on these new facts.”

An even bigger mistake would be to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. will not derive any kind of military or political benefit from it. A decision on ratifying the treaty would be politically effective. I can say with certainty that the majority of countries that are refusing to do so at this point would change their position after a positive decision by the U.S. Senate. Indeed, the “problem” countries, as experience shows, would not want to be perpetual outcasts, and there would be an opportunity for dialogue with them. But it would turn out to be effective only in the case of America abandoning its hypocritical position: You are not allowed to do it, but we can if we want to. The senators must look at the situation realistically and seriously. Political games are not needed here. Having taken one firm step, we must go further.

And there is one more important argument. Universally ratifying and bringing into effect the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will become an important step in the formation of a true global community of governments, a community of joint responsibility for future humanity not only in the realm of security but in all other areas also. And this, as the global economic crisis showed, is needed today as never before.