Arab Revolts and American Bases

The positioning of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, restricts the United States’ opportunities to put pressure on monarch Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to democratize the Persian Gulf kingdom.

30 warships, 30,000 sailors and base personnel numbering another several thousand: This is the makeup of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, whose operational base is in the Juffair district of Bahrain’s capital. There has been an American presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1940s, when the United States began using the base in Bahrain — at the time, a British protectorate. The 5th Fleet’s operations are many and varied: patrolling the Persian Gulf, the Arab Sea, the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean, conducting anti-piracy operations, protecting oil transport routes in the Gulf, and last but not least, forming a barrier to Iranian influence in the region.

The 5th Fleet is part of NAVCENT — United States Naval Forces Central Command — whose headquarters is also in Bahrain. For the right to maintain the military base in Bahrain, the U.S. pays Bahrain $6.7 million annually, plus military equipment (worth $18 million in 2010), as well as security guarantees. After more than 60 years, the American presence in the Gulf state has become normalized for the locals.

Anti-Government Protests, Drenched in Blood

On Feb. 14, the revolts that resounded across Egypt and Tunisia arrived in Bahrain. Thousands of people assembled in Pearl Square — the center of Manama — to protest against the authoritarian regime of King Al Khalifa. For two days security forces allowed the demonstrations to continue, maintaining a passive attitude. But on the third day they intervened ruthlessly, shooting at demonstrators; five people died, and hundreds were injured. Several days later, the king apologized for the excessive use of force and promised to pave the way for democratic reforms, but the demonstrations continued, with the protesters demanding his abdication. The situation seemed to deteriorate, so that on March 15, troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, at the request of the king, entered Bahrain with over 1,000 soldiers, 500 police officers and 100 armored vehicles, putting an end to the street protests. Al Khalifa declared a state of emergency for three months and imposed martial law.

The Americans’ Embarrassed Silence

During this entire time, American officials preferred to keep an embarrassed silence about the events in Bahrain — silence occasionally interrupted by the State Department’s usual appeals for calm. Some rumors say that the United States would have green-lighted the Saudi military intervention. Although the Americans deny this — an official stated that the U.S. was informed of, but not consulted about, the decision to intervene — few believe that such a maneuver could have taken place without Washington’s involvement.

The silence of the American administration shows that the United States continues to prefer, at least in Bahrain, a stable leadership even if undemocratic, to the possibility of major change with uncertain results. It also must be taken into account that the power is in the hands of the Sunni minority, and the Shiite population (about 60 to 70 percent of Bahrain’s total population) is underrepresented in the political arena. This explains the American fear that in the case of a successful Shiite revolt, a leadership chosen democratically in Bahrain could, under the influence of the Shiite regime in Iran, adopt an anti-American course and even shut down the important American naval base. In this case, political realism seems to have prevailed, in Washington, over idealism.