China Does Not Challenge U.S. Dominance but Only Needs Some Space to Stretch

The article [“China’s Military Space Surge”, Aerospace America, March 2011] points out that, between 2006 and 2009, China launched between three and five military missions per year. Since 2006 China has launched approximately 30 military-related satellites. There were fifteen launched in just 2010 alone, setting a new record, and for the first time, matching the United States.

In recent years, China’s military-related space missions have developed rapidly. Among these satellites, more than half are like “wolves in sheep skins,” becoming growing threats to U.S. Navy actions in the Pacific. The Indian Navy is worried too.

American analysts think that China has at least three or four different military satellite systems linked up into one network to support the “East Wind”-21D, an anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of 1500km. The missile is designed to force the group of U.S. aircraft carriers and large allied ships to be active only far away from North Korea — farther than the current location by hundreds of miles.

U.S. Pacific Commander Robert Willard said recently in Tokyo that China’s anti-ship ballistic missile has “undergone extensive testing” and has reached “initial operational capability.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said recently at Duke University that China’s space capabilities coupled with the development of ‘East Wind”-21D has already affected planning of future military operations in the Pacific. “I’m trying to get people to think about how do we use aircraft carriers in a world environment where other countries [China specifically] will have the capability, between their missile and satellite capabilities, to knock out a carrier.”

Perhaps to dispel the doubts of Americans, Rear Admiral Yang Yi of the Chinese Defense National Institute pointed out that the latest issue of the U.S. National Military Strategy Report reflects not only heightened awareness of Chinese military strategy but also tells of many positive aspects of bilateral relations. These aspects include seeking to establish a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive” relationship with China and welcoming China to take on a “responsible leadership role.” This is not only coated diplomacy but meets the true military strategic needs of the U.S. Army. This is because the U.S. is in the midst of dealing with both regional and global security issues and needs China as a partner and not as an opponent.

In discussing how to resolve the “security dilemma” that exists in Sino-U.S. military relations, Yang Yi emphasizes that one important method is to improve bilateral communication on the strategic level. China has to honestly explain to the U.S. that the People’s Liberation Army has neither the capability nor the intention to challenge U.S. dominance and military superiority in regional and global security. China has no strategic goals at all to pursue regional military hegemony. The modernization of the Chinese army has only one goal, which is to protect China’s security and development interests and at the same time to provide the international community with safe “public goods.” China has never, and will never, use military strength to bully the weak.

How should the rising Chinese army and the waning U.S. Army self-adjust?

Recently, Australia has also joined in the discussion and has focused on how to best support the U.S.’s military presence in the region.

However, Australian National University’s Professor Hugh White expressed some of his own views in view of implicit threats towards the U.S. expressed by some of China’s high-level military strategists on the issues of Taiwan and the South Sea. He warns that in East Asia, Washington should make room for China and not vigorously defend its long-term leadership position. This would be more in line with Canberra’s interests.