Awe Instead of Shock

March is the month when progressive mankind wants to defend someone. In March 1999, the North Atlantic Alliance concluded it could not bear enormities of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Kosovo and humanitarian intervention was needed. The air campaign began, which lasted two and a half months and finished with the separation of the autonomous region from Serbia. In March 2003, the American administration concluded they could not delay resolution of the problem with Saddam Hussein. Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted seven and a half years and ended officially only in fall 2010, but it is still too premature to consider the issue solved.

The legal basis of both operations was rather shaky. As for Yugoslavia, NATO appealed to U.N. Security Council resolutions on observance of the humanitarian law norms during the settlement process in Kosovo. Still, no sanction on use of force was given. However, if in 1999 there was the debate on legitimacy of using force, four years later in Iraq there was nothing to argue; the invasion began contrary to protests of the majority of the states and without the U.N. Security Council approval. The attempts of Washington in fall 2002 and winter 2003 to get such approval came to nothing; in the face of Russia and France’s inevitable veto, the U.S. withdrew the issue on intervention from discussion at the Security Council meeting and set about acting independently, bypassing the U.N. as well as NATO, which was split by the issue of Iraq.

The debate started in March 2011 on the background of civil war, which concerns the military intervention to Libya, reminds what was happening on the threshold of the previous interventions. However, the lessons of the past were not lost — the tone of the discussion is quite different.

The very circumstances remind one of Yugoslavia in 1999. There is the odious leader, who is notorious at the international level, and therefore already guilty. There is the internal conflict, which has resulted in victims and refugees moving to neighbor countries. It is the refugee factor that urges on taking action: In winter 1999 the prosperous Europe was so frightened of tens of thousands of people escaping from clashes in Kosovo that it decided on radical actions just to stop that flow. The menace of influx of North Africans running away from cataclysms in their native land is the next nightmare of the Old World, where xenophobia grows.

The resemblance to Iraq in 2003 consists in the abundance of hydrocarbon resources and the influence they exert on world market conjuncture of raw materials. True, up to February of this year Gadhafi did not have problems with his foreign partners similar to those which Saddam Hussein had accumulated by the moment of invasion. The sins of the past (a brought-down airliner, small terror acts in other countries, development of weapons of mass destruction) were forgiven, and business with companies from many countries was growing.

The disturbances in Libya took everyone aback, so the external forces have to adjust on the move: If information and political preparation for the Iraq campaign lasted, as a matter of fact, more than 10 years and the last phase took more than half a year, now there are few weeks only.

If we abstract from difficulties every military campaign against a large state is entailed with, what is the potential benefit of the intervention into Libyan feuds?

First of all, it could be a proof of U.S. capacity as the world’s leading political and military power. Now many speak about American positions weakening in the Middle East, about the sunset of the American influence in this strategically important region. The successful overthrow of Gadhafi would make these conversations stop, at least for a while. All the more so as the leader of Jamahiriya has no friends: everyone turned their back on his regime, comprising the Muslim world and the neighbor countries. The key countries of the region are interested in strengthening America’s role as a regulator — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Jordan.

The intervention would allow the U.S. to take control of the oil industry of the African country with the largest oil reserves, which could calm markets. Finally, the situation stabilizing could stop the flow of refugees, whom Europe as well as all neighbor countries are frightened of. The situation throughout the Arabian East (already tense) will only aggravate owing to refugees’ influx. To proceed from these reasons, the military action would be expedient; however, certain circumstances and risks turn the scale.

After the Iraq experience, even in America (not to mention Europe), there are no persons who want to launch a military campaign without a clear and precise U.N. Security Council sanction. The American warlords and Pentagon officials, remembering they had to get out of the mess started by the half-baked decision of George W. Bush’s administration, now draw attention accurately but persistently to the complexity of the operation and importance of providing it with an irreproachable legal basis.

The approval of the U.N. Security Council can be theoretically obtained. Russia, to all appearances, does not intend to stand up for Gadhafi. China does not like to block on its own “extraneous” issues (which bear no relation to China itself). The Arabian countries can support the decision, just as in the 1990s they supported pressing measures on Saddam Hussein.

However, the sanction on use of force, i.e. intervention into inner affairs, is a thing of such gravity that protracted hesitations are guaranteed, but a result cannot be predetermined.

At the same time, the European allies, who have headed for the reduction of military expenditure, are not prone to spend much on the overthrow of the extravagant dictator. Also they are anxious about other things. One of the marked events of the second half of the 20th century was the Suez crisis, when in 1956 France and Great Britain endeavored to force Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to refuse to nationalize the Suez channel. The operation failed; that meant the end of influence of the former colonial empires in the Middle East and, by and large, in world politics.

A new military action may stir recollections of the colonial epoch in the Muslim world, which may undermine the European positions, especially economic ones, in this region of the world. All the more so as none of the local forces — neither in Libya nor beyond its bounds — spoke for the summons of foreign assistance. NATO’s involvement as an institute is practically excluded; there will be no unanimity on this issue due to, for example, Turkey. On the whole, the participation of the organization, which is headed by the person associated among the Muslim world with the Mohammed cartoon scandal and the refusal to apologize for it (Denmark’s ex-Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen), in the operation in the Middle East is politically counterproductive. The bottom line is: The military operation against Muammar Gadhafi’s regime is improbable. The potential risks and costs are high; readiness of the current U.S. administration to rush into battle applying “storm and onslaught” (in the modern version, “shock and awe”) is much less than its predecessors showed.

Most probably, the activities of the navy in the region are intended to increase psychological pressure on Tripoli; simultaneously diplomatic and informational steps will be taken to isolate it. Of course, this is provided the gallant colonel does not go for broke and commit acts (such as causing an irretrievable damage to oil industry infrastructure) which will untie hands of the external forces.