Brotherhood of Convenience

The level of expedience of Western political leaders shouldn’t be overstated.

The West apparently is no longer ready to promote and defend its values or its own economic and political ascendancy at the expense of confrontation with authoritarian regimes like China or Russia.

The series of recent events in the relationship between the West and the post-Soviet states suggests that pragmatism in Western and, more prominently, European politics has prevailed over idealism yet again, and economic and geopolitical interests have prevailed over declared principles.

The sensational deal between BP and “Rosneft” has authorized, de facto, taking property from YUKOS Oil Company, and thus has crossed out all the routine censure with which the West responds to the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev case. Dissatisfaction in Europe with the recent elections, followed by the twist of repressions against the opposition, has taken the usual turn: The E.U. threatens to forbid Alexander Lukashenko and his close circle to enter member countries and to freeze his assets abroad (at the same time, the president of Belorussia hasn’t been observed to show any intention of moving out of Europe and, somehow, nothing has been heard about his E.U. bank accounts either). At last, a couple of days ago in Brussels, E.U. and NATO leadership welcomed, with all their grandeur, the leader of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, the man whose harsh treatment of demonstrators in Andizhan in 2005 had exceeded all the brutalities that have ever been committed by authorities against opposition in Moscow or Minsk.

“Love comes and goes, but you always need something to eat.” This rule is true regarding politics, as well. It would be absurd to demand, let’s say, from the U.S. a sudden escalation of the relationship with their number one trade partner, China, for the sake of the rights of oppressed Tibetans or the freedom of Liu Xiaobo, a dissident and Nobel laureate. As it has been long and well known, America’s business is business (“Delo Ameriki — biznes”), and yes, it’s not only America’s.

Yet, the level of expedience of Western political leaders shouldn’t be overstated. A long and complicated relationship exists between pragmatism and idealism, interests and ideals in politics. Among the most skilled and most cynical politicians of the nineteenth century were Talleyrand and Metternich; they were also, however strange it may be, men of principle. The former was unfaithful to a multitude of regimes ruling in his country, but never betrayed the interests of France. The latter, after creating a great many unions and coalitions, remained devoted to principles of conservatism and the balance of powers in Europe.

Any demands are realistic only if there are means to satisfy them. Otherwise, it is a question of defining positions: “I like what you do.” After that, everything depends on the other party, which can either agree with the demands made (“Good, I will do better next time”), or reject them in a more or less impolite form.

Sanctions in international politics, as a rule, play a role in such a “defined position.” They used to rarely lead to a political victory for the side that implemented them. On the contrary, there are plenty of ineffective sanctions; from the “continental blockade” Napoleon intended to use to strangle England 200 years ago, to a half-century old American embargo against Cuba.

There is another significant point. Basmanny-Khamovnichesky justice, Andijan machine guns or Tibetan rights: these are the subjects of contention about values the West and the East have had for many years (Russia is a special case; neither Russia nor the world agrees on whether Russia belongs to the West or the East). The West has made great strides on this issue: universal human rights and civil liberties are, at least formally, recognized all over the world and embodied not only in the Constitutions of France and the U.S., but also the Constitutions of China and Russia, or, for example, Congo.

In practice, it is a more complicated issue. The export of social values and political regimes based on them has turned out to be a complex and dangerous business. If democratization in Germany and Japan after military defeat, “under the canopy of friendly bayonets,” was eventually a success, a similar situation in Iraq, let alone Afghanistan, is far from being so cheerful. This process, where there was not such a strong external factor, for example in Turkey or Mexico, was even more difficult and slow. Possibly, the former USSR countries should draw their attention to their experience and try to understand what their own further development can be.

The point is not only about some cultural incompatibility of the West and a relative East, and a rejection of ideals and institutes externally imposed. An alternative choice of ours, “solid ground” values, is needed for such a rejection, but they are not always available. In particular, post-Soviet authoritative regimes do not have more or less intelligible values at all. All their grounding and patriotism ultimately add up to a rehashing of the phrase once said by Alexander I of Russia in order to justify his rejection of liberal reforms: “What is good for other countries and thought of to be as necessary there, can’t be thought of as necessary for Russia yet.”* But this is quite enough for now to retain power and even enjoy popularity quite widely. The case is not that simple; people are anxious for the success of others; they imitate and follow leaders who are confident in themselves and their ideas. The West has noticeably lost its political drive in recent years, and the current political crisis has reminded the world that, in terms of economic well-being, even the most developed countries may get into serious trouble.

The most striking changes are evident in the U.S. politics of the ’90s. The Clinton era was the era of American self-confidence and unquestionable world dominance. But in circumstances of growing crisis, when Bush Junior declared the chaotic “crusade” against terrorism and the universal democratic values failed to succeed, they changed dramatically to being “zeroes.” Under the Obama administration, the U.S. is undergoing a period of deep thinking, dealing with domestic issues and trying, without necessity, not to worsen the external conflicts inherited from the previous era.

The West has unlikely lost confidence in its values, and there are no obvious reasons for this. But it is no longer ready to promote and defend these values, including its very own economic and political influence, or ideals and interests that are tightly intertwined in politics, at the expense of confrontation with authoritarian regimes in Russia or China. The times of “color revolutions” are long gone, and have taken away hope for another wave of democratization like that in Eastern Europe in 1989.

The hopes the Western leaders, along with a large number of people in countries like Ukraine, cherished for democratization have clearly been defeated. The present politics of the West toward its authoritarian partners and rivals appears to be coming to the aforementioned “defined position” on the issue of human rights, along with the strengthening of business partnerships. You can call it either cynicism or realism. In the end, the West is aware enough that it is dealing with people playing by different rules and is not going to be friendly with them until the point of absolute self-disregard (Berlusconi and Shroeder are exceptions, not the rules). The history of hardship of the former Moscow Mayor Luzhkov looking for refuge somewhere in Europe illustrates this quite well. Yury Mikhailovich and his relatives have invested a lot of assets in various objects in Austria, Latvia and the Czech Republic. Alas, the authorities of these countries are in no hurry to grant the Russian magnate-in-disgrace a residential permit.

As Machiavelli wrote, “studying characteristics of states, the following should be taken into consideration: the ability of a sovereign, if there is a need, to protect himself by the means available or if he needs to involve support from the outside.”* At present, the majority of authoritarian post-Soviet “sovereigns,” let alone China or Iran, appear to be completely capable of protecting their authority by means as harsh as they think necessary. This is exactly what the examples of Tehran in 2009 and Minsk in 2010 have shown. Every now and then, their internal political opponents ask for “protection from the outside,” demonstrating their own weakness and the lack of societal support. The Ukrainian “orange” revolution, as it was called in 2004, was stronger not because of the support from the West, but because it was able to fill the streets with thousands of people and frustrate falsification of the people’s will declaration results. But the following confusing defeat of the “orange” can be explained: it was not due to the refusal of support “from Europe” (not at all) but the disappointment of the majority of their own supporters.

However strange it is, realizing the fact that “help won’t come from abroad” may give hope to democracy activists in countries with an authoritative regime. Under these conditions, only an opposition possessing the qualities of true politicians, volition of power and the ability to involve a large number of compatriots can survive.