An Ill-Timed Exercise
Published in Hankyoreh
(South Korea) on 15 February 2011
by (link to original)
(South Korea) on 15 February 2011
by (link to original)
Translated from
by Moctar Aboubacar.
Edited by Alexander Anderson.
The annual joint U.S.-South Korea "Foal Eagle" military training exercise, scheduled to begin at the end of this month, will strongly emphasize planning for any episode of "sudden change" in North Korea.
The term refers to a range of scenarios involving everything from a change of regime in Pyongyang or a civil war as the result of a coup d’état, to the proliferation beyond the country's borders of ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction.
They will also prepare for the taking of South Korean hostages, the mass flight of North Koreans into South Korea or a natural disaster. Significantly, none of the scenarios involve a North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone, but rather designate a series of internal factors in North Korea proper.
But the U.S. and South Korea must also train in preparation for a more direct military confrontation with North Korea. They must build up their response capabilities for limited conflicts, but also for all-out war and other outcomes. In this context, the focus on "sudden change" in the North Korean regime is well-founded.
However, a consensus first needs to be reached with regard to the nature of this possibility. "Sudden change" indicates, more than anything, an internal North Korean problem. As such, it is not unreasonable to suggest that North Korea must be the main actor in resolving any such incident.
Even should South Korea’s assistance be required, it should always be offered in the context of the North-South dialogue. Of course, depending on the issue, international support may also be considered. The goal should ultimately be to resolve and manage peacefully any incident that may arise.
Although there is a real risk that the military commands of both countries are risking all-out war through their exercises, they have continuously insisted that there is a need for adequate training and preparation for any "sudden change" in North Korea.
One must bear in mind, however, that the slightest incident may appear to the North as if South Korea and the U.S. are preparing to launch a preemptive attack. And any military response that North Korea makes as a result could entail reprisals from South Korea.
What is more, China may take these training exercises as confirmation that the U.S. is determined to attack North Korea. The U.S. and South Korea are not helping to stabilize the situation in the region, but rather are increasing its volatility.
Moreover, this is certainly not the ideal time for such an exercise. Each party with an interest in the Korean Peninsula standoff is constantly vying for greater influence, and each is using its own methods. So how will North Korea react to a call for a continuation of North-South talks on the one hand, and military preparations for "sudden change" on the other?
Not just North Korea, but also Russia, China and other concerned states will certainly regard the U.S. and South Korea with suspicion, and it is our hope that both countries carefully weigh their participation in these military exercises.
The term refers to a range of scenarios involving everything from a change of regime in Pyongyang or a civil war as the result of a coup d’état, to the proliferation beyond the country's borders of ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction.
They will also prepare for the taking of South Korean hostages, the mass flight of North Koreans into South Korea or a natural disaster. Significantly, none of the scenarios involve a North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone, but rather designate a series of internal factors in North Korea proper.
But the U.S. and South Korea must also train in preparation for a more direct military confrontation with North Korea. They must build up their response capabilities for limited conflicts, but also for all-out war and other outcomes. In this context, the focus on "sudden change" in the North Korean regime is well-founded.
However, a consensus first needs to be reached with regard to the nature of this possibility. "Sudden change" indicates, more than anything, an internal North Korean problem. As such, it is not unreasonable to suggest that North Korea must be the main actor in resolving any such incident.
Even should South Korea’s assistance be required, it should always be offered in the context of the North-South dialogue. Of course, depending on the issue, international support may also be considered. The goal should ultimately be to resolve and manage peacefully any incident that may arise.
Although there is a real risk that the military commands of both countries are risking all-out war through their exercises, they have continuously insisted that there is a need for adequate training and preparation for any "sudden change" in North Korea.
One must bear in mind, however, that the slightest incident may appear to the North as if South Korea and the U.S. are preparing to launch a preemptive attack. And any military response that North Korea makes as a result could entail reprisals from South Korea.
What is more, China may take these training exercises as confirmation that the U.S. is determined to attack North Korea. The U.S. and South Korea are not helping to stabilize the situation in the region, but rather are increasing its volatility.
Moreover, this is certainly not the ideal time for such an exercise. Each party with an interest in the Korean Peninsula standoff is constantly vying for greater influence, and each is using its own methods. So how will North Korea react to a call for a continuation of North-South talks on the one hand, and military preparations for "sudden change" on the other?
Not just North Korea, but also Russia, China and other concerned states will certainly regard the U.S. and South Korea with suspicion, and it is our hope that both countries carefully weigh their participation in these military exercises.