America and China’s Korean Peninsula Calculus

The world’s eyes are now on Washington, D.C., where the leaders of the “G2”, the U.S. and China, will meet with great fanfare. Chinese President Hu Jintao left for America on Jan. 18. Each spoken word and nuanced gesture of President Hu and President Obama will be scrutinized by the rest of the world.

This is particularly true in Korea, as matters of the Korean peninsula — including the thorny issue of North Korean nuclear capacity — will be at the core of the U.S.-China summit. On the table for discussion are the overall security of the Korean peninsula and the question of whether to resume the six-party talks. The tense diplomacy between the two Koreas may have recently been launched after taking into account the implications of this meeting between the Chinese and American leaders. North Korea continues to have recourse to its “talk offensive”, demanding unconditional talks with the South. The South is nonetheless sticking to its hard-line policy toward the North. There seems to be no willingness to talk with the North before it meets certain conditions, including formally apologizing for sinking the Cheonan and firing at Yeonpyeong Island.

The U.S. and China may fancy themselves as representatives of the opposing sides of the Korean peninsula. This is not far from the truth. The U.S. actively supports the South Korean position and shares with its ally many of its views on North Korean policies. While China is more secretive on its stance, its unwillingness to disclose is akin to standing by the North Korean position. The Chinese call to resume the six-party talks is demonstrative of this support for North Korea. China and North Korea were the first to suggest reopening the six-party talks. The U.S. and South Korea demand that, as part of the agreement to resume such talks, certain conditions be fully satisfied in advance.

A particularly divisive matter among the four countries is North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S. wants this issue to be discussed at the UN Security Council or resolved in an agreement as a condition to the six-party talks. In contrast, China seems to want to discuss all Korean issues through the six-party talks alone. These two positions very accurately project the differing stances of the two Koreas.

The G2 presidents will not arrive at a working agreement through consideration of South and North Korean opinions alone. These prominent world leaders in the international community must address the issues of the Korean peninsula as the G2. Negotiations on the matter will certainly be shaped by what each country deems to be in its advantage. Of course, the U.S. and China view South Korea and North Korea, respectively, as very important allies from geopolitical and diplomatic points of view. It would nonetheless be impossible for either country to come to an agreement without guaranteeing its own most basic interests. Diplomacy is the art of securing national interests to the greatest degree possible. To the U.S. and China, the Korean peninsula is ultimately just an ever-changing variable.

The Chinese and American media alike have pinpointed bilateral cooperation and general improvement of U.S.-Sino relations as the two most important aspects of the upcoming meeting. It wouldn’t be wrong to think that each agreed point between the two countries is based on thorough mutual understanding. However, this raises the concern that the two Koreas could actually just be outsiders looking in at those who will decide the fate of their peninsula. A source in Beijing claims that there is less and less of what Korea can do to influence the six-party talks or peninsula politics, and that U.S.-Sino cooperation is an increasingly important factor.

In 2005, Song Minsoon — then the Korean Deputy Minister for Political Affairs and Chief Negotiator to the six-party talks — played the “Korean role” with confidence, helping facilitate the negotiations that led to the Joint Statement of Sept. 19. Christopher Hill and Wu Dawei, heads of the American and Chinese delegations to the six-party talks, both relied heavily on Song at the time. When the talks drew to an impasse due to North Korean greed, Vice Minister Wu had to look to Deputy Minister Song for assistance in reasoning with Kim Kye Gwan, the Vice Minister of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That Song and Kim were able to communicate directly greatly facilitated the progress of the talks.

Due to incidents like the Yeonpyeong island attacks, the two Koreas are unable to pull out of a deep mutual distrust. But the resolution of political problems on the Korean peninsula cannot be left exclusively to American and Chinese calculations. The North and South need to hold an honest discussion and re-engage as insiders at the heart of the peninsula’s political debate.