Sunnis’ Greatest Fear: Being Dumped by the United States

Since 1979 there has been a nightmare, feared by most of the United States’ Arab allies: being dumped by the Americans. From the Saudi kingdom to the Gulf principalities and the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, everyone remembers the fate of the Shah of Iran. After the prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, was overthrown in 1953, this autocrat was a cornerstone of the Soviet containment and of the “Great Oil Game” set up from Washington. One generation later, the shah was abandoned at the height of the campaign by an American administration that deemed him henceforth indefensible.

The authoritarian monarchies have been silent during the Tunisian revolutions and nervous about the turn of events in Egypt. They can only be more unsettled now by the successive statements issued by the United States, encouraging President Hosni Mubarak to respond quickly to the pressure from his streets.

Saudi Arabia dropped its traditional reserve on Thursday, Feb. 10, speaking out thunderously against “blatant interference” by certain foreign countries. From the Saudi dynasty’s perspective, the United States has been fueling the protests with their insistently worded messages. It seems inconceivable and unthinkable that a country should weaken its own ally thus — especially in a region where everything that negatively affects the Arab axis, any “softened” country (that is, close to the Western world) — only strengthens this Iranian neighbor. It has already been freed of the containment once predicted by Iraq at the beginning of the American invasion of 2003.

With Egypt frozen by its inner disputes for a while, this axis has lost one of its two driving forces. Even though its reach had been slightly diminished by its aging regime and its waning influence in Palestinian affairs, Egypt had, until now, conserved its best assets: a diplomatic method and know-how unrivaled throughout the region, and a strong emerging economy.

The other driving force of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, is not without its failures. Jordan has had its own troubles. In Morocco, the Saudi king recuperates from back operations performed in the United States in December 2010. This only further casts shadows on the already-fragile dynasty, confronted with rapidly repeating successions because of the advanced age of the king (86 years old), the Sultan prince and heir (83 years old), and the next in line of succession, Prince Nayef (77 years old).

Adding to this relative uncertainty (the dynasty has always known how to get along, to preserve the more essential Saud house) is the dysfunction of the Saudi State. The massive floods that hit the city of Jeddah on Jan. 26, about one year after the first fatal riverbanks overflowed, are a nice symbolic representation of the State’s deficiencies: The oil superpower hadn’t taken any preventative measures since last year. Saudi Arabia is a rich member of the G-20 and has a huge influence on the oil market, but its population is young, and it’s well-known that their poorly performing education system does not prepare them to contribute to the country’s economy, in spite of their king’s desire for a system overhaul.

The Saudi influence is disputed, as is Egypt’s. Even before the former Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, begged for Saudi Arabia’s hospitality on Jan. 14 — the country resigned itself to giving him a cold welcome — the kingdom had experienced a stinging failure with Lebanon. First, there was Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation (who had been one of the proteges, who then arranged to be naturalized in Saudi Arabia), then the nomination of a Sunni prime minister, placed willingly or unwillingly directly into Shiite Hezbollah circles. After a years-long rift, Riyadh reconciled with Damascus in 2009, in the hopes of gaining President Bachar Al-Assad’s support and stabilizing Lebanon. One year later, King Abdullah finally walked in the footsteps of Nicolas Sarkozy. In the end, it was to no avail.

As it is, the progress report that could force the major Sunni regimes of the Near Orient to take notice of the wave of revolutions sparked in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on Dec. 17, 2010, will only give greater cause for concern. They have already been deceived by America in its inability to manage any part of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and they are confused as to why Washington is paying attention to Tehran: They dread a reversal of alliances. These regimes are now questioning just how solid their ties are to the United States, as they are tested with demands for democracy, and more of it.

These countries have long subcontracted their security details to American troops stationed throughout the region, from Qatar to Bahrain. They also depend on equipment provided by the Pentagon. They know the switch that doles out military support to Egypt flipped in Washington, and they have seen its “off” position, from November 2009 to February 2010, during the Saudi intervention in the Yemenite rebellion on its borders. With all this to reflect upon, it can only be distressing.