What Is the Cost?

Outcomes of the meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers, held in Paris on Tuesday, March 15, suggest that the times when invitations for Russia to participate in the then-G-7 summits only caused stinging comments from the Western media are now a thing of the past. Today, it is hard to believe that only a few years ago Western journalists competed in their attempts to sting Russia as painfully as possible, and that the most common definition of its role in this elite world club was as the fifth wheel of a coach.

Today, Russia’s place in the world has changed dramatically in comparison with the ’90s. Russia today is in fact a full member of the club of developed countries, although falling behind in formal characteristics such as economic power and maturity of democracy in the Western meaning of the term. However, current developments in global politics require the presence of Russia in the group of powerful countries. This is especially so in times of crisis or acute situations in which international life in the beginning of the 21st century has been particularly rich. So it’s not only that Russia is not stingy and participates in G-8 programs to aid poor nations. The world is changing in such a way that the need in collective decisions has sharply increased, for all their costs associated with clashes of the world’s leading players’ interests.

Today Russia’s foreign policy, one way or another, goes in line with G-8 policies. This includes our country’s participation in sanctions against Iran, as well as support of coalition efforts in Afghanistan, which involves the transit of military cargo through our territory. In addition, Russia has taken an unequivocal position with respect to the events in Libya, has signed and ratified the START treaty with the United States, and there is progress in cooperation with NATO. Of course, all this strengthens the authority of Russia in the G-8.

Moreover, the situation that is now emerging in North Africa and the Middle East is going to strengthen this authority even further. The U.S. influence in these regions, although retained, will clearly be weaker than it was, for instance, under the regime in Egypt, which has now been overthrown. Many predictions, including optimistic ones, are made on the development of the situation in North Africa and the Middle East. But it is likely that new governments there will have a strong Islamist, and therefore anti-American and anti-Western, spirit. It was for this particular reason that the foreign ministers of the G-8, securing themselves, have not endorsed delivering pinpoint air strikes on Libya.

Russia, in the wake of historical memory, can come back to these regions. Experts argue, for example, that the fate of Israel in the case of Islamist changes in North Africa and the Middle East will depend on Russia and the United States. The European Union needs merely oil and natural gas from these regions. The E.U., by and large, does not care who is in power there, whether or not the local population is starving, or whether people there have minimal rights. When choosing between oil and European values, Brussels and other reputable European capitals definitely bet on [their own] interests.

By the way, Russia’s role in the G-8 and in the world at large will now, of course, intensify. Russia not only has significant reserves of oil and natural gas, but is also stable. Meanwhile, no one can predict how long it will take North Africa to appease the situation, whereas the view that hydrocarbons will go up at this time is supported by many.