Cairo Has a Test for Obama

How the U.S. Administration Is Contriving to Cope with the Egypt Crisis

Looking from Moscow at how the political crisis in Egypt is developing and the attempts of the American administration to cope with them, you can tell that U.S. President Barack Obama is not in a very desirable position.

Irrespective of what the outcome of the Egyptian crisis will be, it is now becoming more obvious that the Obama administration is unlikely to escape serious foreign policy problems. It is clear: The fate of the U.S. relationship with the Islamic world and the perception of its role and capabilities in the system of international relations will depend on the way the Obama administration manages the political crisis in Egypt. It goes without saying that the fates of pro-American Arabic regimes in Jordan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are bound to the U.S.’s new role, let alone the fate of Israel.

For the two years of his presidency, Mr. Obama was often compared to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. His presidency was quite infamous, mainly due to his inability to manage the country’s economic problems and the failure of his administration to prevent the collapse of the Shah regime and the takeover of power by the anti-American Islamic radical group in Iran. As a result, he lost the election to the now-late Ronald Reagan and remained a one-term president. The similarity of the situation here is deepening because President Carter had chosen a cornerstone of his foreign policy — the concept of human rights protection — and demanded that his key ally, the Iranian Shah, should stop using violence, which had paralyzed his activity; thereby, he largely facilitated the takeover of power and the rule of Islamic radical groups in the Middle East. Now let’s have a look at the decisions of the current administration toward conflict resolution in Egypt.

The impression is that after several days of mass demonstrations in Cairo and other Egyptian cities that demand President Mubarak step down and statements from the Egyptian army representatives about neutrality, Washington decided that the days of Mubarak were over. Consequently, the Obama administration had seen no further necessity to support its ally, who had enjoyed this privilege for 30 years; it would be better to befriend the opposition camp, acting under slogans of democracy and political freedoms, with the hope of achieving a fast change of government in Egypt and having elections that would bring a new government of U.S.- and Israel-friendly politicians. Under the new leadership, Egypt would remain a reliable ally to the U.S. in helping to establish stability in the region and to fight international terrorism and Islamic radicalism. With this aim in mind, the Obama administration conditioned Mubarak to stop using violence and to continue to implement the formation of the new power through free and democratic elections in a peaceful way. The president and members of his administration were not satisfied with the statement made by Mubarak that he wouldn’t run for the next presidential election but would keep his power until the elections, which are to take place in September of this year. Mr. Obama and his Press Secretary Gibbs announced that the transition of power must happen immediately. The administration was backed up by Sen. John McCain, who stepped out with a peremptory speech about an immediate resignation of Mubarak, along with the transfer of power to the hands of “a caretaker administration that includes members of Egypt’s military, government, civil society, and pro-democracy opposition, which can lead the country to free, fair and internationally credible elections this year as part of a real transition to democracy.”

McCain’s statement had attracted the attention of politicians along with analysts, thanks to the U.S. media that had spread the word that the statement was made directly after the meeting with Mr. Obama at the White House and represents (nearly) the official position on the issue of the president himself. The political situation in Egypt and the course of its development suggests that the Obama administration, McCain-like politicians and a vast number of American newspaper, radio and television commentators have overreached themselves in their evaluations of the situation.

Mubarak did the opposite. Instead of stepping down, he had mobilized his followers, who organized mass demonstrations in support of the current president that were meant to show the Egyptian and international societies that he had the support of the majority in the country. The mass demonstrations of support/approval were supposed to convince the army and other agencies to remain loyal to their president. Witnesses of the clashes between the supporters and Mubarak’s opposition say the army did not try to stop Mubarak supporters from banishing the opposition from Tahrir Square. They also say the army was bored with these mass demonstrations and street fights and did not show agreement with the radical demands of an immediate resignation of the president and the regime change.

Therefore, if Mubarak manages to consolidate the majority of society to support him, to keep the loyalty of the army and other agencies by September, then he could stabilize the situation in the country by implementing a number of reforms and renewing the government that would be adequate to the needs and political realities of the country. This could result in a serious political defeat of the Obama administration, not only in the eyes of Egyptian society but in the whole of the Arabian world. Particularly, it would affect such countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia where the governments and political elite are reliable allies of the U.S. The governments and the elite of these countries would lose trust in the current U.S. administration, and they would more likely than not refuse the U.S. as a partner to rely on in the case of any political crisis.

And now let’s see what will happen if, under pressure from the internal and external forces, Mubarak has to immediately step down within days or even weeks. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman had recollected several times an old truth that, as a rule, social, economical and especially political transformations toward liberal democracy are possible under the condition of a strong power in the country. The power chooses the time, the sequence of actions, the allies that are needed to be mobilized and the rivals to neutralize. If the power is weak, as it is now in Egypt, and its legitimacy is under question because of the demands for radical reforms and a change of government that had been a key element of the regime — shouted by protestors in the streets and even the allies from the outside — under these conditions, radical political reforms may lead to the fall of state power. If the situation gets out of control, the country may descend into chaos with a possible threat of beginning a wide-ranging civil war.

A humane and generous request from Washington to the Egyptian authorities to stop the use of violence toward the protestors in the streets may have catastrophic consequences for the country. When the opposition, represented by the masses of protestors in the streets, is confident that authorities will not use violence, in this case they act according to the rules of a zero-sum game and do not make reasonable concessions or compromises. As the experience of Tsarist Russia shows, the king’s abdication and refusal to use force led to the fall of the state.

In the current conditions, there are no formal, institutionally organized political bodies outside the governing regime in Egypt. Civil society institutions are weak; there is no culture of horizontal relations when political and civil powers are equally ready to make concessions and compromises. In these circumstances, the immediate holding of free, democratic, competitive elections means a step toward the transfer of power to “the Muslim Brotherhood.” The experience of free elections in this region shows — as in the cases of Lebanon and the Palestinian autonomy — the power is taken over by parties like Hamas and Hezbollah that are more appropriate to the suffering and spirit of the streets. As for liberal democrats, they represent a minority in these countries.

Hereby, taking into account the Egyptian situation, there are three possible scenarios for the Obama administration. All of them may be disastrous. The first scenario is that in spite of the formal requirements from Washington, Mubarak will keep power, will hold elections in September himself and liberalize the regime. The second is if the crisis is short-lived, the army will preserve its moral authority as the savior of the fatherland and will establish a military dictatorship with uncertain consequences. In some specialists’ opinion, the Egyptian army is inexperienced and lacks the skill for the political governance of the country. The third scenario is that the crisis will continue, and under pressure from Washington and demonstrators, Mubarak resigns. More likely, chaos will invade the country. As a result of the elections, weak interim-government institutions are formed, represented by religious radicals from “the Muslim Brotherhood,” who — if chaos and instability persist, and the army remains neutral — establish monopoly on the power in the country and therefore create fundamentally new conditions not only for the Egyptian, Arabian and Islamic world but for the entire system of international relations.

Obviously, such a failure of international policy will inevitably have a negative effect and will sharply decrease the chance of the current U.S. president to win the 2012 elections.