The Islamic Party and Its Political Role under American Occupation

There is no doubt that the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 has constituted a devastating shake that has strongly upset all Iraqi society, particularly the political parties and movements with various persuasions. It has also constituted a painful test of the positions and behavior of these parties as compared with their slogans and the theoretical standpoints that they had long been chanting. The political parties and Islamic groups were not immune from this test. From the outset it was evident that a political equation consisting of two parties has taken shape in the Iraqi political arena. The latter did not compose of movements with necessarily harmonious orientations. Each party has consisted of forces and religious, secular and independent parties from the extreme right to the extreme left. However, the difference lies in the waypoint that each party has settled on.

Therefore, by the time the Iraqi people expressed this rejection of invasion, aggression and occupation, and that is through the emergence of a resistance, one that is militarily fierce, politically anti-occupation and civically reluctant. The spearhead of this movement was the Islamic resistance, which inflicted upon the occupational forces costly material and human causalities, too consistent in its conduct with its slogans and principles dictated by its backgrounds, either religious and legal or national and ethical. By this time we find that other forces, parties and other Islamist personalities have assumed positions in the opposite direction by engaging in the political project of the occupation. Some people erroneously believe that the U.S. occupation had already spontaneously begun setting out political path and that it was making random decisions after the military occupation. Yet, six years later, the researcher can be carefully monitoring phases and points that make up what looks like the traced curve that indicated a pre-planned scheme that was conducted prior to the effective military invasion, and continued afterwards. To shed light on these phases and the parties may greatly help in understanding the positions of some forces, and later explains the speed of political alignments with or against the occupation and to siding with this side or the other. Upon auditing documents belonging to the so-called “Iraqi opposition,” you can classify the phases it passed through: whereby the first one was characterized by opposition to the former national political system of Iraq. This is an evident issue in politics and differing views about the nature of governance (especially as the slogans of the so-called Iraqi opposition at this stage did not go beyond the logo claiming regime change). They also did not directly or indirectly tackle projects of Iraq’s division either through federalism or through conveying the principle of sectarian and ethnic quota as a ruling system.

More importantly, they did not expose themselves to Iraq’s Arab identity or to cooperation with the United States as an occupying power to help them invade and completely destroy Iraq. However, the history of this opposition has marked a second phase and has made a distinction between the positions of political and religious forces. On one side, figures opposed to the regime, but at the same time reluctant to cooperate with the U.S.-British occupation. On the other hand, forces that cooperated early with the “infidel enemy” and the “Great Satan” and the “imperialist enemy” and embarked on supervising these conferences, under the so-called United States’ Ambassador to the Iraqi opposition, Zalmay Khalil Zada, who personally oversaw the conferences of the “opposition,” which planned to the post invasion period and to dealing with the occupation of Iraq as war spoil to escape with. At the London and Salah Al-Din conferences, prior to the occupation, new terms had been observed for the first time such as federalism, lack of Iraq’s Arab identity and the maltreatment of the Shiite majority. These terms were not common in all the literature of the early opposition; hence, we conclude that the prior approval and signature by the parties taking part in these conferences, including the Islamic party, had come into effect before the occupation, and therefore it is not a coincidence that the heroes and the crew of the phases that immediately followed the post-occupation come to be the same parties as those before the occupation and not, as some claim, that they had striven to enter the political process “to pay the lesser of two evils,” but knowingly and with premeditation and planning of the major phases following the occupation.

Hundreds of texts in the Holy Qur’aan and the Immaculate Sunnah do confirm a unique meaning and a unique rule that applies to the description of the invasion launched by the United States on Iraq: the obligation of jihad, the outlawing of surrender to the enemy, of retreating on a Conquering Day, of betrayal of the nation, of conniving with the enemy, of (legitimizing) the occupation of Muslim lands, of granting trusteeship to the infidels over Muslims, of granting protectorship to unbelievers over Muslims, of seeking assistance from polytheists against Muslims and of enabling the unbelievers to have custody over the faithful. Such is the quintessence and the abundant compendium, which has been derived from the views of all schools of Islamic jurisprudence, without exception, extracted by the highest ranking scholars in the Islamic world from the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The rest of the rule unanimously states that this is as an advisory opinion by the scholars of Islam. It has been stated in the encyclopedia of fiqh: “If the infidels usurp a spot of the Dar al-Islam, Jihad, then, becomes the duty of all inhabitants of the usurped area, be they men, women, young, old, healthy or sick. If the people of the township fail to push the enemy back from the House of Islam, Jihad becomes the duty of the inhabitants of the township immediately surrounding the that in the house of Islam, and so on, so that it becomes the duty of all Muslims. It is not permissible to allow non-Muslims to conquer Dar al-Islam, and all Muslims transgress if they leave others seize anything from the House of Islam.” First, the Governing Council phase of July 13, 2003: the Governing Council was constituted as the first practical example of the principle of sectarian quota and as a grave unprecedented event never witnessed in the political history of Iraq; dividing Iraq into representative ratios according to the sect, race or creed. This principle became a rule that applied later all the joints of political and government action and applied even to the method of forming the government forces and security.

The Governing Council, which Was Founded by the Civil Governor of the Occupation

Paul Bremer, inaugurated its first session on September 4, 2003, the day of the fall of Baghdad, which is a national holiday in Iraq. The Islamic Party introduced itself through its acknowledgement of the Secretary General as a representative of a key category of Iraqi society, and its members waived, in accordance with this, their rights due to prior agreements between the American civil ruler and heads of the two biggest political blocs, one racist and the other sectarian. The two blocs cooperated with the occupation in as much as these agreements stipulated that the two blocs obtained 80 percent of the seats in the Governing Council. Referring to this point in his memoirs, Bremer mentions that he had to complete “his play” through the inoculation of the rest of the Council with some marginal and poor representatives of Sunnah, communists, women, Alcald and Assyrian representatives to complete the remaining 20 percent.

Second, the Constitution passing phase, October 15, 2005: If the participation in the formation of the Governing Council in July 2003 had constituted the first step and a politically unprecedented event in the division of a unified Iraq on the basis of sectarian and ethnic lines as a prelude to a century of discord and strife, then the participation in enacting and passing the so-called “Permanent Constitution” represents the most dangerous political move. It represents a continuous occupation, but by indirect means. This constitution has legalized and legitimized the principle of sectarian and ethnic quota, and caused Iraq’s Arabism mentioned in the preamble to be charged with hatred and a spirit of revenge. This constitution that partitioned sovereignty, independence and wealth, and legitimized the division of Iraq through the adoption of the principle of federalism is turning Iraq into cantons rivaling for power and wealth. Before the referendum on the constitution on October 15, 2005, most of the forces, personalities and national parties opposed to the occupation agreed to boycott it because it harmed the interests of the Iraqi people and had been introduced by the American occupation. It has been tailored to serve the narrow interests of the occupation and the cooperating parties that had nothing to do with the interests of the Iraqi people. An extensive meeting held for this purpose included representatives of the Islamic Party, whose representatives almost refused to participate in the referendum on the constitution through “the biggest ‘no’ to the constitution,” which is the slogan that the party’s media campaign used —which rejects the constitution in Baghdad and the provinces. These measures swayed those involved towards vivid popular rejection of the referendum on this destructive constitution, or at least to a large part of society not giving its consent. This would cause it to go tumbling out of legitimacy, even if the rest do give their consent, because the constitution class differs from the elections. Therefore legitimacy lies in its approval by the whole nation.

The Islamic party’s declaration of approval of the constitution, less than forty-eight hours before the referendum, constituted a great shock and unexpected blow which caused dissent and confusion among the people. This was especially surprising because the president of the Islamic party declared as of October 12, 2005 that he had obtained “a promise” to amend the constitution within four months after the referendum; however, here four years have passed and not even one character of the sectarian, ethnic and fragmenting constitution has been amended.

Three, the Sahawat Support Phase, 2006 – 2007: a combination of several factors lies behind the emergence of the Sahawat phenomenon; and here it is important to note that this phenomenon is tantamount to a U.S. patent in terms of design and manufacture. It is a social phenomenon that been employed for political and military purposes. The Islamic party’s support of the Sahawat phenomenon is one the main reasons behind the evolution of the occupation as an effective tool to lay siege to the Iraqi resistance factions and reduce the area of work and lower their operation rates. The danger of the contribution of the Islamic party lies in, besides other factors, the maturing of the Sahawat phenomenon and a breach of the balance of power in favor of the occupation, which tottered and collapsed in 2006 and 2007. During this time, the U.S. Army recorded 180 resistance operations a day (qualified important and violent). The party adopted the most serious role in this phenomenon, namely, theorizing and educating in order to shift the conflict from the main enemy, personified by the occupation forces, to another secondary enemy representing one of the repercussions of the occupation. This is Iran, which prepared the legitimate ground, at least psychologically, to many of the tribal forces. Unfortunately, to some the image has caused them to take up weapons and take part in some skirmishes with the resistance factions to work hand in hand with the occupying forces. Funds played a major role in inducing them into the trap of the occupation, which abandoned them as soon as their availability to cooperate expired.

Four, the security agreement passing phase of November 17, 2008: In the midst of the tremendous human and material casualties incurred by the United States since 2003 with the war of attrition waged by the Iraqi armed Islamic and national resistance factions, all the U.S. occupation had to do was to think of withdrawal, or at least to schedule it along with maintaining a minimum of interests and objectives for which the war was mounted. For the purpose of withdrawing, the occupation designed the Strategic Framework Agreement, which legally speaking, turned the occupation from the status of coercion and aggression under international law, taking into consideration the United States and Britain as occupying powers in 2003, into being accordance with resolution 1483. The invading forces and hundreds of thousands of mercenaries turned, through this agreement to “friendly” forces, and their presence was at the legitimate request of the Iraqi people suggesting that the convention did not change anything as to the brutality of the occupation, including the arrest and killing of Iraqis and the continued violation of the sovereignty and the independence of Iraq. The timing of the occupation is subject to the desire of the occupation itself and of those who tied their fate to the occupation. The most serious paragraph in this agreement is the Iraqi government’s relinquishment of the Iraqi people’s right to claim material and moral compensation for the millions of Iraqi martyrs, prisoners and displaced persons in addition to stealing the wealth of Iraq and relieving the American war criminals from legal accountability.

Upon submitting the Convention to be ratified by the so-called Iraqi parliament, it was evident that the refusal to pass it would almost be unanimous because of its gravity. It was expected that the Kurdish parties would secede. Immediately afterwards, the Supreme Council (the Badr Organization) changed its position after Iran had forged a deal with the United States; however, most of the blocks maintained their rejection of the bargain, and as usual the relief came at the hands of the Islamic Party and the Accordance Front that it led. The front (as the third constituent of the principle of quotas) agreed on the Convention in a way which reflects the complete disregard for the feelings of the Iraqi people for the benefit of the American occupation and the same way in which the infamous Constitution was passed, wherein the Islamic Party claimed its approval to be conditioned to a “political reform” document and a referendum.

Five, the policy of confusion and deal conclusion: You cannot tackle many of the minor phases, which strikes puzzle and doubt into the researcher concerning their purport. They have exceeded the most pragmatic and narrowest self-interested Western parties as to their volatility and contradictory agenda to stay in power. They keep on switching from a “tripartite Alliance” in Dukan with separatist parties to a ‘’Quintuple Alliance,” affirming the principle of sectarian and ethnic quota allied with forces which were inextricably involved in shedding the blood of Iraqis, to effective contribution to the fight against Islamist forces and factions which stood in the opposite side resisting the occupation. They also eventually managed to publicly demand to include these forces and factions on the terrorism list and to attack their headquarters after attempts to clone them failed. Most of the political blocs in Maliki’s government in early 2007 decided to withdraw to protest against his control of power, and so 17 ministers withdrew from the government; that is to say more than half of the government ministers. The Accordance Front withdrew just like the rest of the blocks. They restricted the release of detainees and the amending of the constitution as a condition to rejoin the government, and by the time Maliki’s government was agonizing and clinically dead, the Accordance Front abruptly announced its return before all the other blocks, including blocks nearby al-Maliki as the Sadri, the Virtue, and other partisans. None of them explained such a return, especially as not even one of the demands that constituted the basis for the withdrawal was responded.

Six, what is the destiny of the Islamic Party? There is no doubt that the Islamic Party’s participation in the political process during six years was not fruitful. They were unable to implement any of the slogans they had raised: raising grievances about the category it represents, release of tens of thousands of prisoners and detainees, amending the constitution. Also, its volatile inconstancy constituted a sharp ambivalence between its principles as an Islamic party, its expediency and the self-interest guided behaviors of its leaders, particularly those coming from Europe and the West, who were influenced by its manners, and no longer differentiate between interests and principles. This has profoundly hurt its reputation as a party and that of some of its personalities of renowned background, history and roots. This has left a profound impact on his popularity and completely tumbled its credibility. The recent results of the party in the municipal elections well confirm this fact, whereby the Accordance Front, as a whole, including the Islamic Party, obtained no more than the total proportion of 7.2 percent, including 2 percent that was not due, but was added out of the other minor lists that did not get enough votes. Besides this, the number of seats obtained in the provinces supposed to be strongholds of the Islamic Party clearly illustrates that the reality and the fate of the Islamic Party no longer differs from that of its consort party in the quotas of the Supreme Council (the Badr Organization); as such, the Accordance Front obtained seven seats out of 55 in Baghdad, and six seats out of 29 in Anbar province, three seats only out of 37 in Nineveh, and to five seats out of 28 in the province of Salah al-Din. These indicators prepare the way for the following possible consequences as related to this party:

First, a move of most of the junior partisans of this party to other more credible and stable parties, especially after the next legislative elections, which will illustrate how it is popularly fragile. Second, the party’s resorting to continuously conclude more of the deals on the table and under the table, and making more concessions to the occupation and to sectarian and ethnic groups in return for maintaining a face-saving as well as its leaders in one form or another in power; For example, passing an oil law or the waiver of Kirkuk and giving up the cause of Mosul to the separatist parties in exchange for their support. Third, the party’s second line national leaders’ taking the lead and correcting the path and the party’s deviations in the previous phase and making an objective review based on the results of previous policies to prevent the disintegration of the party, or its dissolving. Fourth, return to the right path, repent to God and apologize to the Iraqi people for abandoning the entire political process which formed a continuation to the occupation, was conceived in its womb and in accordance with its terms and tightened its rules so that they could not be modified, and join the forces of resistance, at least the political one.

During the years of conflict, the United States has quite cleverly managed — which turned out to be a blessing in disguise — to overthrow two types of Islamist politicians. The first category is the non-nationalist Islamists or the submissive Islamists: those who follow in pursuit of power, authority and wealth. The second category to have been overthrown is the extremist and penitentiary Islamists. The sole hope remaining is the national and moderate Islamists, who take a middle course. It accepts the others and does not compromise under the pretext of maneuver and will not push try and damage smaller groups. This would lead to more harm than good, based on the interests of the Iraqi people manifested by obtained political, economic and military independence, and the unity of Iraqi land and people; basically, the rejection of the federal state project and the principle of quotas and the preservation of Iraq’s Arab Islamic identity. Even if the stability and the harmony of its conduct has been proven compatible with the slogans it raises, the road ahead is still long for the formulation of modern laws and equations consistent with the complexities of Iraq. Thus, the difficulties of plains begin where the mountain difficulties end.